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# **PLACEMENT OF BREAKAWAY LIGHT POLES LOCATED DIRECTLY BEHIND MIDWEST GUARDRAIL SYSTEM (MGS)**

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16. Abstract

 Light poles are commonly installed along highways to provide proper illumination in critical areas. When placing utility poles in close proximity to guardrail, the poles may affect the guardrail's ability to safely contain and redirect vehicles by creating unwanted stiffening or hinging of the barrier system around the pole. The pole may also present a snag obstacle to impacting vehicles and induce vehicle instabilities. In this study, the lateral offset between the face of the light pole and the back of the post was evaluated. The minimum safe lateral offset was determined to be 20 in. (508 mm) through crash testing and computer simulation with non-linear finite element analysis. Two crash tests were conducted according to the American Association of State Highway Transportation Officials (AASHTO) *Manual for Assessing Safety Hardware* (MASH) Test Level 3 (TL-3) impact safety criteria. In test no. ILT-1, a 5,000-lb (2,268-kg) pickup truck impacted the combination Midwest Guardrail System (MGS) laterally offset 20 in. (508 mm) in front of a luminaire pole at a speed of 62.6 mph (100.7 km/h) and an angle of 25.2 degrees. In test no. ILT-1, the pickup truck was captured and safely redirected while impacting the luminaire pole and disengaging it at base. In test no. ILT-2, a 2,420-lb (1,098-kg) small car impacted the MGS laterally offset 20 in. (508 mm) in front of a luminaire pole at a speed of 62.7 mph (100.9 km/h) and an angle 24.8 degrees. In test no. ILT-2, the car was safely contained and redirected while minimally contacting the luminaire pole. The MGS provided acceptable safety performance under MASH TL-3 when critically impacted by a pickup truck and a small car. Thus, a minimum lateral offset of 20 in. (508 mm) between the back of the post and front face of the breakaway pole was sufficient to assure a safe performance of the MGS during vehicle impacts without undesired interaction with the pole. Accordingly, guidance was provided for safe pole placement behind the MGS.



#### **DISCLAIMER STATEMENT**

<span id="page-2-0"></span>This report was completed with funding from the Illinois Tollway. The contents of this report reflect the views and opinions of the authors who are responsible for the facts and the accuracy of the data presented herein. The contents do not necessarily reflect the official views or policies of the Illinois Tollway, the Illinois Department of Transportation, or the Federal Highway Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation. This report does not constitute a standard, specification, regulation, product endorsement, or an endorsement of manufacturers.

#### **UNCERTAINTY OF MEASUREMENT STATEMENT**

<span id="page-2-1"></span>The Midwest Roadside Safety Facility (MwRSF) has determined the uncertainty of measurements for several parameters involved in standard full-scale crash testing and non-standard testing of roadside safety features. Information regarding the uncertainty of measurements for critical parameters is available upon request by the sponsor and the Federal Highway Administration.

#### **INDEPENDENT APPROVING AUTHORITY**

<span id="page-2-2"></span>The Independent Approving Authority (IAA) for the data contained herein was Mr. Scott Rosenbaugh, Research Engineer.

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# **TABLE OF CONTENTS**

<span id="page-4-0"></span>





# **LIST OF FIGURES**

<span id="page-7-0"></span>













# **LIST OF TABLES**

<span id="page-14-0"></span>

## **1 INTRODUCTION**

#### <span id="page-15-1"></span><span id="page-15-0"></span>**1.1 Problem Statement**

Obstacles, including light poles, typically should not be placed within the working width of a guardrail system. There are many instances where it is desirable to install light poles directly behind W-beam guardrail in order to provide adequate illumination along roadways. However, there are several concerns with placing light poles in close proximity to guardrail that may affect its ability to safely contain and redirect vehicles. First, interaction between a deflected guardrail system and a pole may create stiffening or hinging of the barrier system about the pole, which may cause pocketing and increased loading to the guardrail system. Second, impacting vehicles may snag on the pole, which could increase vehicle decelerations and instabilities. While the use of breakaway light poles may mitigate these concerns to some degree, the interaction between a guardrail system and a closely-positioned light pole requires further investigation.

The Illinois Tollway and the Illinois Department of Transportation have been using the Midwest Guardrail System (MGS) as their standard W-beam guardrail system for 10 years. The MGS has a 31-in. (787-mm) top rail mounting height, 75-in. (1,905-mm) post spacing, W6x9 steel posts, 12-in. (305-mm) blockout depth, and midspan rail splices. The MGS has been successfully full-scale crash tested with a 2,425-lb (1,100-kg) small car (designated 1100C) and a 5,000-lb (2,268-kg) pickup truck (designated 2270P) according to the *Manual for Assessing Safety Hardware* (MASH) Test Level 3 (TL-3) criteria [\[1](#page-190-1)[-3\]](#page-190-2).

The current Illinois Tollway standard denotes pole placement no closer to the guardrail post than 28 in. (711 mm) for the standard 6-ft 3-in. (1,905-mm) post spacing MGS, 23 in. (584 mm) for the half-post spacing MGS, and 14 in. (356 mm) for the quarter-post spacing MGS. The barrier clearance distance is defined as the perpendicular distance from a line connecting the back of guardrail posts to the near face of an obstacle, as shown in [Figure 1.](#page-15-2)



<span id="page-15-2"></span>Figure 1. Barrier Clearance Distance

In order to accommodate poles positioned closer than the current minimum barrier clearance distance, an investigation should be conducted to determine safe placement of the light pole with respect to the guardrail system.

#### <span id="page-16-0"></span>**1.2 Research Objective**

The objectives of this research project were to determine the minimum lateral offset of the light pole with respect to the standard guardrail system with 6 ft  $-$  3 in. (1.9 m) post spacing and develop guidance for the safe placement of the Illinois Tollway standard light pole behind the MGS. The guardrail offset away from the light pole was to be tested and evaluated according to the Test Level 3 (TL-3) safety performance criteria in the *Manual for Assessing Safety Hardware* (MASH) [\[3\]](#page-190-2).

## <span id="page-16-1"></span>**1.3 Scope**

The research objectives were achieved through the completion of several tasks in two phases. In phase I, a literature review was performed on previous testing of W-beam guardrail systems (including MGS) with and without poles to evaluate dynamic deflections, working widths, deflected barrier lengths, as well as vehicle pocketing and snagging risks. In addition, a review was performed on relevant breakaway light pole systems specified by the Illinois Tollway.

Second, a combination of LS-DYNA computer simulation [\[4\]](#page-190-3), engineering analysis, and experience with MGS crash testing was utilized to select a minimum lateral pole offset for the MGS system with the standard post spacing as well as determine the critical impact points (CIPs) for full-scale crash testing with 2270P and 1100C vehicles.

In phase II, two full-scale crash tests were performed on the MGS with nearby light poles, as recommended in phase I. The first crash test utilized a 5,000-lb (2,268-kg) pickup truck impacting the MGS with pole at a speed of 62.1 mph (100 km/h) and an angle of 25 degrees. In the second crash test, a 2,425-lb (1,100-kg) small car impacted the MGS with pole at a speed of 62.1 mph (100 km/h) and an angle of 25 degrees.

Following the full-scale crash testing, the safety performance of the MGS with a minimum lateral offset away from a pole was evaluated. Implementation guidance was provided regarding the safety performance of the MGS with a nearby Illinois Tollway light pole. A summary report of the research project with respect to the as-tested light pole and the barrier combination was provided.

#### **2 LITERATURE REVIEW**

#### <span id="page-17-2"></span><span id="page-17-1"></span><span id="page-17-0"></span>**2.1 MGS Crash Testing and Computer Simulation**

#### **2.1.1 Dynamic Deflection and Working Width**

A study was conducted by Midwest Roadside Safety Facility (MwRSF) to compile past testing of Midwest Guardrail System (MGS) at Test Level 3 (TL-3). The study also involved numerous simulations on the MGS at TL-1, TL-2, or TL-3 [\[5\]](#page-190-4). Working widths and dynamic deflections were found for each test level regarding the standard MGS and MGS with curb. Only simulations involving standard MGS at TL-3 were considered for the purpose of this project.

Maximum dynamic deflection of the system is a measure of the maximum distance any individual component deflected backward when compared to its undeflected position. Working width is defined as the farthest distance the barrier or vehicle extended laterally during impact, as measured from the original, undeformed front face of the guardrail. Working widths are always greater than or equal to dynamic deflections.

For TL-3, a minimum working width of 60.3 in. (1,532 mm) was determined based on the largest MGS working width observed in full-scale crash testing [\[5,](#page-190-4) [6\]](#page-190-5). If lateral offsets between guardrail systems and obstacles are reduced, the impacting vehicle may engage or interact with the shielded obstacle. States must determine if the benefits associated with decreased guardrail-toobstacle offset and increased guardrail placement away from road outweigh the potential consequences of a vehicle engaging an obstacle while being redirected by the rail [\[5\]](#page-190-4). Currently, the Illinois Tollway uses a minimum barrier clearance distance of 28 in. (711 mm) for guardrail with standard post spacing. The current Illinois Tollway practice for minimum clearance distance of poles behind MGS with different post spacing is shown in [Table 1.](#page-17-3) The Illinois Tollway bases these lateral offsets on the guardrail placement recommendations for shielding rigid obstacles found in the research report by Polivka et al. [\[7\]](#page-190-6). According to this study, the minimum recommended distances the MGS should be placed away from a rigid obstacle are 49 in. (1.25 m), 44 in. (1.12 m), and 35 in. (0.9 m) for the standard-, half-, and quarter-post spacing designs, respectively, as measured from the front face of the W-beam rail to the front face of the obstacle. Thus, the recommended distances from the back of the post to the front face of post would be 28 in. (711 mm), 23 in. (584 mm), and 14 in. (356 mm) for the standard-, half-, and quarter-post spacing designs, respectively.



<span id="page-17-3"></span>Table 1. Illinois Tollway Barrier Clearance Distance

#### **2.1.2 Guardrail Deflection Analysis**

<span id="page-18-0"></span>A report compiling guardrail tests from various organizations was completed at the Texas Transportation Institute (TTI) [\[8\]](#page-190-7). Various guardrail configurations were included and those with 31-in. (787-mm) top mounting height and 75 in. (1,905 mm) post spacing are summarized i[n Table](#page-18-1)  [2](#page-18-1) for test no. 3-11 and [Table 3](#page-19-1) for test no. 3-10. Many variations of the MGS have been tested, but only those with standard MGS configurations were referenced for this project. The MGS tested with douglas fir, ponderosa pine, southern yellow pine, and white pine posts were also included. In addition, guardrail configurations using alternate blockouts or no blockouts were included. In addition, TTI performed a full scale crash test on a W-beam system similar to the MGS [\[9\]](#page-190-8). The single difference between the standard MGS and this test was the blockout depth was reduced from 12 in. (305 mm) to 8 in. (203 mm). One crash test, test no. 420020-5, was performed at test designation no. 3-10 and the guardrail performed adequately. This test is also included in [Table 3.](#page-19-1)

For test designation no. 3-11, the maximum, average, and minimum dynamic deflections were 60.2 in. (1,529 mm), 44.5 in. (1,131 mm), and 34.1 in. (866 mm), respectively. The maximum, average, and minimum working widths were 60.3 in. (1,532 mm), 51.3 in. (1,302 mm), and 43.2 in. (1,097 mm), respectively. For test designation no. 3-10 the maximum, average, and minimum dynamic deflections were 35.9 in. (912 mm), 26.6 in. (677 mm), and 17.4 in. (442 mm), respectively. The maximum, average, and minimum working widths were 48.3 in. (1,227 mm), 38.3 in. (973 mm), and 28.6 in. (726 mm), respectively.



<span id="page-18-1"></span>Table 2. Guardrail Testing under Test Designation No. 3-11

\*Guardrail with alternate posts and/or blockouts.

\*\*Guardrail with no blockouts.

<b>Testing Agency</b>	<b>Test Number</b>	<b>Testing Criteria</b>	Dynamic Deflection in. $(mm)$	Working Width in. $(mm)$
<b>MwRSF</b>	$NPG-1$	NCHRP 350	17.4(441)	40.3(1,022)
<b>MwRSF</b>	2214MG-3	<b>MASH</b>	35.9 (913)	48.3 (1,227)
<b>MwRSF</b>	$MGSSYP-2*$	<b>MASH</b>	22.2(564)	39.7 (1,008)
<b>MwRSF</b>	MGSRF-3*	<b>MASH</b>	<b>NA</b>	38.4 (975)
<b>MwRSF</b>	$MGSNB-2**$	<b>MASH</b>	29.1 (740)	34.5 (877)
<b>TTI</b>	420020-5	<b>MASH</b>	28.6(725)	28.6 (725)

<span id="page-19-1"></span>Table 3. Guardrail Testing under Test Designation No. 3-10

\*Guardrail with alternate posts and/or blockouts.

\*\*Guardrail with no blockouts.

#### <span id="page-19-0"></span>**2.2 Light Pole Testing Details**

The light pole used by the Illinois Tollway is a standard 50 ft (15.2 m) tall pole with a 15 ft (4.6-m) mast arm, as manufactured by Hapco and Valmont. The pole has a 10-in. (254-mm) base diameter and a 6-in. (152-mm) top diameter. The pole is designed to meet the 2009 American Association of State Highway Transportation Officials (AASHTO) *Standard Specifications for Structural Supports for Highway Signs, Luminaires, and Traffic Signals* [\[11\]](#page-191-1).

The light pole is mounted on a CS370 transformer base, also manufactured by Valmont. The 9-in. (229-mm) tall breakaway transformer base was evaluated by Southwest Research Institute (SwRI) in 1990 according to AASHTO *Standard Specifications for Structural Supports for Highway Signs, Luminaires, and Traffic Signals* [\[11\]](#page-191-1). In June 1990, the light pole bases were impacted at 20 mph (32.2 km/h) with a 1,800-lb (816-kg) pendulum. The pendulum was fitted with a 10-stage crushable nose, which simulated the stiffness and energy dissipation of a 1979 Volkswagen Rabbit. The results of the tests are shown in [Table 4.](#page-21-2) Test-13 and Test-14 had calculated changes in velocity greater than the FHWA requirement of 16 feet per second, but they were accepted due to the tendency to overestimate the calculated 60 mph values.

Both base designs received Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) aid reimbursement eligibility letters [\[12](#page-191-2)[-14\]](#page-191-3). A similar base, the CS300, was also tested and received eligibility. All tested bases were manufactured by Akron, but three letters were required for the three distribution firms – Feralux, Akron Foundry, and Pole Lite. The two base designs are shown in Figures 2 and 3. The CS300 design is identical to the TB-AF-6-9 and the Pole Lite F-1300 designs, with the only difference being the distribution firm. The same is true for the CS370 design regarding the TB-AF-5-9 and Pole Lite F-1302 designs.



<span id="page-20-0"></span>Figure 2. Feralux CS300 Light Pole Base



<span id="page-20-1"></span>Figure 3. Feralux CS370 Light Pole Base

Test No.	<b>Base</b>	Pole Type	Pole Weight $lb$ (kg)	<b>Test Delta V</b> at 20 mph fps (m/s)	Calculated Delta V at 60 mph fps $(m/s)$
Test-AF-1	Feralux CS-300	Aluminum	413 (187)	3.4(1.0)	6.4(2.0)
Test-1	Pole Lite F-1300 or $TB-AF-6-9$	Aluminum	413 (187)	4.7(1.4)	6.8(2.1)
Test-2	Feralux CS-300	<b>Steel</b>	777 (352)	5.3(1.6)	11.1(3.4)
$Test-10$	Pole Lite F-1300 or TB-AF-6-9	<b>Steel</b>	777 (352)	5.0(1.5)	11.0(3.4)
$Test-11$	Pole Lite F-1300 or TB-AF-6-9	Aluminum	442 (191)	4.9(1.5)	7.0(2.1)
$Test-12$	TB3-AF-1517-17 I.W.	<b>Steel</b>	955 (433)	7.9(2.4)	17.1(5.2)
$Test-13$	Feralux CS-370	<b>Steel</b>	955 (433)	6.6(2.0)	16.5(5.0)
$Test-14$	Pole Lite F-1302 or TB-AF-5-9	<b>Steel</b>	955 (433)	7.6(2.3)	16.8(5.1)
Test- $15$	Feralux CS-370	Aluminum	591 (268)	6.9(2.1)	10.5(3.2)
$Test-16$	Pole Lite F-1302 or TB-AF-5-9	Aluminum	591 (268)	5.8(1.8)	10.1(3.1)
$Test-17$	Feralux CS-300	Aluminum	442 (191)	4.5(1.4)	6.9(2.1)

<span id="page-21-2"></span>Table 4. Feralux Light Pole Base Testing

# <span id="page-21-1"></span><span id="page-21-0"></span>**2.3 Related Research**

#### **2.3.1 Light Pole and Guardrail**

Breakaway poles are required on high-speed highways by the FHWA. In certain situations, guardrail systems will be placed in front of light poles. In 1994, guardrail and light pole systems were crash tested in Ohio using the standard Type 5 guardrail and either the Type AT-A or Type AT-X light pole base [\[15\]](#page-191-4). The Ohio Type 5 guardrail consisted of 7-in. (178-mm) diameter, 6-ft (1.83-m) long pine wood posts and 6-in. (152-mm) x 8-in. (203-mm) x 14-in. (356-mm) oak wood blockouts. The blockouts were contoured to fit the round posts. Posts were spaced 6 ft  $-3$  in. (1,905 mm) on center and embedded 42 in. (1,067 mm) into the soil. The guardrail had a top mounting height of 27 in. (686 mm). A 28-ft (8.54-m) tall steel light pole was selected and evaluated for this project. The GE Model M-400R2 luminaire was mounted on a 15-ft (4.57-m) arm with a 3-ft (914-mm) upsweep, as shown in [Figure 4.](#page-22-0)



<span id="page-22-0"></span>Figure 4. Ohio Study - GE Model M-400R2 Light Pole

Two aluminum base designs were utilized, and the dimensions of each differed. Type AT-A had a base width of  $16<sup>3</sup>/8$  in. (416 mm) and tapered to 13 in. (330 mm) at the top, and Type AT-X had a 14-in. (356-mm) wide base and tapered to 13 in. (330 mm) at the top, as shown in [Figure](#page-23-0)  [5.](#page-23-0) The sizes of the bases resulted in the Type AT-A being placed 18 in. (457 mm) behind the back of the guardrail, and the Type AT-X placed 6 in. (152 mm) behind the back of the guardrail. A total of six tests were completed, four of which included light poles. The placement of the light poles along the guardrail was chosen based on either location of maximum guardrail deflection or highest kinetic energy of the impactor. The results of the six tests are shown in [Table 5.](#page-23-1)



<span id="page-23-0"></span>Figure 5. Ohio Study - Light Pole Bases

<span id="page-23-1"></span>Table 5. Ohio Guardrail and Light Pole System Results

Test No.	Test Designation	Light Pole Base	Light Pole Distance from Impact ft $(m)$	Dynamic Deflection in. $(mm)$	Occupant <b>Risk</b> Collected	Pole Impacted by Vehicle (Snagging)
	$3-11$	None		59.8 (1,518)	Yes	
$\overline{2}$	$3 - 11$	Type $X$	1834 (5.72)	40.2(1,021)	N <sub>0</sub>	Yes
3	$3-11$	Type $X$	6(1.83)	47.3 (1,201)	N <sub>o</sub>	N <sub>o</sub>
$\overline{4}$	$3-11$	Type A	$6\frac{1}{4}(1.91)$	53.9 (1,369)	Yes	N <sub>o</sub>
5	$3-10$	None		12.6(320)	Yes	
6	$3-10$	Type $X$	$6\frac{1}{4}(1.91)$	11.0(280)	Yes	Yes

Test no. 1 was performed without a light pole to determine a baseline for the Type 5 guardrail under test designation no. 3-11. The guardrail was impacted at 60 mph (96.6 km/h) at 25.0 degrees. The exit angle was 10 degrees, and the occupant risk parameters were below the NCHRP Report No. 350 limit values.

Test no. 2 incorporated the type "X" base design, which placed the light pole 6 in. (152 mm) behind the guardrail. The base was located 18<sup>3</sup>/<sub>4</sub> ft (5.72 m) downstream from the intended impact point, because test no. 1 indicated this location would have the highest guardrail deflection. The guardrail system was impacted at 59.0 mph (95 km/h) at 24.6 degrees. Contact marks from the vehicle were found on the light pole. The pole did not break away, but it constrained the

guardrail deflections, which resulted in an exit angle of 17.9 degrees and exceeded the evaluation criteria limit. Occupant risk values were not acquired due to an on-board computer malfunction.

Test no. 3 also used the type "X" base design, and the pole was positioned 6 in. (152 mm) behind the guardrail and 6 ft (1.83 m) downstream from the impact location, which was selected due to the high kinetic energy of the impactor at this point. The guardrail system was impacted at 60 mph (96.5 km/h) at 27.3 degrees. The light pole broke away, and the transformer base fractured. The guardrail deflections were less than when no light pole was present, and the exit angle was 25.4 degrees, which was greater than the allowable limit. Furthermore, vehicle damage was greater in test no. 3 than test no. 2, indicating that break away of the light pole did not correlate with reduced vehicle damage. The on-board computer malfunctioned and occupant risk values were not acquired.

Test no. 4 evaluated the "A" base design, which placed the light pole 18 in. (457 mm) behind the guardrail. The base was located  $6ft - 3$  in. (1,905 mm) downstream from the intended impact point. The guardrail system was impacted at 58.0 mph (93.3 km/h) at 26.7 degrees. The pole broke away, and the guardrail deflections were similar to when no light pole was present. The exit angle was 17.2 degrees, which was greater than the allowable limit. The light pole base performed as designed and fractured near the attachment lugs. Damage to the vehicle in test no. 4 was greater than the damage from test no. 3, even though the light pole was placed farther behind the guardrail. Occupant risk values for this test were below the allowable values in NCHRP Report No. 350.

Test no. 5 was performed without a light pole to determine a baseline for the Type 5 guardrail under test designation no. 3-10. The guardrail was impacted at 57.5 mph (92.5 km/h) at 20.7 degrees. The exit angle of 7.9 degrees and the occupant risk values were within the NCHRP Report No. 350 limits.

Test no. 6 used the "X" base design, and the pole was positioned 6 in. (152 mm) behind the guardrail and  $6 \text{ ft} - 3 \text{ in.} (1.9 \text{ m})$  downstream from the intended impact location. The guardrail system was impacted at 64.9 mph (104.5 km/h) at 21.4 degrees. The light pole did not break away, and the base had an indentation on the impact side, likely caused by the left-front wheel. Again, the guardrail deflections in this test were less than when no light pole was present. The exit angle of 9.5 degrees and the occupant risk values were within the limits in NCHRP Report No. 350.

The primary objective was to determine if vehicle snag occurred on the poles during impact with the guardrail. The research report noted that the presence of light poles did not cause snagging of the test vehicle, and no change in the placement of light poles behind the guardrail was recommended. However, snagging was only noted if the vehicle contacted the pole and rapidly decelerated. Other contact between the test vehicles and the pole was observed, but it was not classified as snagging.

Furthermore, the effect of the light pole on guardrail performance was also evaluated. Unfortunately, it was difficult to make definitive conclusions based on the collected data. Impact speeds varied from 57.5 mph (92.5 km/h) to 65 mph (104.5 km/h), occupant risk factors could not be obtained from all tests, and the light pole was not critically impacted in all tests because the maximum rail deflection did not occur at the pole location. Finally, three of the four guardrail and light pole tests had exit angles greater than the 15 degrees requirement given in the NCHRP Report No. 350 [\[10\]](#page-191-0). These results suggest the light pole may have affected the guardrail's performance.

# **2.3.2 Sign Support and Guardrail**

<span id="page-25-0"></span>A project evaluating the safety performance of a sign support and guardrail system was completed by the Civil and Environmental Engineering Department at the University of Florence in Firenze, Italy in 2014 [\[16\]](#page-191-5). A variable message sign (VMS) with a non-breakaway sign support structure and an H3 steel barrier, as shown in [Figure 6,](#page-25-1) were evaluated using finite element method (FEM) simulations and no crash testing. The objectives of the study were to evaluate heavy vehicle and sign support interaction as well as determine minimum lateral offset between sign support and barrier.



Figure 6. Sign Support and Guardrail

<span id="page-25-1"></span>Initially, three separate models were created: a barrier; a heavy vehicle; and a sign support structure. The barrier model was evaluated and validated by a full scale crash test. The sign support structure model for this test included a VMS spanning a three lane motorway with an emergency lane and traditional sign supports made of high-strength steel (S355JO). Only the parts bearing the highest stress during the crash of the sign support were included in the model due to the complexity of the design. A 35,274-lb (16,000-kg) infinitely rigid cube with a 9.84-ft x 9.84-ft (3-m x 3-m) cross section was used to simulate a heavy goods vehicle (HGV) with an impact velocity of 49.7 mph (80 km/h). The sign support model was evaluated independently of the guardrail, and no risk of sign support failure was found.

The final stage of the project was to determine the minimum distance between the sign support and the guardrail where both would perform according to criteria defined in EN 1317- 2:2010 [\[17\]](#page-191-6). After evaluating many simulations with varying placement along and behind the barrier, the minimum distance between the barrier and sign support was 51.2 in. (1,300 mm) away from the front of the barrier.

## **2.3.3 Zone of Intrusion**

<span id="page-26-0"></span>Stiff barriers, such as concrete barriers, have negligible deflections. However, zone of intrusion (ZOI), or vehicle intrusion over the top of the barrier, is a concern for attachments mounted on or near these barriers [\[18\]](#page-191-7). Subsequently, ZOI is considered for rigid bridge rails and parapets, not guardrail. In many of the reviewed tests, the vehicle's impacting corner intruded the farthest over the concrete barriers, and the greatest intrusion occurred early in the impact event.

TL-3 barriers were divided into three subgroups depending on their ZOI [\[18\]](#page-191-7). Group one consisted of slope-faced concrete barriers and steel tubular rails on 6-in. (152-mm) curbs or greater. The ZOI for group one was 18 in. (457 mm) away from the front face of the barrier. The ZOI for group two was 24 in. (610 mm) and included combination concrete and steel rails, vertical-faced concrete barriers, and timber rails. The ZOI for group three was 30 in. (762 mm) and included steel tubular rails not on curbs or on curbs less than 6 in. (152 mm) high.

Following this study, MwRSF performed three full-scale crash tests on a single-slope concrete barrier with adjacent light poles in 2008 [\[19\]](#page-191-8). The first two tests involved a light pole placed on top of the concrete barrier using a rearward pedestal, and the third test involved a groundmounted light pole placed 10.5 in. (267 mm) behind the barrier. The first full-scale crash test, test no. ZOI-1, was performed according to test designation no. 4-12 of NCHRP Report No. 350. The test consisted of a 17,605-lb (7,985-kg) single-unit truck impacting the barrier at a speed of 50.4 mph (81.0 km/h) and an angle of 15.6 degrees. This test passed the NCHRP Report No. 350 safety requirements as the single-unit truck was safely brought to a controlled stop. The second full-scale crash test, test no. ZOI-2, was performed according to test designation no. 4-11 of NCHRP Report No. 350. The test consisted of a 4,430-lb (2,009-kg) pickup truck impacting the barrier at a speed of 61.7 mph (99.3 km/h) and an angle of 23.4 degrees. This test passed the NCHRP Report No. 350 safety requirements as the pickup truck was safely brought to a controlled stop. The third fullscale crash test, test no. ZOI-3, was performed according to test designation no. 4-12 of NCHRP Report No. 350. The test consisted of a 17,637-lb (8,000-kg) single-unit truck impacting the barrier at a speed of 50.2 mph (80.8 km/h) and an angle of 16.4 degrees. This test passed the NCHRP Report no. 350 safety requirements as the single-unit truck was safely brought to a controlled stop.

The impact location for the third test was selected such that the maximum vehicle intrusion over the barrier would occur at the light pole location. This placement would ensure a worst-case scenario impact. Test no. ZOI-3 was deemed acceptable according to the TL-4 criteria found in NCHRP Report No. 350 [\[10\]](#page-191-0). Unfortunately, the maximum intrusion occurred before the pole was impacted, and definitive recommendations could not be made for use of a ground-mounted luminaire pole placed behind a concrete barrier.

# **3 TEST REQUIREMENTS AND EVALUATION CRITERIA**

# <span id="page-27-1"></span><span id="page-27-0"></span>**3.1 Test Requirements**

Since it is not recommended to place obstacles within the working width of guardrail systems, closer pole placement behind the MGS would require crash testing and evaluation under TL-3 of MASH [\[3\]](#page-190-2). This study was conducted in compliance with MASH 2016. Note that there is no difference between MASH 2009 [\[20\]](#page-192-0) and MASH 2016 for longitudinal barriers such as the system tested in this project. According to TL-3 of MASH, longitudinal barrier systems must be subjected to two full-scale vehicle crash tests, as summarized in [Table 6.](#page-27-3)

<span id="page-27-3"></span>



<sup>1</sup> Evaluation criteria explained in [Table 7.](#page-28-1)

The critical impact points for both crash tests were determined using computer simulation to maximize vehicle and pole interaction, as discussed in the following chapter.

# <span id="page-27-2"></span>**3.2 Evaluation Criteria**

Evaluation criteria for full-scale vehicle crash testing are based on three appraisal areas: (1) structural adequacy; (2) occupant risk; and (3) vehicle trajectory after collision. Criteria for structural adequacy are intended to evaluate the ability of the MGS with an offset light pole to contain and redirect impacting vehicles. In addition, controlled lateral deflection of the test article is acceptable. Occupant risk evaluates the degree of hazard to occupants in the impacting vehicle. Post-impact vehicle trajectory is a measure of the potential of the vehicle to result in a secondary collision with other vehicles and/or fixed objects, thereby increasing the risk of injury to the occupants of the impacting vehicle and/or other vehicles. These evaluation criteria are summarized in [Table 7](#page-28-1) and defined in greater detail in MASH. The full-scale vehicle crash test was conducted and reported in accordance with the procedures provided in MASH.

In addition to the standard occupant risk measures, the Post-Impact Head Deceleration (PHD), the Theoretical Head Impact Velocity (THIV), and the Acceleration Severity Index (ASI) were determined and reported on the test summary sheet. Additional discussion on PHD, THIV and ASI is provided in MASH.

# <span id="page-28-0"></span>**3.3 Soil Strength Requirements**

In accordance with Chapter 3 and Appendix B of MASH, foundation soil strength must be verified before any full-scale crash testing can occur. During the installation of a soil dependent system, additional W6x16 (W152 x 23.8) posts are to be installed near the impact region utilizing the same installation procedures as the system itself. Prior to full-scale testing, a dynamic impact test must be conducted to verify a minimum dynamic soil resistance of 7.5 kips (33.4 kN) at post deflections between 5 and 20 in. (127 and 508 mm) and measured at a height of 25 in. (635 mm). If dynamic testing near the system is not desired, MASH permits a static test to be conducted instead and compared against the results of a previously established baseline test. In this situation, the soil must provide a resistance of at least 90% of the static baseline test at deflections of 5, 10, and 15 in. (127, 254, and 381 mm). Further details can be found in Appendix B of MASH.

<span id="page-28-1"></span>Table 7. MASH Evaluation Criteria for Longitudinal Barrier



#### <span id="page-29-0"></span>**4 SELECTION OF POLE PLACEMENT THROUGH LS-DYNA SIMULATION**

Computer simulation was utilized to select critical impact points and critical pole location for the full-scale crash tests. A baseline model of a 29-post, 175-ft (53.35-m) long Midwest Guardrail System (MGS) was validated with test nos. 2214MG-2 and 2214MG-3 using NCHRP Report No. W179 procedures for verification and validation of computer simulations used for roadside safety applications [\[1-](#page-190-1)[2,](#page-190-9) [21\]](#page-192-1).

The MGS model incorporated 72-in. (1,830-mm) long, W6x9 steel posts with 12-in. (305- mm) deep blockouts, as shown in [Figure 7.](#page-29-1) The upstream and downstream ends of the system were anchored with the MGS trailing-end anchorage with two BCT posts on each end [\[22\]](#page-192-2). The postsoil resistance was simulated with lateral and longitudinal springs for the steel posts and downstream anchor posts considering the computational efficiency, and with a Drucker-Prager soil element material for the upstream anchor posts to represent soil resistance more accurately.



<span id="page-29-1"></span>Figure 7. Finite Element Model of MGS: (a) System Layout and (b) End Anchorage

<b>Part Name</b>	<b>Element</b> <b>Type</b>	<b>Element</b> <b>Formulation</b>	<b>Material Type</b>	<b>Material</b> <b>Formulation</b>	
<b>Anchor Cable</b>	Beam	Belytschko-Schwer, <b>Resultant Beam</b>	$6x19\frac{3}{4}$ Wire Rope	Moment, <b>Curvature Beam</b>	
<b>Anchor Post</b> <b>Bolt</b>	Solid	<b>Constant Stress Solid</b> Element	ASTM A307	Rigid	
<b>Anchor Post</b> <b>Bolt Heads</b>	Shell	Belytschko-Tsay	ASTM A307	Rigid	
<b>Anchor Post</b> Washers	Solid	<b>Constant Stress Solid</b> Element	<b>ASTM F844</b>	Rigid	
<b>BCT</b> Anchor Post	Solid	Fully Integrated, S/R	Wood	<b>Plastic Kinematic</b>	
<b>Bearing Plate</b>	Solid	<b>Constant Stress Solid</b> Element	<b>ASTM A36</b>	Rigid	
<b>Blockout</b>	Solid	Fully Integrated, S/R	Wood	Elastic	
<b>Blockout Bolts</b>	Shell	Belytschko-Tsay	ASTM A307	Rigid	
<b>Bolt Springs</b>	Discrete	DRO=Translational Spring/Damper	<b>ASTM A307</b>	Spring, <b>Non-Linear Elastic</b>	
Ground-Line Strut	Shell	Belytschko-Tsay	<b>ASTM A36</b>	Piecewise, <b>Linear Plastic</b>	
Post Soil Tubes	Shell	Belytschko-Tsay	<b>Equivalent Soil</b>	Rigid	
Line Post Soil Springs	Discrete	DRO=Translational Spring/Damper	<b>Equivalent Soil</b>	Spring, <b>General Non-Linear</b>	
W-Beam Guardrail Section	Shell	Fully Integrated, <b>Shell Element</b>	AASHTO M180, 12-Ga. <b>Galvanized Steel</b>	Piecewise, <b>Linear Plastic</b>	
W6x9 Post	Shell	Fully Integrated, <b>Shell Element</b>	<b>ASTM A992</b> Gr. 50	Piecewise, <b>Linear Plastic</b>	
Anchorage Soil	Solid	<b>Constant Stress Solid</b> Element	Crushed Limestone	Drucker Prager	

<span id="page-30-0"></span>Table 8. Summary of MGS Model Parts and LS-DYNA Parameters [\[23\]](#page-192-3)

A series of computer simulations were conducted with the MGS with nearby poles to determine the minimum safe lateral pole offset based on risks of rail pocketing, rail rupture, vehicle instability, and other hazards. The analyses primarily focused on MASH TL-3 impacts with 2270P vehicles due to increased dynamic deflections, but several simulations with 1100C vehicle impacts were also performed to ensure that the lateral pole offset was safe for small cars.

#### <span id="page-31-0"></span>**4.1 Evaluation Criteria**

The presence of a pole behind a guardrail may cause vehicle snag on the pole, posts impacting the pole, and interaction between the deflected rail and the pole, all of which may affect the guardrail's ability to safely contain and redirect vehicles. Vehicle snag on the pole can increase vehicle decelerations and instabilities. Interaction between a deflected guardrail system and a pole can cause pocketing and increased loading to the guardrail. Thus, several criteria, such as vehicle stability, occupant risk measures, rail pocketing, vehicle snag on pole, rail deflection, and rail load, were evaluated in each simulation.

Euler angles, including roll, pitch, and yaw angles, were used to evaluate vehicle stability. Roll and pitch angles should not exceed 75 degrees according to MASH [3]. Occupant risk measures, which evaluate the degree of hazard to the occupants in the impacting vehicle, included the longitudinal and lateral occupant impact velocities (OIVs) as well as longitudinal and lateral occupant ridedown accelerations (ORAs). According to MASH, longitudinal and lateral occupant impact velocities should fall below the maximum allowable value of 40.0 ft/s (12.2 m/s). MASH also states that longitudinal and lateral ORAs should fall below the maximum allowable value of 20.49 g's [\[3\]](#page-190-2). In addition, all post deflections in the impact region were examined to evaluate the pole-post interaction as well as its effects on snag, deceleration, and prevention of pole release.

Maximum pocketing angle is also a concern, as excessive pocketing angles can affect a system's capability to safely contain and redirect a vehicle. The pocketing angle is defined as the angle between the deflected rail during the impact event and initial guardrail orientation. In some situations, the rail can form a pocket between two adjacent posts due to large lateral rail displacement, which may impede the vehicle's redirection out of the system. The maximum pocketing angle for each simulation was calculated by tracking adjacent nodes on the rail to determine barrier deflections. The pocketing angle in the baseline simulation with no pole was 39.2 degrees.

The maximum rail load was also examined. The MGS W-beam rail consisted of AASHTO M180 steel [\[24\]](#page-192-4), with a minimum ultimate strength of 70 ksi (482 MPa), which correlates to a rail tensile strength of 112 kips (498 kN) at the splice and 141 kips (627 kN) in the full-section. In another study, the maximum rail tensile strength of the MGS W-beam was estimated in a range of 92 to 98 kips (409 to 436 kN) at a splice [\[25\]](#page-192-5).

#### <span id="page-31-1"></span>**4.2 LS-DYNA Baseline Simulations**

An existing baseline model of the MGS impacted by a 2270P pickup truck was validated with the results from the test no. 2214MG-2 [\[1\]](#page-190-1). In test no. 2214MG-2, a 5,000-lb (2,268-kg) pickup truck impacted the steel-post MGS, which had a 31-in. (787-mm) top rail mounting height, was installed in standard soil, and with standard post spacing, at an impact speed of 62.9 mph (101.2 km/h) and an angle of 25.5 degrees.

The reduced-element, 2270P Chevrolet Silverado pickup truck model, originally developed by the National Crash Analysis Center (NCAC) and modified by MwRSF, was utilized to simulate test no. 2214MG-2 [\[26\]](#page-192-6). The 5,004-lb (2,270-kg) pickup truck model impacted the steel-post MGS installed in standard soil and with standard post spacing at an impact speed of 62.1 mph (100 km/h) and an angle of 25.4 degrees. A summary of the results from numerical simulation and test no. 2214MG-2 is shown in [Table 9.](#page-32-1) The simulation and full-scale crash test were compared using NCHRP Report No. W179 procedures for verification and validation of computer simulations used for roadside safety applications [\[21\]](#page-192-1). The full V&V (Validation and Verification) comparison is shown in Appendix A. A comparison between the actual and finite element simulation of test no. 2214MG-2 is shown in [Figure 8.](#page-32-0) In the test, dynamic deflection was 1.2 in. (30 mm) lower as compared to the simulation. Simulated maximum roll angle, longitudinal and lateral ORAs were higher than in the actual test. However, the simulation met the V&V procedure requirements. Therefore, the model was utilized for further numerical studies. In this study, the differences between the test and simulation results were considered when evaluating the results.

Evaluation Parameters	Max. Dynamic Deflection ft (m)	Length Contact ft (m)	Max. Roll Angle (degrees)	Max. Pitch Angle (degrees)	Max. Yaw Angle (degrees)	Long. <b>ORA</b> (g's)	Lateral <b>ORA</b> (g's)	Long. <b>OIV</b> ft/s (m/s)	Lateral <b>OIV</b> ft/s (m/s)
Physical Test	3.64 (1.11)	33.8 (10.3)	$4.81^\circ$	$1.84^{\circ}$	45.74°	8.23	6.93	15.32 (4.67)	15.61 (4.76)
Simulation	3.74 (1.14)	29.5 (9)	$11.67^\circ$	$3.17^{\circ}$	$46.21^{\circ}$	11.16	9.05	14.53 (4.43)	16.37 (4.99)

<span id="page-32-1"></span>Table 9. Summary of Crash Test No. 2214MG-2 and Simulation Results



Figure 8. 2270 Vehicle Crash: Test No. 2214MG-2 (left) and Simulation (right)

<span id="page-32-0"></span>A Toyota Yaris model, developed by NCAC and modified by MwRSF, was used to simulate test no. 2214MG-3 [\[26\]](#page-192-6). The 2,775-lb (1,258-kg) passenger car model impacted the MGS installed in standard soil and using a standard post spacing at an impact speed of 62.1 mph (100 km/h) and an angle of 25 degrees. A summary of the results from numerical simulation and test no. 2214MG-3 is shown in [Table 10.](#page-33-1) A comparison between the test and simulation results are shown in [Figure 9.](#page-33-0)



<span id="page-33-1"></span>



<span id="page-33-0"></span>Figure 9. 1100C Vehicle Crash: Test No. 2214MG-3 (left) and Simulation (right)

The full V&V comparison is shown in Appendix B. The simulation did not meet the V&V procedure requirements primarily due to differences in maximum barrier deflection and maximum vehicle roll and yaw. The simulated dynamic deflection was 12 percent lower than observed in the crash test, and the roll angle was 8 degrees lower in the simulation than observed in the crash test. In the test, four posts deflected. While in the simulation, only three posts deflected during car impact. The 1100C Toyota Yaris model was geometrically different than the 1100C Kia Rio used in the crash test. Thus, the results were expected to differ. These differences were considered when determining the critical impact point and pole placement for MASH test no. 3-10.

#### <span id="page-34-0"></span>**4.3 Determination of Critical Impact Points**

Prior to simulation of the MGS with an offset pole, it was desired to determine the critical impact point (CIP) along the MGS that would be most detrimental for interaction of the MGS and vehicle. According to MASH, the impact point should be selected to represent the critical location along a barrier system that will maximize the risk of test failure. For longitudinal barriers, including the MGS, CIPs are selected to maximize loading at rail splices and maximize the potential for wheel snag and vehicle pocketing. Based on the general MASH recommendation, testing agencies are encouraged to utilize a more detailed analysis, such as computer simulation, to estimate the CIP location for each full-scale crash test. Thus, several impact points along the MGS were evaluated through numerical simulations without a pole to determine the impact location that could maximize the risk of test failure in terms of increased occupant risk values, deflection, and potential for snagging and pocketing if a pole was present. These simulations were conducted to provide an insight into critical locations of impact on the MGS without pole, more refined simulations were performed to determine the critical pole location, as detailed in the following chapters. The critical impact point for the 2270P pickup test was determined to be 4 in. (100 mm) downstream from post no. 11, as shown in [Figure 10a](#page-35-0). This impact point maximized the MGS deflection, the longitudinal ORA, and the potential for snagging. A summary of the results simulated at various impact points on the MGS is shown in [Table 11.](#page-34-1) The lateral and longitudinal OIVs were similar for all impact points with averages of 16 ft/s (4.9 m/s) and 15 ft/s (4.6 m/s), respectively.



<span id="page-34-1"></span>Table 11. Summary of Simulated Results with Varied Impact Points – Test Designation No. 3-11

Moreover, a series of simulations was conducted using a passenger car impacting the MGS at various impact points. For the passenger car case, the critical impact point on the MGS that led to maximum rail deflection (29.8 in. (757 mm)), maximum vehicle roll angle (14.3 degrees), and high occupant risk values (lateral ORA of 12.7 g's and longitudinal ORA of 14 g's) was at the mid-span between post nos. 11 and 12, as shown in [Figure 10b](#page-35-0). A summary of the results is shown in [Table 12.](#page-35-1) The lateral and longitudinal OIVs were similar, with averages of 18.4 ft/s (5.6 m/s) and 21.6 ft/s (6.6 m/s), respectively.

<b>Impact Point</b>	Lateral <b>ORA</b> (g's)	Longitudinal <b>ORA</b> (g's)	Maximum Dynamic Deflection in. $(mm)$	Pocketing Angle $(\text{deg})$	Maximum Vehicle Roll Angle (deg)
4 in. (100 mm) Downstream from Post No. 11	10.3	13.3	26.9(684)	18	3.5
$\frac{1}{4}$ Span Downstream from Post No. 11	10.5	15	28.2 (717)	18	4.5
Mid Span Downstream from Post No. 11	12.7	14	29.8 (757)	18	14.3
<sup>3</sup> / <sub>4</sub> Span Downstream from Post No. 11	10.6	12.7	26.9(683)	17.5	2

<span id="page-35-1"></span>Table 12. Summary of Simulated Results with Varied Impact Points – Test Designation No. 3-10





(b)

<span id="page-35-0"></span>Figure 10. Critical Impact Points: (a) Test Designation No. 3-11 and (b) Test Designation No. 3- 10
## **4.4 Pole Model**

Computer models of a 50-ft (15.25-m) tall pole with a 9-in. (228-mm) tall base were generated using a fine mesh, as shown in [Figure 11.](#page-36-0) An automatic, single-surface contact was provided for the pole, vehicle, and MGS contact. In the LS-DYNA simulations, the pole and base were modeled as rigid parts that were constrained in all directions using MAT\_RIGID. Thus, the pole could not break away. Accurate modeling of the breakaway mechanism of the pole was out of the scope of this project. As such, this modification would lead to a more severe simulated impact as compared to the actual test and thus a more conservative pole placement. Also, the use of the rigid pole would still provide insight into the potential for barrier and vehicle interaction with the pole. The pole has a 10-in. (254-mm) diameter at the base and a 6-in. (152-mm) diameter at the top. Two aluminum material models were utilized to represent the pole and base. Material parameters are summarized in [Table 13.](#page-37-0)

<span id="page-36-0"></span>

Figure 11. Computer Model of Pole and Base



### <span id="page-37-0"></span>Table 13. Summary of Material Parameters for Pole-Base Model

## **4.5 Determination of Critical Pole Offset**

# **4.5.1 Determination of Critical Pole Offset for Test Designation No. 3-11**

The baseline simulation was modified to simulate a 5,004-lb (2,270-kg) pickup truck impacting the MGS with a laterally offset pole and investigate the interaction between the vehicle, pole, and MGS. In order to identify worst-case scenarios, pickup truck impacts into the MGS model were simulated when the pole was placed behind the guardrail with the front face of pole laterally 12 in. to 28 in. (305 mm to 711 mm) behind the back of posts. The centerline of the pole was also shifted longitudinally away from the centerline of the posts along the barrier to maximize vehicle interaction with the barrier and pole, as shown in [Figure 12.](#page-37-1)



<span id="page-37-1"></span>Figure 12. Longitudinal and Lateral Offset of Pole with Respect to MGS

In the baseline model, four posts (post nos. 12 to 15) deflected when impacted by the truck model. Thus, longitudinal pole offsets from the four posts were considered. The longitudinal offsets studied included: 0 in. (i.e., pole placed directly behind the post); 4; 8; 12; 16; 20; and midspan 37.5 in. (102; 203; 305; 406; 508; and 953 mm).

The 2270P model impacted the MGS at the CIP, or 4 in. (100 mm) downstream from post no. 11. Preliminary analyses indicated that lateral pole placement closer than 16 in. (406 mm) behind the post caused aggressive impacts with the rigid pole, and reliable results could not be obtained. One case with a 12-in. (305-mm) lateral offset was studied, but the simulation did not complete due to unresolvable errors. Pole offsets of 24 and 28 in. (610 and 711 mm) behind the MGS did not appear to be critical to the barrier performance, as the vehicle had minimal interaction with the pole. Thus, lateral offsets of 16, 18, and 20 in. (406, 457, and 508 mm) were selected for further analysis.

## **4.5.1.1 Vehicle Behavior**

Vehicle behavior was examined to evaluate the potential for safe vehicle redirection without instability. In all simulations, the vehicle was smoothly redirected without any significant override or underride. However, all three lateral offsets resulted in increased vehicle-pole interaction with increased vehicle's roll and pitch angles, as shown in [Figure 13.](#page-39-0) In this figure, the x-axis represents the post number in the MGS. The offset of the data points from the post number in the x-axis represents the relative longitudinal offset of the pole from the associated post in the MGS (except the baseline data point). For example, the data points with the x-coordinate of 12.5 represent the cases where pole was placed at mid-span between posts nos. 12 and 13. All angular displacement angles were within MASH limits.



<span id="page-39-0"></span>Figure 13. Vehicle Behavior: (a) Maximum Roll Angle and (b) Maximum Pitch Angle

## **4.5.1.2 Occupant Risk**

Occupant risk values were calculated for each simulation utilizing the local accelerometer node at the vehicle's center of gravity and processed the same way as MASH full-scale crash tests. The maximum occupant ridedown acceleration obtained from the LS-DYNA simulations at a 16 in. (406-mm) offset is shown in [Figure 14.](#page-41-0) The x-axis represents the post number in the MGS, and y-axis indicates the longitudinal ORAs values. Data labels represent the longitudinal offset of the pole from the post no. associated with the x-axis.

As shown in [Figure 14,](#page-41-0) cases with the pole offset away from post no. 13 had increased lateral and longitudinal ORAs, which indicates the potential for more aggressive contact between the pole, barrier, and vehicle. A similar trend was also observed for 18-in. (457-mm) and 20-in. (508-mm) lateral pole offsets, as shown in [Figure 15.](#page-42-0)



<span id="page-41-0"></span>Figure 14. Occupant Ridedown Acceleration for 16-in. (406-mm) Lateral Offset: (a) Lateral and (b) Longitudinal



<span id="page-42-0"></span>Figure 15. Occupant Ridedown Acceleration for 16, 18, and 20-in. (406, 457, and 508-mm)

For all lateral pole offsets from 16 to 20 in. (406 to 508 mm), the longitudinal ORAs exceeded the acceptable MASH value with some longitudinal pole offsets. These cases mostly involved the pole at any longitudinal offset away from post no. 13 where maximum pole, barrier, and vehicle interaction occurred. As shown in [Figure 14,](#page-41-0) the maximum longitudinal ORA occurred when the pole was located at a 16-in. (406-mm) lateral offset and an 8-in. (203-mm) longitudinal offset away from post no. 13. In this simulation, the vehicle's wheel snagged on post no. 13 and the base of the pole, as shown in [Figure 16.](#page-43-0) The magnitude of these large lateral and longitudinal ORAs values were not expected in full-scale crash testing as the actual pole may break away during testing and induce less resistance than the simulations predicted. In addition, LS-DYNA tends to predict slightly larger lateral and longitudinal ORAs as compared to the crash testing results, which also occurred in the baseline simulation comparison due to lack of failure in wheel, tire, and suspension model assembly. Therefore, the large simulated lateral and longitudinal ORAs were deemed unlikely to occur in the physical testing and would be further evaluated with crash testing.

However, these decelerations did indicate increased vehicle and barrier interaction with an offset pole and raised the potential for degradation in barrier performance. For the cases with the pole located at 4-, 8-, 12-, and 16-in. (102-, 203-, 305-, and 406-mm) longitudinal offsets, more aggressive behavior occurred as compared to the cases when the pole was placed directly behind the post or at mid-span. This may be attributed to the wheel snagging on the base of the pole. As shown i[n Figure 17,](#page-44-0) the simulated lateral and longitudinal peak decelerations confirmed that a pole offset downstream from post no. 13 maximized pole, barrier, and vehicle interaction.



<span id="page-43-0"></span>Figure 16. Maximum Vehicle, Barrier, and Pole Interaction – 16-in. (406-mm) Lateral Offset and 8-in. (203-mm) Longitudinal Offset Away from Post No. 13



<span id="page-44-0"></span>Figure 17. Peak Deceleration: (a) Longitudinal and (b) Lateral

#### **4.5.1.3 Rail Pocketing**

Excessive pocketing angles can affect a system's capability to safely contain and redirect a vehicle. The simulated pocketing angles are shown in [Figure 18.](#page-45-0) The pocketing angle in the baseline simulation was 39.2 degrees. The pole did not significantly increase the pocketing angle over the baseline simulation. A maximum simulated pocketing angle of 46 degrees was observed for a pole placed at a lateral offset of 18 in. (457 mm) and did not appear to be critical as the pickup truck was redirected.



<span id="page-45-0"></span>Figure 18. Rail Pocketing Angle – 2270P Vehicle

### **4.5.1.4 Vehicle Snag**

In simulations, two mechanisms for vehicle snag on the pole were identified: fender snagging (shown in [Figure 19a](#page-46-0)), and wheel snagging (shown in [Figure 19b](#page-46-0)). The wheel snag on the pole appeared to be responsible for increased vehicle instability and occupant risk values. In the simulations, the maximum lateral snag distance was greater for the fender snag as compared to the wheel. A maximum fender snag of 14 in. (356 mm) occurred, as shown in [Figure 20.](#page-47-0) However, fender snag was likely overrepresented in the simulation due to the lack of pole fracture.



<span id="page-46-0"></span>Figure 19. 2270P Vehicle Snag: (a) Fender Snag and (b) Wheel Snag



<span id="page-47-0"></span>Figure 20. Maximum 2270P Vehicle Snag

### **4.5.1.5 Rail Deflection**

The maximum simulated dynamic rail deflections at 16-, 18-, and 20-in. (406-, 457-, and 508-mm) lateral pole offsets is shown in [Figure 21.](#page-48-0) In most cases, the pole restricted rail deflections by up to 30 percent as compared to the baseline case without a pole. However, these reduced barrier deflections were not believed to be detrimental to the barrier performance since the truck was still smoothly redirected.



<span id="page-48-0"></span>Figure 21. Maximum Rail Deflection - 2270P Vehicle

#### **4.5.1.6 Tensile Rail Load**

The maximum simulated tensile rail load at 16-, 18-, and 20-in. (406-, 457-, and 508-mm) lateral pole offsets is shown in [Figure 22.](#page-49-0) The maximum tensile load on the rail was 66 kips (293.5 kN) when the pole was located at a 16-in. (406-mm) lateral offset and a 4-in. (102-mm) longitudinal offset away from post no. 12. Rail rupture was not a concern as the loads were well below the tensile capacity of the rail.



<span id="page-49-0"></span>Figure 22. Maximum Rail Load - 2270P Vehicle

### **4.5.1.7 Critical Pole Placement**

In all simulations, the vehicle was captured and redirected at lateral pole offsets of 16 in. to 20 in. (406 mm to 508 mm). Among all evaluation criteria (including vehicle stability, occupant risk, rail pocketing, vehicle snag, rail deflection, and rail load) large longitudinal ORAs and vehicle wheel snag on the pole's base were found to be the most critical. Longitudinal pole offsets downstream from post no. 13 increased longitudinal ORA and wheel snag. Based on the simulations results, a 16-in. (406-mm) lateral pole offset away from the back of the MGS posts was considered the minimum lateral offset that could reliably be evaluated with LS-DYNA without modeling the breakaway mechanism. The 16-in. (406-mm) lateral offset had a reasonable chance of passing MASH safety criteria as the large ORAs would not be likely to occur in a crash test if the pole broke away or if the impacting tire disengaged. Sequential photographs for the simulation with the most critical pole offset (i.e., pole located with a 16-in. (406-mm) lateral offset and an 8in. (203-mm) longitudinal offset away from post no. 13) are shown in [Figure 23.](#page-50-0)



<span id="page-50-0"></span>Figure 23. Sequential Photographs: 16 in. (406 mm) Lateral Offset and 8 in. (203 mm) Longitudinal Offset from Post No. 13

The project sponsor recommended using a 20-in. (508-mm) lateral pole offset between the MGS and the pole to allow sufficient clearance between a 30-in. (762-mm) diameter concrete foundation and line posts. The Illinois Tollway's leave-out requirement behind the guardrail post was 15 in. (381 mm), and the 20-in. (508-mm) lateral pole offset allows a 10-in. (254-mm) clearance from the back of steel post to the side of the concrete foundation. Other studies indicated that a 7-in. (178-mm) clear distance in the leave-out will not negatively affect post rotation and deflection [\[27\]](#page-192-0). In addition, constructability of the pole foundation and posts would be easier with the larger lateral offset. It was also believed that the 20-in. (508-mm) lateral pole offset would improve the performance of the combination MGS and the pole system as compared to the 16-in. (406-mm) lateral offset. Based on the simulations, the 20-in. (508-mm) lateral pole offset provided fewer concerns in terms of occupant risk, vehicle stability, roll and pitch angles, pocketing angle, rail load, and vehicle snagging as compared to the cases with 16-in. (406-mm) lateral pole offset. Thus, a 20-in. (508-mm) lateral pole offset was selected for evaluation using MASH test designation no. 3-11 crash test.

Given a 20-in. (508-mm) lateral pole offset, it was necessary to determine the critical longitudinal pole offset. It was observed that the posts do not deform in the same manner in the crash tests and simulations. Therefore, previous testing of a MGS to portable concrete barrier (PCB) transition (test no. MGSPCB-1) was analyzed to determine more precise post deflection trajectories and interaction with obstacles [\[28\]](#page-192-1). In test no. MGSPCB-1, a 5,079-lb (2,304-kg) pickup truck impacted the PCB to MGS transition, as shown in [Figure 24,](#page-52-0) at a speed of 63.2 mph (101.7 km/h) and at an angle of 25.3 degrees. In this test, one of the posts (post no. 16) twisted, bent downstream, and hit the end of the portable concrete barrier, as shown in [Figure 25.](#page-53-0) Similar post interaction was expected to occur with the presence of a pole. The trajectory of post no. 16 in test no. MGSPCB-1 (that represents post no. 13 in the present evaluation study) was closely examined with respect to the candidate longitudinal pole offsets of 8, 12, 16, 20, and 24 in. (203, 305, 406, and 610 mm), as shown in [Figure 26.](#page-54-0) The longitudinal pole offset away from post no. 13 was selected to ensure that the post would have the maximum engagement with the pole upon vehicle impact. Accordingly, a 20-in. (508-mm) lateral and 24-in. (610-mm) longitudinal pole offset away from post no. 13 was recommended for evaluation under MASH test designation no. 3-11, as shown in [Figure 27.](#page-54-1) Sequential photographs of the simulation with recommended pole placement for test no. 3-11 are shown in [Figure 28.](#page-55-0)

<span id="page-52-0"></span>

Figure 24. MGS to PCB Transition, Test No. MGSPCB-1

<span id="page-53-0"></span>

Figure 25. Test No. MGSPCB-1: (a) Post Contact with PCB and (b) Barrier Damage



<span id="page-54-0"></span>Figure 26. Estimated Possible Post and Pole Interaction



<span id="page-54-1"></span>Figure 27. Recommended Pole Placement for MASH Test No. 3-11



<span id="page-55-0"></span>Figure 28. Sequential Photographs, Recommended Pole Placement for Test No. 3-11

#### **4.5.2 Determination of Critical Pole Offset for Test Designation No. 3-10**

The numerical analysis primarily focused on the 2270P vehicle. However, 1100C vehicle impacts were also evaluated using 16-in. and 20-in. (406-mm and 508-mm) lateral pole offsets. In test no. 2214MG-3, the maximum rail deflection was 914 mm (36 in.) [\[2\]](#page-190-0). The total width of the MGS is 21¼ in. (540 mm). With a 20-in. (508-mm) lateral pole offset away from the back of the post, interaction between the deflected rail and pole was not expected to occur. However, the maximum dynamic post deflection in test no. 2214MG-3 was 27 in. (686 mm). Therefore, the posts could potentially interact with the pole with a 20-in. (508-mm) lateral pole offset away from the back of the posts. Similar to the case of the 2270P pickup impacting the MGS offset away from the pole, the vehicle wheel could extend under the rail and interact with the posts and pole.

Several cases were simulated with the pole located 16 in. and 20 in. (406 mm and 508 mm) behind the back of post and longitudinal offsets varying from 4 in. to 16 in. (102 mm to 406 mm) downstream from the posts where the maximum deflection occurred (post nos. 13 and 14). The critical impact point was previously found at the midspan of post nos. 11 and 12. Similar to the pickup truck case, several simulation results were evaluated, including vehicle behavior, occupant risk, rail pocketing, vehicle snag, rail deflection, and rail load. A comparison of longitudinal ORAs, shown in [Figure 29,](#page-57-0) indicated that pole placement longitudinally offset away from post no. 13 led to larger ORAs as compared to the cases where the pole was placed longitudinally offset away from post no. 14. Note, a 20-in. (508-mm) lateral pole offset was selected for the 1100C crash test, but the trend was expected to be similar.

Similar to pickup truck case, the large lateral and longitudinal ORAs, which represented increased vehicle-pole interaction, appeared to be the most important parameter, as shown in [Figure 30.](#page-58-0) A summary of evaluation criteria with longitudinal offsets from post no. 13 and a 20 in. (508-mm) lateral offset is shown in [Table 14.](#page-59-0) Based on the simulation, the critical pole location for small car testing was a 20 in. (508 mm) laterally offset and 8 in. (203 mm) longitudinally from post no. 13 due to high longitudinal ORAs. Sequential photographs for this simulation are shown in [Figure 31.](#page-60-0)

However, a result comparison between test no. 2214MG-3 and the baseline simulation, as shown in [Figure 9,](#page-33-0) indicated different post deformation and trajectories. As shown in [Figure 32,](#page-61-0) the trajectory of post no. 16 in test no. 2214MG-3 was traced and overlaid with longitudinal pole offsets of 8, 12, and 16 in. (203, 305, and 406 mm). A 20-in. (508-mm) lateral and 16-in. (406 mm) longitudinal pole offset away from post no. 13 was recommended for full-scale crash testing, as shown in [Figure 33.](#page-61-1) A 16-in. longitudinal offset was believed more conservative to guarantee the vehicle would impact pole. Simulated sequential images from the test designation no. 3-10 simulation with a 20-in. (508-mm) lateral pole offset and a 16-in. (406-mm) longitudinal pole offset are shown in [Figure 34.](#page-62-0)



<span id="page-57-0"></span>Figure 29. Simulated Longitudinal Occupant Ridedown Acceleration 16-in. (406-mm) Lateral Offset – Test No. 3-10



<span id="page-58-0"></span>Figure 30. Simulated Occupant Ridedown Acceleration - 20-in. (508-mm) Lateral Offset from MGS – Test No. 3-10: (a) Lateral and (b) Longitudinal

Case	<b>Baseline</b>	$4$ in. $(102 \text{ mm})$ long. offset	8 in. $(203 \text{ mm})$ long. offset	$12$ in. $(305 \text{ mm})$ long. offset	$16$ in. $(406 \text{ mm})$ long. offset
Lateral ORA $(g's)$	10.5	10.7	13.3	18.7	17.6
Longitudinal ORA $(g's)$	15.4	15.7	26.4	23	19.5
Lateral OIV $m/s$ (ft/s)	18.4 (5.6)	16 (4.9)	18 (5.5)	18 (5.5)	18 (5.5)
Longitudinal OIV m/s (ft/s)	23.6 (7.2)	31 (9.4)	26 (8)	25.5 (7.8)	25.2 (7.7)
Roll (deg)	4.6	6.1	15	11.7	9.8
Pitch (deg)	1.7	3.4	9	6.5	5.1
Rail Deflection mm (in.)	28 (717)	30(755)	26(667)	27 (680)	27 (685)
Rail Load kN (kips)	36(160)	36(160)	35(155)	32.5 (144.5)	30.6(136)

<span id="page-59-0"></span>Table 14. Summary of Simulation Results for Test No. 3-10 - Pole at 20-in. (508 mm) Lateral and Longitudinal Offset from Post No. 13



<span id="page-60-0"></span>Figure 31. Simulated Sequential Photographs - 20-in. (508-mm) Lateral Offset and 8-in. (203mm) Longitudinal Offset from Post No. 13, MASH Test No. 3-10



<span id="page-61-0"></span>Figure 32. Estimated Possible Post and Pole Interaction - 1100C Vehicle



<span id="page-61-1"></span>Figure 33. Recommended Pole Placement for MASH Test No. 3-10



<span id="page-62-0"></span>Figure 34. Simulated Sequential Photographs 20-in. (508-mm) Lateral Offset, 16-in. (406-mm) Longitudinal Offset from Post No. 13, MASH Test No. 3-10

### **5 TEST INSTALLATION DESIGN DETAILS**

#### **5.1 Test No. [ILT-1](#page-141-0)**

The W-beam guardrail system was comprised of 175 ft (53.25 m) of standard, 12-gauge (2.66-mm) thick W-beam rail segments supported by steel posts with a light pole placed 20 in. (508 mm) laterally behind the posts, as shown in [Figure 35.](#page-64-0) End anchorage systems were used on both the upstream and downstream ends of the guardrail system. Design details are shown in Figures 35 through 62. Photographs of the test installation in a mirrored orientation are shown in Figures 63 through 66. Material specifications, mill certifications, and certificates of conformity for the system materials are shown in [Appendix E.](#page-277-0)

The MGS was constructed with 29 guardrail posts. Post nos. 3 through 27 were galvanized ASTM A992/A709-36 steel W6x8.5 sections measuring 6 ft (1,829 mm) long. Post nos. 1, 2, 28, and 29 were timber posts measuring 5.5 in. x 7.5 in. x 42.5 in. (140 mm wide x 190 mm deep x 1,080 mm long) and were placed in 6-ft (1,829-mm) long steel foundation tubes, as shown in Figures 39 and 40. The timber BCT posts and foundation tubes were part of the end anchor systems that were designed to replicate the capacity of a tangent guardrail terminal.

Post nos. 1 through 29 were spaced 75 in. (1,905 mm) on center with a soil embedment depth of 40 in. (1,016 mm), as shown in [Figure 37.](#page-66-0) The posts were placed in a compacted coarse, crushed limestone material with a strength that satisfied MASH criteria. For post nos. 3 through 27, 6-in. x 12-in. x 14.25-in. (152-mm wide x 305-mm deep x 362-mm long) wood spacer blockouts were used to block the rail away from the front face of the steel posts.

Standard 12-gauge (2.66-mm) thick W-beam rails were placed between post nos. 1 and 29, as shown in Figures 35 and 38. The top rail height was 31 in. (787 mm) with rail splices at the midspan locations. All lap-splice connections between the rail sections were configured to reduce vehicle snag at the splice during the crash test.

The Illinois Tollway standard light pole measures 50 ft (15.25 m) tall with a 15-ft (4.6-m) long mast arm and 0.31-in. (8-mm) wall thickness, as shown in [Figure 36.](#page-65-0) The pole is supported on a breakaway transformer base manufactured by Hapco. The pole has a 10-in. (254-mm) base diameter and a 6-in. (152-mm) top diameter. The 9-in. (229-mm) tall breakaway transformer base was fabricated from 356-T6 aluminum, as shown in Figures 52 and 53. The weights of the pole shaft and arm mast were 484 lb (219.5 kg) and 52 lb (23.6 kg), respectively. Approximately 55 lb (25 kg) of steel plate was added to the end of the luminaire arm to simulate the luminaire weight. The total weight of the pole assembly was 591 lb (268.1 kg). The front face of the pole was offset 20 in. (508 mm) laterally behind the back of the posts, and the centerline of the pole was offset 24 in. (610 mm) longitudinally from the centerline of post no. 13.



<span id="page-64-0"></span>Figure 35. System Layout, Test No. [ILT](#page-141-1) - 1



June

MwRSF Report No. [TRP-03-361-17](#page-0-3)

[29, 2017](#page-0-2)

<span id="page-65-0"></span>Figure 36. Illinois Tollway Pole Details, Test No. [ILT](#page-141-1) - 1



<span id="page-66-0"></span>Figure 37. Post Detail, Test No. [ILT](#page-141-1) - 1



June [29, 2017](#page-0-2)

Figure 38. Splice and Post Detail, Test No. [ILT](#page-141-1)-1



Figure 39. End Section Detail, Test No. [ILT](#page-141-1) - 1



Figure 40. BCT Anchor Detail, Test No. [ILT](#page-141-1) - 1



June [29, 2017](#page-0-2) MwRSF Report No. [TRP-03-361-17](#page-0-3)

Figure 41. Post Nos. 3-27 Components, Test No. [ILT](#page-141-1)-1



Figure 42. BCT Timber Posts and Foundation Tube Detail, Test No. [ILT](#page-141-1)-1


Figure 43. BCT Post Components and Anchor Bracket, Test No. [ILT](#page-141-0)-1



Figure 44. Ground Strut Details, Test No. [ILT](#page-141-0) - 1



Figure 45. BCT Anchor Cable and Load Cell Detail, Test No. [ILT](#page-141-0)-1



Figure 46. Modified BCT Anchor Cable, Test No. [ILT](#page-141-0)-1



Figure 47. Shackle and Eye Nut Detail, Test No. [ILT](#page-141-0)-1



Figure 48. Rail Section Details, Test No. [ILT](#page-141-0) - 1



Figure 49. Guardrail Hardware Details, Test No. [ILT](#page-141-0) - 1



June [29, 2017](#page-0-0)

Figure 50. Illinois Tollway Pole Details, Test No. [ILT](#page-141-0) - 1



Figure 51. Pole Base and Truss Connection Detail, Test No. [ILT](#page-141-0)-1

66



June

MwRSF Report No. [TRP-03-361-17](#page-0-1)

[29, 2017](#page-0-0)

Figure 52. Pole Detail, Test No. [ILT](#page-141-0)-1



Figure 53. Anchor Base Detail, Test No. [ILT](#page-141-0)-1



Figure 54. Truss Detail, Test No. [ILT](#page-141-0) - 1



Figure 55. Foundation Detail, Test No. [ILT](#page-141-0) - 1



Figure 56. Pole Hardware Details, Test No. [ILT](#page-141-0) - 1



Figure 57. Foundation Hardware Details, Test No. [ILT](#page-141-0) - 1



Figure 58. Ballast Plate and Attachment Hardware, Test No. [ILT](#page-141-0)-1



Figure 59. Bill of Bars, Test No. [ILT](#page-141-0)-1



Figure 60. Bill of Materials, Test No. [ILT](#page-141-0) - 1

Item	QTY.	Description	Material Specification	As-Tested Modification	Hardware
No.		[25] Día. UNC, 4" [102] Long Hex	Bolt - ASTM A449 or SAE J429 Grade 5 Galv. Per ASTM		Guide
d4	4	Head Bolt	A153, Nut - ASTM A563DH Galv. Per ASTM A153		-
d5	8	[25] Dia. Hardened Flat Washer	ASTM A153 Galv. Low Carbon Steel	$\qquad \qquad$	-
d6	4	[25] Día. 1/2" [13] Thick Flat Washer	Q235 Steel, Galv. Per ASTM A123, Coating Grade 50	$\overline{\phantom{0}}$	-
d7	8	1/2" [13] Dia. UNC x 3" [76] Long Hex Head Bolt and Nut	Bolt - 304 Stainless Steel or ASTM F593, Nut - ASTM F594 Stainless Steel	$\overline{\phantom{0}}$	-
d8	16	$1/2$ " $[13]$ Dia. Flat Washer	18-8 Stainless Steel	$\overline{\phantom{m}}$	-
d9	8	1/2" [13] Dia. Split Lock Washer	18-8 Stainless Steel	$\qquad \qquad \blacksquare$	-
d10	$\overline{\mathbf{2}}$	1/4" [6] Dia. x 3/4" [19] Flat Head Screw	18-8 Stainless Steel	-	-
f1	25	5/8" [16] Dia. UNC x 14" [356] Long Guardrail Bolt and Nut	Bolt ASTM A307 Galv., Nut ASTM A563A Galv. Per AASHTO M232 (ASTM A153) for Class C or Per AASHTO M298 (ASTM B695) for Class 50	$\overline{\phantom{0}}$	FBB06
f2	114	5/8"[16] Dia. UNC x 1 1/2" [38]  Long Guardrail Bolt and Nut	Bolt ASTM A307 Golv., Nut ASTM A563A Golv. Per AASHTO M232 (ASTM A153) for Class C or Per AASHTO M298 (ASTM B695) for Class 50		FBB01
f3	4	7/8" Dia. [22] UNC x 7 1/2" [191] Long Hex Flead Bolt and Nut	Bolt ASTM A307 Galv., Nut ASTM A563A Galv. Per AASHTO M232 (ASTM A153) for Class C or Per AASHTO M298 (ASTM B695) for Class 50		FBX22a
f4	4	5/8" [16] Dia. UNC x 10" [254] Long Hex Head Bolt and Nut	Bolt ASTM A307 Galv., Nut ASTM A563A Galv. Per AASHTO M232 (ASTM A153) for Class C or Per AASHTO M298 (ASTM B695) for Class 50		FBX16a
f5	16	5/8" [16] Dia. x 1 1/2" [38] Long Hex Head Bolt and Nut	Bolt ASTM A307 Galv., Nut ASTM A563A Galv. Per AASHTO M232 (ASTM A153) for Class C or Per AASHTO M298 (ASTM B695) for Class 50		FBX16a
f6	4	5/8" [16] Dia. UNC x 10" [254] Long Guardrail Bolt and Nut	Bolt ASTM A307 Galv., Nut ASTM A563A Galv. Per AASHTO M232 (ASTM A153) for Class C or Per AASHTO M298 (ASTM B695) for Class 50	$\overline{\phantom{0}}$	FBB03
g 1	44.	5/8″ [16] Dia. Plain Round Washer	ASTM F844 Galv. Per AASHTO M232 (ASTM A153) for Class C or Per AASHTO M298 (ASTM B695) for Class 50	$\qquad \qquad \blacksquare$	FWC16 <sub>0</sub>
g2	8	7/8″ [22] Dia. Plain Round Washer	ASTM F844 Galv. Per AASHTO M232 (ASTM A153) for Class C or Per AASHTO M298 (ASTM B695) for Class 50	$\overline{\phantom{0}}$	FWC22a
h1	4	1" [25] Dia., 84" [2134] Long Anchor Bolt	ASTM F1554 Grade 105 or A449 Galv. Per AASHTO M232 (ASTM A153) for Class C or Per AASHTO M298 (ASTM B695) for Class 50	-	-
h2	4	1" [25] Dia. UNC Hex Nut	ASTM A563DH or A194 Gr. 2H Galv. Per AASHTO M232 (ASTM A153) for Class C or Per AASHTO M298 (ASTM B695) for Class 50		FNX24b
SHEET: 27 of 28 IL Tollway MGS-Pole					
					<b>DATE:</b> 3/13/2017 DRAWN BY:
			Midwest Roadside Safety Facility	<b>Bill of Materials</b> DWG. NAME. SCALE: None	TJD/JEK REV. BY:
				Illinois_Pole-MGS_R22	UNITS: In.[mm] KAL/RWB/ MP/TJD

76

Figure 61. Bill of Materials, Test No. [ILT](#page-141-0)-1



Either Part h5 or Part h9 is used.<br>\*\* Either Part h5 or Part h9 is used.<br>\*\* Per researcher recommendation, use ASTM F844 washer instead of ASTM F436 to attach ballast.

77



Figure 62. Bill of Materials, Test No. [ILT](#page-141-0)-1



Figure 63. Test Installation, Test No. [ILT](#page-141-0) - 1



Figure 64. Test Installation, Test No. [ILT](#page-141-0) - 1







Figure 65. Test Installation, Test No. [ILT-1](#page-141-1)



Figure 66. Test Installation, Test No. [ILT-1](#page-141-1)

## **5.2 Test No. [ILT-2](#page-162-0)**

Similar to test no. ILT-1, test no[. ILT-2](#page-162-0) utilizes a 175-ft (53.3-m) MGS with a 50-ft (15.25 m) tall with a 15-ft (4.6-m) long mast arm light pole with 0.31-in. (8-mm) wall thickness as detailed in Figures 67 through 94. The weights of the pole shaft and arm mast were 474 lb (215 kg) and 55 lb (25 kg), respectively. Approximately 55 lb (25 kg) of steel plate was added to the end of the luminaire arm to simulate the luminaire weight. The total weight of the pole assembly was 584 lb (265 kg). The front face of the pole was offset 20 in. (508 mm) laterally behind the posts, and the centerline of the pole was offset 16 in. (406 mm) longitudinally downstream from post no. 13. Test no. [ILT-2](#page-162-0) was conducted on a barrier with a rail height of 32 in. (813 mm) to maximize potential vehicle underride and interaction with pole. Additional design details are shown in Figures 67 through 69. Photographs of the test installation are shown in Figures 95 through 98.



Figure 67. System Layout, Test No. [ILT](#page-162-1) - 2



Figure 68. Illinois Tollway Pole Details, Test No. [ILT](#page-162-1) - 2



Figure 69. Post Detail, Test No. [ILT](#page-162-1) - 2



Figure 70. Splice and Post Detail, Test No. [ILT](#page-162-1) - 2



Figure 71. End Section Detail, Test No. [ILT](#page-162-1) - 2



Figure 72. BCT Anchor Detail, Test No. [ILT](#page-162-1) - 2



Figure 73. Post Nos. 3-27 Components, Test No. [ILT](#page-162-1)-2



Figure 74. BCT Timber Posts and Foundation Tube Detail, Test No. [ILT](#page-162-1) - 2

90



Figure 75. BCT Post Components and Anchor Bracket, Test No. [ILT](#page-162-1)-2



Figure 76. Ground Strut Details, Test No. [ILT](#page-162-1) - 2



Figure 77. BCT Anchor Cable and Load Cell Detail, Test No. [ILT](#page-162-1)-2


Figure 78. Modified BCT Anchor Cable, Test No. [ILT](#page-162-0) - 2



Figure 79. Shackle and Eye Nut Detail, Test No. [ILT](#page-162-0) - 2



Figure 80. Rail Section Details, Test No. [ILT](#page-162-0) - 2



Figure 8 1. Guardrail Hardware Details, Test No. [ILT](#page-162-0) - 2



Figure 82. Illinois Tollway Pole Details, Test No. [ILT](#page-162-0) - 2



June [29, 2017](#page-0-0) MwRSF Report No. [TRP-03-361-17](#page-0-1)

Figure 83. Pole Base and Truss Connection Detail, Test No. [ILT](#page-162-0) - 2



Figure 84. Pole Detail, Test No. [ILT](#page-162-0) - 2



Figure 85. Anchor Base Detail, Test No. [ILT](#page-162-0) - 2



Figure 86. Truss Detail, Test No. [ILT](#page-162-0) - 2



Figure 87. Foundation Detail, Test No. [ILT](#page-162-0) - 2



Figure 88. Pole Hardware Details, Test No. [ILT](#page-162-0) - 2



Figure 89. Foundation Hardware Details, Test No. [ILT](#page-162-0) - 2



Figure 90. Ballast Plate and Attachment Hardware, Test No. [ILT](#page-162-0) - 2



Figure 91. Bill of Bars, Test No. [ILT](#page-162-0) - 2



Figure 92. Bill of Materials, Test No. [ILT](#page-162-0) - 2





Figure 93. Bill of Materials, Test No. [ILT](#page-162-0) - 2

DRAWN BY:<br>TJD/JEK



\* Either Part h5 or Part h9 is used.<br>\*\* Per researcher recommendation, use ASTM F844 washer instead of ASTM F436 to attach ballast.



Figure 94. Bill of Materials, Test No. [ILT](#page-162-0) - 2















Figure 97. Test Installation, Test No. [ILT-2](#page-162-1)



Figure 98. Test Installation, Test No. [ILT-2](#page-162-1)

### **6 TEST CONDITIONS**

### **6.1 Test Facility**

The testing facility is located at the Lincoln Air Park on the northwest side of the Lincoln Municipal Airport and is approximately 5 miles (8.0 km) northwest of the University of Nebraska-Lincoln.

### **6.2 Vehicle Tow and Guidance System**

A reverse-cable, tow system with a 1:2 mechanical advantage was used to propel the test vehicle. The distance traveled and the speed of the tow vehicle were one-half that of the test vehicle. The test vehicle was released from the tow cable before impact with the barrier system. A digital speedometer was used on the tow vehicle to increase the accuracy of the test vehicle's impact speed.

A vehicle guidance system that was developed by Hinch [\[29\]](#page-192-0) was used to steer the test vehicle. A guide flag, attached to the left-front wheel and the guide cable, was sheared off before impact with the barrier system. The  $\frac{3}{8}$ -in. (9.5-mm) diameter guide cable was tensioned to approximately 3,500 lb (15.6 kN) and supported both laterally and vertically every 100 ft (30.5 m) by hinged stanchions. The hinged stanchions stood upright while holding up the guide cable. As the vehicle was towed down the line, the guide flag struck and knocked each stanchion to the ground.

### **6.3 Test Vehicle**

For test no. [ILT-1,](#page-141-0) a 2009 Dodge Ram 1500 Quadcab was used as the test vehicle. This vehicle meets the requirements for a MASH 2270P pickup truck. The curb, test inertial, and gross static vehicle weights were 4,961 lb (2,250 kg), 5000 lb (2,268 kg), and 5,165 lb (2,343 kg), respectively. The test vehicle is shown in [Figure 99,](#page-130-0) and vehicle dimensions are shown in [Figure](#page-131-0)  [100.](#page-131-0)

For test no. [ILT-2,](#page-162-1) a 2009 Hyundai Accent was used as the test vehicle. This vehicle meets the requirements for a MASH 1100C passenger car. The curb, test inertial, and gross static vehicle weights were 2,434 lb (1,104 kg), 2,420 lb (1,098 kg), and 2,586 lb (1,173 kg), respectively. The test vehicle is shown in [Figure 101,](#page-132-0) and vehicle dimensions are shown in [Figure 102.](#page-133-0)

The longitudinal component of the center of gravity (c.g.) was determined using the measured axle weights. The Suspension Method [\[30\]](#page-192-1) was used to determine the vertical component of the c.g. for the pickup truck. This method is based on the principle that the c.g. of any freely suspended body is in the vertical plane through the point of suspension. The vehicle was suspended successively in three positions, and the respective planes containing the c.g. were established. The intersection of these planes pinpointed the final c.g. location for the test inertial condition. The vertical component of the c.g. for the 1100C vehicle was determined utilizing a procedure published by SAE [\[31\]](#page-192-2). The location of the c.g. for test nos[. ILT-1](#page-141-0) and [ILT-2](#page-162-1) are shown in Figures 100 and 102, respectively. Data used to calculate the location of the c.g. are shown in [Appendix F.](#page-333-0)

<span id="page-130-0"></span>

Figure 99. Test Vehicle, Test No. [ILT-1](#page-141-0)



<span id="page-131-0"></span>Figure 100. Vehicle Dimensions, Test No. [ILT-1](#page-141-0)



<span id="page-132-0"></span>Figure 101. Test Vehicle, Test No. [ILT-2](#page-162-1)



<span id="page-133-0"></span>Figure 102. Vehicle Dimensions, Test No. [ILT-2](#page-162-1)

Square, black- and white-checkered targets were placed on the vehicle for reference to be viewed from the high-speed digital video cameras and aid in the video analysis, as shown in Figures 103 and 104. Round, checkered targets were placed on the center of gravity on the leftside door, the right-side door, and the roof of the vehicle. The front wheels of the test vehicle were aligned to vehicle standards except the toe-in value was adjusted to zero so that the vehicles would track properly along the guide cable. A 5B flash bulb was mounted on the left side of the vehicle's dash and was fired by a pressure tape switch mounted at the impact corner of the bumper. The flash bulb was fired upon initial impact with the test article to create a visual indicator of the precise time of impact on the high-speed videos. A remote controlled brake system was installed in the test vehicle so the vehicle could be brought safely to a stop after the test.

### **6.4 Simulated Occupant**

For test nos. [ILT-1](#page-141-0) and [ILT-2,](#page-162-1) a Hybrid II 50<sup>th</sup>-Percentile, Adult Male Dummy, equipped with clothing and footwear, was placed in the right-front and left-front seat of the test vehicles, respectively, with the seat belt fastened. The dummy, which had a final weight of approximately 170 lb (77 kg), was represented by model no. 572, serial no. 451, and was manufactured by Android Systems of Carson, California. As recommended by MASH, the dummy was not included in calculating the c.g. location.

## **6.5 Data Acquisition Systems**

## **6.5.1 Accelerometers**

Two environmental shock and vibration sensor/recorder systems were used to measure the accelerations in the longitudinal, lateral, and vertical directions. Both accelerometers were mounted near the center of gravity of the test vehicles. The electronic accelerometer data obtained in dynamic testing was filtered using the SAE Class 60 and the SAE Class 180 Butterworth filter conforming to the SAE J211/1 specifications [\[32\]](#page-193-0).

The SLICE-1 and SLICE-2 units were modular data acquisition systems manufactured by Diversified Technical Systems, Inc. (DTS) of Seal Beach, California. The acceleration sensors were mounted inside the bodies of custom built SLICE 6DX event data recorders and recorded data at 10,000 Hz to the onboard microprocessor. Each SLICE 6DX was configured with 7 GB of non-volatile flash memory, a range of ±500 g's, a sample rate of 10,000 Hz, and a 1,650 Hz (CFC 1000) anti-aliasing filter. The "SLICEWare" computer software programs and a customized Microsoft Excel worksheet were used to analyze and plot the accelerometer data.

### **6.5.2 Rate Transducers**

Two angular rate sensor systems mounted inside the bodies of the SLICE-1 and SLICE-2 event data recorders were used to measure the rates of rotation of the test vehicle. Each SLICE MICRO Triax ARS had a range of 1,500 degrees/sec in each of the three directions (roll, pitch, and yaw) and recorded data at 10,000 Hz to the onboard microprocessors. The raw data measurements were then downloaded, converted to the proper Euler angles for analysis, and plotted. The "SLICEWare" computer software program and a customized Microsoft Excel worksheet were used to analyze and plot the angular rate sensor data.



Figure 103. Target Geometry, Test No. [ILT-1](#page-141-0)



Figure 104. Target Geometry, Test No. [ILT-2](#page-162-1)

## **6.5.3 Retroreflective Optic Speed Trap**

The retroreflective optic speed trap was used to determine the speed of the vehicle before impact. Three retroreflective targets, spaced at approximately 18-in. (457-mm) intervals, were applied to the side of the vehicle. When the emitted beam of light was reflected by the targets and returned to the Emitter/Receiver, a signal was sent to the data acquisition computer, recording at 10,000 Hz, as well as the external LED box activating the LED flashes. The speed was then calculated using the spacing between the retroreflective targets and the time between the signals. LED lights and high-speed digital video analysis are only used as a backup in the event that vehicle speeds cannot be determined from the electronic data.

### **6.5.4 Load Cells**

Load cells were installed at the downstream and upstream anchorage systems for test nos. [ILT-1](#page-141-0) and [ILT-2.](#page-162-1) The load cells were Transducer Techniques model no. TLL-50K with a load range up to 50 kips (222 kN). During testing, output voltage signals were sent from the transducers to a National Instruments PCI-6071E data acquisition board, acquired with LabView software, and stored on a personal computer at a sample rate of 10,000 Hz. The positioning and set up of the transducers are shown in [Figure 105.](#page-137-0)



(a)

<span id="page-137-0"></span>

Figure 105. Location of Load Cells: (a) Upstream and (b) Downstream Anchorage Systems

### **6.5.1 Digital Photography**

Three AOS X-PRI high-speed digital video cameras, one AOS S-VIT 1531 high-speed video camera, one AOS TRI–VIT 2236 high-speed video camera, four GoPro Hero 3+ digital video cameras, seven GoPro Hero 4 digital video cameras, and one JVC digital video camera were utilized to film test no. [ILT-1.](#page-141-0) Camera details, camera operating speeds, lens information, and a schematic of the camera locations relative to the system are shown in [Figure 106.](#page-139-0)

Three AOS X-PRI high-speed digital video cameras, one AOS S-VIT 1531 high-speed video camera, one AOS TRI–VIT 2236 high-speed video camera, four GoPro Hero 3+ digital video cameras, eight GoPro Hero 4 digital video cameras, and one JVC digital video camera were utilized to film test no. [ILT-2.](#page-162-1) Camera details, camera operating speeds, lens information, and a schematic of the camera locations relative to the system are shown in [Figure 107.](#page-140-0)

The high-speed videos were analyzed using ImageExpress MotionPlus and RedLake MotionScope software programs. Actual camera speed and camera divergence factors were considered in the analysis of the high-speed videos. A Nikon D50 digital still camera was also used to document pre- and post-test conditions for all tests.





<span id="page-139-0"></span>Figure 106. Camera Locations, Camera Speeds, and Lens Settings, Test No. [ILT-1](#page-141-1)



No.	Type	<b>Operating Speed</b> (frames/sec)	Lens	Lens Setting
$AOS-5$	<b>AOS X-PRI Gigabit</b>	500	Telespar 135mm Fixed	
AOS- $6$	<b>AOS X-PRI Gigabit</b>	500	Sigma 28-70 DG	
$AOS-7$	<b>AOS X-PRI Gigabit</b>	500	Sigma 28-70	35
$AOS-8$	<b>AOS S-VIT 1531</b>	500	Kowa 16 mm Fixed	35
$AOS-9$	<b>AOS TRI-VIT 2236</b>	1000	Kowa 12 mm Fixed	
$GP-3$	GoPro Hero 3+	120		
$GP-4$	GoPro Hero 3+	120		
$GP-5$	GoPro Hero 3+	120		
$GP-6$	GoPro Hero 3+	120		
$GP-7$	GoPro Hero 4	240		
$GP-8$	GoPro Hero 4	240		
$GP-9$	GoPro Hero 4	120		
$GP-10$	GoPro Hero 4	240		
$GP-11$	GoPro Hero 4	120		
$GP-12$	GoPro Hero 4	120		
$GP-13$	GoPro Hero 4	240		
$GP-14$	GoPro Hero 4	120		
$JVC-2$	$JVC - GZ-MG27u$ (Everio)	29.97		

<span id="page-140-0"></span>Figure 107. Camera Locations, Camera Speeds, and Lens Settings, Test No. [ILT-2](#page-162-0)

## <span id="page-141-1"></span><span id="page-141-0"></span>**7 FULL-SCALE CRASH TEST NO. ILT-1**

## **7.1 Static Soil Test**

Before full-scale crash test no. [ILT-1](#page-141-0) was conducted, the strength of the foundation soil was evaluated with a static test, as described in MASH. The static test results, as shown in [Appendix G,](#page-336-0) demonstrated a soil resistance above the baseline test limits. Thus, the soil provided adequate strength, and full-scale crash testing could be conducted on the barrier system.

## **7.2 Weather Conditions**

Test no. [ILT-1](#page-141-0) was conducted on September 23, 2016 at approximately 3:00 p.m. The weather conditions as per the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (station 14939/LNK) were reported and are shown in [Table 15.](#page-141-2)



<span id="page-141-2"></span>Table 15. Weather Conditions, Test No. [ILT-1](#page-141-0)

# **7.3 Test Description**

The 5,000-lb (2,268-kg) Dodge Ram pickup truck impacted the combination MGS with luminaire pole at a speed of 62.6 mph (100.7 km/h) and at an angle of 25.2 degrees. Initial vehicle impact was to occur 4 in. (102 mm) downstream from post no. 11, as shown in [Figure 108.](#page-142-0) As detailed in Chapter [4,](#page-29-0) the impact point was selected through LS-DYNA analysis to maximize the MGS deflection, the longitudinal ORA, and the potential for vehicle snag. The actual impact point was 3 in. (76 mm) downstream from post no. 11. A sequential description of the impact events is contained in [Table 16.](#page-143-0) A summary of the test results and sequential photographs are shown in [Figure 109.](#page-145-0) Additional sequential photographs are shown in Figures 110 through 111.

Upon impact, the right-front bumper contacted the rail at post no. 11. At 0.160 seconds, the right-front fender struck the pole and began to crush inward. At 0.170, the right-front tire snagged on post no. 13, while the pickup truck was at an angle of 17.3 degrees relative to the MGS. Then, the light pole base fractured, disengaged, and began to fall toward the ground. At 0.320 seconds, the vehicle became parallel to the system, and at 0.860 seconds, the vehicle exited the system. At 1.414 seconds, the pole came to rest on top of the guardrail between post nos. 14 and 15. The vehicle came to rest 83 ft  $-6$  in. (25.5 m) downstream from impact and 6 ft  $-6$  in. (2.0) m) laterally in front of the traffic side of the guardrail system. The vehicle trajectory and final position are shown in [Figure 112.](#page-148-0)

<span id="page-142-0"></span>

Figure 108. Impact Location, Test No. [ILT-1](#page-141-0)

<b>TIME</b> (sec)	<b>EVENT</b>		
0.0	Vehicle's right-front bumper contacted rail 3 in. (76 mm) downstream from post no. 11, and vehicle's front bumper deformed.		
0.002	Post no. 11 deflected backward.		
0.010	Post no. 12 deflected backward. Vehicle right fender contacted rail and deformed.		
0.012	Post no. 10 deflected backward.		
0.014	Vehicle's right headlight deformed.		
0.023	Post no. 11 twisted clockwise.		
0.026	Post no. 12 twisted counterclockwise.		
0.028	Post no. 15 twisted counterclockwise; Post nos. 16, 17, and 18 twisted counterclockwise; and engine hood deformed.		
0.030	Vehicle rolled toward barrier.		
0.034	Post no. 14 twisted counterclockwise. Post nos. 7, 8, 9, and 10 twisted clockwise.		
0.036	Post no. 13 twisted counterclockwise and deflected backward.		
0.042	Post no. 12 bent backward and downstream.		
0.054	Vehicle yawed away from barrier.		
0.056	Post no. 13 bent downstream.		
0.060	Post no. 14 deflected backward.		
0.064	Post no. 12 disengaged away from rail.		
0.114	Post no. 13 disengaged away from rail.		
0.120	Post no. 14 bent downstream.		
0.128	Post no. 15 deflected backward.		
0.140	Blockout no. 13 contacted light pole.		
0.160	Vehicle's right-front fender contacted light pole.		
0.162	Post no. 14 disengaged away from rail.		
0.164	Light pole fell toward ground.		
0.170	Vehicle's right-front wheel contacted light pole base. Light pole base disengaged away from ground.		
0.176	Vehicle's right-front door contacted rail and deformed.		
0.182	Post no. 15 bent downstream.		
0.188	Vehicle rolled away from barrier.		
0.192	Post no. 16 deflected backward.		
0.194	Vehicle's right-rear door deformed.		

<span id="page-143-0"></span>Table 16. Sequential Description of Impact Events, Test No. [ILT-1](#page-141-0)






Figure 109. Summary of Test Results and Sequential Photographs, Test No. [ILT-1](#page-141-0)



Figure 110. Additional Sequential Photographs, Test No. [ILT-1](#page-141-1)





0.000 sec



0.180 sec



0.360 sec



0.540sec



0.720 sec



0.900 sec

Figure 111. Additional Sequential Photographs, Test No. [ILT-1](#page-141-1)



Figure 112. Vehicle Final Position and Trajectory Marks, Test No. [ILT-1](#page-141-1)

# **7.4 Barrier Damage**

Damage to the barrier was moderate, as shown in Figures 113 through 118. Barrier damage consisted of deformed guardrail posts, disengaged wooden blockouts, contact marks on a guardrail section and posts, and deformed W-beam rail. The length of vehicle contact along the MGS was approximately 39 ft  $-11$  in. (12.2 m), which spanned 3 in. (76 mm) downstream from post no. 11 to 32 in. (813 mm) downstream from post no. 17. The second contact between the vehicle and the rail spanned from 32 in. (813 mm) upstream from post no. 24 to 15½ in. (394 mm) upstream from post no. 25.

Moderate deformation and flattening of the W-beam rail occurred between post nos. 11 and 14. Flattening occurred on the bottom corrugation of the rail from 47½ in. (1.2 m) downstream from post no. 11 to 23 in. (584 mm) upstream of the midspan between post nos. 14 and 15. Kinks were found in the rail at the top corrugation 36 in. (914 mm) downstream from post no. 11 and at the bottom corrugation 4½ in. (114 mm) upstream from post no. 12. The W-beam rail released from post nos. 13 through 16 during the impact and disengaged from post nos. 3 through 11 due to the secondary strike from the pole. All splice locations were measured before and after the test. A maximum splice movement of  $\frac{3}{4}$  in. (19 mm) was recorded at one location in the contact region, which was located between post nos. 12 and 13.

Although the post bolts pulled through the rail at the upstream anchor, the cable anchor remained intact between the rail and the bottom of post no. 1, as shown in [Figure 118.](#page-155-0) Blockout no. 13 disengaged away from post no. 13 after the post-to-rail bolt fractured. Post nos. 12 through 16 bent backward and downstream at the ground line. Soil heaves began to form behind the nontraffic side flange of post nos. 12 and 15. The downstream anchorage was undamaged.

The maximum lateral permanent set rail deflection was 22.5 in. (572 mm) at midspan between post nos. 14 and 15, as measured in the field. The maximum lateral dynamic rail and post deflections were 44.1 in. (1,120 mm)at the midspan between post nos. 14 and 15, and 16 in. (406 mm) at post no. 13, respectively, as determined from high-speed digital video analysis. The working width of the system was 47.3 in. (1,201 mm), as measured at the midspan between post nos. 14 and 15. The light pole landed 25.9 ft (7.9 m) behind and 27 1/8 in. (689 mm) in front of the rail face.



Figure 113. Midwest Guardrail System Damage, Test No. [ILT-1](#page-141-1)



Figure 114. Rail Damage, Test No. [ILT](#page-141-0) - 1



Figure 115. System Damage, Post Nos. 8 through 14, Test No. [ILT](#page-141-0)-1



Figure 116. System Damage, Post Nos. 15 through 17 Damage, Test No. [ILT](#page-141-0)-1



Figure 117. Upstream Anchor Damage, Test No. [ILT-1](#page-141-1)



Figure 118. Downstream Anchor Damage, Test No. [ILT-1](#page-141-1)

# <span id="page-155-0"></span>**7.5 Light Pole Damage**

In test no. [ILT-1,](#page-141-1) the light pole base fractured, disengaged, thus causing the pole to fall on the guardrail, and then impacted the ground. Pole damage consisted of the base tearing out, detachment of bolt covers, fracture of mast arm braces, and contact marks on the pole and base. A 6-in. tall x 12-in. wide (152-mm tall x 305-mm wide) section on the upstream edge of the transformer base and a 6-in. tall x 4.5-in. wide (152-mm tall x 114-mm wide) section on the front side of the transformer base fractured, as shown in [Figure 119.](#page-156-0) The foundation bolts were exposed, but not damaged. Contact marks were visible at 6 in. (152 mm) and 24 in. (610 mm) above the base along the front side of the pole, while scrapes were found on the back side of the pole at 31 in. above the base. The pole's mast arm braces fractured while hitting the guardrail. The vertical braces of mast arm fractured from the bottom member.

<span id="page-156-0"></span>

Figure 119. Pole Damage, Test No. [ILT-1](#page-141-1)

# **7.6 Vehicle Damage**

The damage to the vehicle was moderate, as shown in Figures 120 and 121. The maximum occupant compartment deformations are listed in [Table 17](#page-157-0) along with the deformation limits established in MASH for various areas of the occupant compartment. None of the established MASH deformation limits were exceeded. Complete occupant compartment and vehicle deformations and the corresponding locations are provided in [Appendix H.](#page-340-0)



<span id="page-157-0"></span>

The majority of vehicle damage was concentrated on the right-front corner and right side of the vehicle where impact occurred. A 9/16-in. (14-mm) gap formed between the hood and right fender. The right-front corner of the bumper was crushed inward approximately 8 in. (203 mm). The right fender was crushed backward to the door panel and was dented and torn behind the rightfront wheel. The right-front door had a 5-in. x 2-in. x  $\frac{1}{4}$ -in. (127-mm x 51-mm x 6-mm) dent approximately 8 in. (203 mm) above the bottom. The right headlight fractured and crushed backward. The left taillight cracked. The right-front wheel assembly deformed and crushed inward toward the engine compartment. The right-front tire was deflated, and it had a 1½-in. (38-mm) tear in its sidewall. The right-front rim was fractured, and a 9-in. x 7-in. (229-mm x 178-mm) section disengaged. Gouges and dents were found on the right-front door and the right-front corner of the hood. A 3-in. wide x 1-in. deep x 10-in. long (76-mm x 25-mm x 254-mm) gouge was found on the right-rear bumper. The airbags did not deployed during the impact. The overall undercarriage damage included some scraping on the driver-side front knuckle assembly, a tear above the lower control arm on the frame, and scraping on the transmission cross member end on the passenger side.



Figure 120. Vehicle Damage, Test No. [ILT-1](#page-141-1)









Figure 121. Vehicle Damage, Test No. [ILT](#page-141-0) - 1

# **7.7 Occupant Risk**

The calculated occupant impact velocities (OIVs) and maximum 0.010-sec average occupant ridedown accelerations (ORAs) in both the longitudinal and lateral directions are shown in [Table 18.](#page-160-0) The OIVs and ORAs were within suggested limits, as provided in MASH. The calculated THIV, PHD, and ASI values are also shown in [Table 18.](#page-160-0) The results of the occupant risk analysis, as determined from the accelerometer data, are summarized in [Table 18.](#page-160-0) The recorded data from the accelerometers and the rate transducers are shown graphically in [Appendix](#page-353-0)  [I.](#page-353-0) The SLICE-2 unit was designated as the primary accelerometer unit during this test, as it was mounted closer to the c.g. of the vehicle.



<span id="page-160-0"></span>Table 18. Summary of OIV, ORA, THIV, PHD, and ASI Values, Test No. [ILT-1](#page-141-1)

# **7.8 Load Cells**

The pertinent data from the load cells was extracted from the bulk signal and analyzed using the transducer's calibration factor. The recorded data and analyzed results are shown in [Figure 122](#page-161-0) and detailed in [Appendix K.](#page-387-0) The exact moment of impact could not be determined from the transducer data as impact may have occurred a few milliseconds prior to a measurable signal increase in the data. Thus, the extracted data curves should not be taken as precise time after impact, but rather a general time line between events within the data curve itself.

**ILT-1 Cable Anchor Loads**



<span id="page-161-0"></span>Figure 122. Cable Anchor Loads, Test No. [ILT-1](#page-141-1)

#### **7.9 Discussion**

The analysis of the test results for test no. [ILT-1](#page-141-1) showed that the MGS with a light pole installed at a lateral pole offset of 20 in. (508 mm) behind the back of the steel post and a longitudinal offset of 24-in. (610-mm) away from post no. 13 adequately contained and redirected the 2270P vehicle with controlled lateral displacements of the barrier. There were no detached elements nor fragments that showed potential for penetrating the occupant compartment nor presented undue hazard to other traffic. Deformations of, or intrusions into, the occupant compartment that could have caused serious injury did not occur. The test vehicle did not penetrate nor ride over the barrier and remained upright during and after the collision. Vehicle roll, pitch, and yaw angular displacements, as shown in [Appendix I,](#page-353-0) were deemed acceptable because they did not adversely influence occupant risk safety criteria nor cause rollover. After impact, the vehicle exited the barrier at an angle of 11.7 degrees, and its trajectory did not violate the bounds of the exit box. Therefore, test no. [ILT-1](#page-141-1) conducted on the MGS with a 20-in. lateral offset away from a breakaway pole was determined to be acceptable according to the MASH safety performance criteria for test designation no. 3-11.

Regarding the comparison of the test and simulation results (presented in Chapter 4), it should be noted that due to the lack of pole fracture in the simulations, there were some discrepancies between the test observations and numerical results, including lower occupant risk values and less aggressive fender snag and crushing in the actual test. The lateral and longitudinal ORAs in test no. ILT-1 were 7.8 and 14.7 g's, while simulated lateral and longitudinal ORAs were 9.8 and 17.8 g's. In the actual test, the right fender was crushed backward to the door panel. Similar fender snag on the pole was observed in the simulation. In general, the simulation with the assumption of the rigid pole could conservatively replicate the impact well.

## <span id="page-162-2"></span><span id="page-162-0"></span>**8 FULL-SCALE CRASH TEST NO. ILT-2**

#### **8.1 Static Soil Test**

Before full-scale crash test no. [ILT-2](#page-162-0) was conducted, the strength of the foundation soil was evaluated with a static test, as described in MASH. The static test results, as shown in [Appendix G,](#page-336-0) demonstrated a soil resistance above the baseline test limits. Thus, the soil provided adequate strength, and full-scale crash testing could be conducted on the barrier system.

#### **8.2 Weather Conditions**

Test no. [ILT-2](#page-162-0) was conducted on September 28, 2016 at approximately 2:00 p.m. The weather conditions as per the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (station 14939/LNK) were reported and are shown in [Table 19.](#page-162-1)



<span id="page-162-1"></span>Table 19. Weather Conditions, Test No. [ILT-2](#page-162-0)

# **8.3 Test Description**

The 2,420-lb (1,098-kg) Hyundai Accent car impacted the combination MGS with luminaire pole at a speed of 62.7 mph (100.9 km/h) and at an angle of 24.8 degrees. Initial vehicle impact was to occur at midspan between post nos. 11 and 12, as shown in [Figure 123,](#page-163-0) which was selected based on LS-DYNA analysis and previous crash testing. The actual impact point was 1 in. (25 mm) upstream from the targeted impact point (midspan between post nos. 11 an 12). A sequential description of the impact events is contained in [Table 20.](#page-164-0) A summary of the test results and sequential photographs are shown in [Figure 124.](#page-165-0) Additional sequential photographs are shown in Figures 125 and 126.

Upon impact, the vehicle's front bumper contacted the rail at 5¼ in. (133 mm) downstream from midspan between post nos. 11 and 12. At 0.090 seconds, vehicle bumper contacted post no. 13, and the left-front tire underrode the rail and snagged on post no. 13. Post no. 13 deflected backward but did not contact the pole nor the base. The left-front wheel barely grazed the base of the pole. Thus, the pole did not fracture. The vehicle was safely captured and redirected. At 0.320 seconds, the vehicle was parallel to the system. At 0.600 seconds, the vehicle exited the system. The vehicle came to rest 137 ft  $-1$  in. (41.8 m) downstream from impact and 32 ft  $-5$  in. (9.9 m) laterally in front of the traffic side of the guardrail system. The vehicle trajectory and final position are shown in [Figure 127.](#page-168-0)

<span id="page-163-0"></span>

Figure 123. Impact Location, Test No. [ILT-2](#page-162-0)

<b>TIME</b> (sec)	<b>EVENT</b>				
0.0	Vehicle's right-front bumper contacted rail 51/4 in. (133 mm) downstream from midspan between post nos. 11 and 12.				
0.004	Vehicle's front bumper deformed.				
0.008	Post no. 12 deflected backward. Vehicle's hood deformed.				
0.010	Vehicle's left-front headlight and left-front fender deformed.				
0.016	Post no. 11 deflected backward.				
0.018	Post no. 13 deflected backward.				
0.031	Post no. 11 twisted counterclockwise.				
0.036	Vehicle yawed away from barrier and post no. 10 twisted counterclockwise.				
0.039	Post no. 9 twisted counterclockwise.				
0.040	Post nos. 7 and 8 twisted counterclockwise.				
0.041	Post no. 6 twisted counterclockwise and post no. 14 twisted clockwise.				
0.044	Post nos. 15 and 16 twisted clockwise.				
0.052	Post nos. 1 and 2 twisted counterclockwise.				
0.056	Post no. 10 deflected backward. Vehicle rolled away from barrier.				
0.060	Vehicle pitched downward.				
0.062	Post no. 29 deflected upstream.				
0.076	Vehicle left-front door deformed.				
0.077	Post no. 13 twisted clockwise.				
0.081	Post no. 13 deflected downstream and fracture at ground line.				
0.089	Vehicle's front bumper contacted post no. 13.				
0.093	Post no. 13 disengaged away from rail.				
0.097	Post nos. 14 and 15 deflected backward.				
0.125	Vehicle detached front bumper contacted traffic side of light pole.				
0.150	Vehicle pitched upward.				
0.160	Post no. 14 deflected downstream.				
0.166	Vehicle front bumper contacted post no. 14.				
0.168	Post no. 14 disengaged away from rail and fractured at ground line				
0.258	Post no. 15 deflected downstream. Vehicle's front bumper contacted post no. 15.				
0.276	Post no. 15 disengaged away from rail and fractured at ground line.				
0.320	Vehicle became parallel to barrier at a speed of 29.4 mph (47.3 km/h)				
0.450	Post no. 16 deflected downstream.				
0.650	Vehicle exited system at a speed of 26.7 mph (42.9 km/h) and at an angle of 8.2 degrees.				

<span id="page-164-0"></span>Table 20. Sequential Description of Impact Events, Test No. [ILT-2](#page-162-0)





<span id="page-165-0"></span>Figure 124. Summary of Test Results and Sequential Photographs, Test No. [ILT-2](#page-162-2)

151



0.000 sec



0.120 sec



0.240 sec



0.360 sec



0.480 sec



0.600 sec



0.000 sec



0.120 sec



0.240 sec



0.360 sec



0.480 sec



0.600 sec

Figure 125. Additional Sequential Photographs, Test No. [ILT-2](#page-162-0)



0.000 sec



0.120 sec



0.240 sec



0.360 sec







0.600 sec



0.000 sec



0.120 sec



0.240 sec



0.360 sec



0.480 sec



0.600 sec

Figure 126. Additional Sequential Photographs, Test No. [ILT-2](#page-162-0)

<span id="page-168-0"></span>

Figure 127. Vehicle Final Position and Trajectory Marks, Test No. [ILT-2](#page-162-0)

### **8.4 Barrier Damage**

Damage to the barrier was moderate, as shown in Figures 128 through 131. Barrier damage consisted of deformed guardrail posts, disengaged wooden blockouts, contact marks on a guardrail section and posts, and deformed W-beam rail. The length of vehicle contact along the MGS was approximately 27 ft – 11 in.  $(8.5 \text{ m})$ , which spanned from 1 in.  $(25 \text{ mm})$  upstream from the midspan between post nos. 11 and 12 to 4 in. (102 mm) upstream of post no. 16.

Moderate flattening of the W-beam rail occurred between post nos. 12 and 15. Several kinks were found at the top and bottom corrugations of the rail between post nos. 12 and 16. Tire marks were found at the top and bottom corrugation of the rail beginning from the impact point (1 in. (25 mm) upstream from the midspan between post nos. 11 and 12) up to post no. 16. All splice locations were measured before and after the test. A maximum splice movement of  $\frac{3}{4}$  in. (19 mm) was recorded at one location in the contact region, which was located between post nos. 13 and 14.

Post nos. 13 and 14 bent longitudinally downstream at the ground-line. The 20-in. (508 mm) long part of the front flange of post no. 13 twisted. The front upstream flange of post nos. 14 and 15 bent inward toward the web. Post no. 15 partially rotated backward and downstream. Post nos. 13, 14, and 15 disengaged away from the rail. The blockout bolt hole at post no. 16 deformed, but it did not tear. Vertical cracks were found in the blockouts of post nos. 1 through 8, 17 and 18. A 4¼-in. (108-mm) and a 1¼-in. (32 mm) soil gap was found on the front and back sides of post no. 12, respectively. The upstream and downstream anchors were undamaged.

The maximum lateral permanent set rail deflection was 22.5 in. (572 mm) at the midspan between post nos. 13 and 14, as measured in the field. The maximum lateral dynamic rail and post deflections were 29.4 in. (747 mm) at the midspan between post nos. 13 and 14 and 15.1 in. (384 mm) at post no. 14, respectively, as determined from high-speed digital video analysis. The working width of the system was 35.8 in. (909 mm), as measured at the midspan between post nos. 13 and 14.



Figure 128. Midwest Guardrail System Damage, Test No. [ILT-2](#page-162-0)



Figure 129. System Damage, Post Nos. 10 through 12, Test No. [ILT-2](#page-162-0)



Figure 130. System Damage, Post Nos. 13 through 15, Test No. [ILT-2](#page-162-0)







# **8.5 Light Pole Damage**

In test no. [ILT-2,](#page-162-0) the left-front wheel barely grazed the base of the pole. Thus, the pole did not fracture. Contact marks were visible at the front side of the base, as shown in [Figure 132.](#page-173-0)

<span id="page-173-0"></span>

Figure 132. Pole Contact Marks, Test No. [ILT-2](#page-162-0)

## **8.6 Vehicle Damage**

The damage to the vehicle was moderate, as shown in Figures 133 through 135. The maximum occupant compartment deformations are listed in [Table 21](#page-174-0) along with the deformation limits established in MASH for various areas of the occupant compartment. None of the established MASH deformation limits were violated. Complete occupant compartment and vehicle deformations and the corresponding locations are provided in [Appendix H.](#page-340-0)



<span id="page-174-0"></span>

The vehicle damage was mostly concentrated on the left-front corner, where impact occurred. The left side of the hood buckled upward and crushed backward. The left fender crushed inward approximately 14 in. (356 mm) toward the engine compartment. Scrapes were found along the left fender 18 in. and 26 in. (457 mm and 660 mm) from the bottom of the fender. A 5-in. (127 mm) gap formed between the hood and right fender. The front bumper and bumper cover detached. The left headlight fractured, crushed, and remained attached. A 5-in. wide x  $\frac{1}{2}$ -in. deep x 8-in. long (127-mm wide x 13-mm deep x 203-mm long) dent and scratches occurred in the left-front door. The radiator bent and dented. The front wheel assembly remained undamaged. The lower left section of the windshield had a crack 11 in. (279 mm) inward and 26 in. (660 mm) upward, as shown in [Figure 135.](#page-177-0) The left fender and the left-front door overlapped ½ in. (13 mm).

The overall undercarriage damage of the vehicle included a scrape behind the engine cross member and a 3 in. (76 mm) of crush on the driver-side frame horn. The radiator cross member bent upward on the driver side for 2 in. (51 mm).



Figure 133. Vehicle Damage, Test No. [ILT-2](#page-162-0)







Figure 134. Vehicle Damage, Test No. [ILT-2](#page-162-0)



<span id="page-177-0"></span>Figure 135. Vehicle Windshield Crack, Test No. [ILT-2](#page-162-0)

# **8.7 Occupant Risk**

The calculated occupant impact velocities (OIVs) and maximum 0.010-sec average occupant ridedown accelerations (ORAs) in both the longitudinal and lateral directions are shown in [Table 22.](#page-178-0) Note that the OIVs and ORAs were within suggested limits, as provided in MASH. The calculated THIV, PHD, and ASI values are also shown in [Table 22.](#page-178-0) The results of the occupant risk analysis, as determined from the accelerometer data, are summarized in [Table 22.](#page-178-0) The recorded data from the accelerometers and the rate transducers are shown graphically in [Appendix](#page-370-0)  [J.](#page-370-0) The SLICE-1 unit was designated as the primary accelerometer unit during this test, as it was mounted closer to the c.g. of the vehicle.

<b>Evaluation Criteria</b>		<b>Transducer</b>		<b>MASH</b>
		<b>SLICE-1</b> (Primary)	<b>SLICE-2</b>	<b>Limits</b>
<b>OIV</b>	Longitudinal	$-20.0$ $(-6.1)$	$-21.0$ $(-6.4)$	$\pm$ 40 (12.2)
$ft/s$ (m/s)	Lateral	15.4 (4.7)	15.4 (4.7)	$\pm$ 40 (12.2)
<b>ORA</b>	Longitudinal	$-10.5$	$-10.2$	± 20.49
g's	Lateral	10.6	11.0	± 20.49
MAX.	Roll	6.6	7.5	± 75
<b>ANGULAR</b> DISPL.	Pitch	$-3.0$	$-2.8$	± 75
deg.	Yaw	40.6	39.7	not required
<b>THIV</b> $ft/s$ (m/s)		24.3(7.4)	23.9(7.3)	not required
<b>PHD</b> g's		14.3	14.7	not required
<b>ASI</b>		0.985	0.945	not required

<span id="page-178-0"></span>Table 22. Summary of OIV, ORA, THIV, PHD, and ASI Values, Test No. [ILT-2](#page-162-0)

## **8.8 Load Cells**

The pertinent data from the load cells was extracted from the bulk signal and analyzed in [Figure 136](#page-179-0) and detailed in [Appendix K.](#page-387-0) The exact moment of impact could not be determined from the transducer data as impact may have occurred a few milliseconds prior to a measurable signal increase in the data. Thus, the extracted data curves should not be taken as precise time after impact, but rather a general time line between events within the data curve itself.

**ILT-2 Cable Anchor Loads**



<span id="page-179-0"></span>Figure 136. Cable Anchor Loads, Test No. [ILT-2](#page-162-0)

#### **8.9 Discussion**

Analysis of the test results for test no. [ILT-2](#page-162-0) showed that the MGS with a light pole installed with a lateral offset of 20 in. (508 mm) from the back side of the steel-post MGS and a longitudinal offset of 16 in. (406 mm) from post no. 13 adequately contained and redirected the 1100C vehicle with controlled lateral displacements of the barrier. There were no detached elements nor fragments that showed potential for penetrating the occupant compartment nor presented undue hazard to other traffic. Deformations of, or intrusions into, the occupant compartment that could have caused serious injury did not occur. The test vehicle did not penetrate nor ride over the barrier and remained upright during and after the collision. Vehicle roll, pitch, and yaw angular displacements, as shown in [Appendix J,](#page-370-0) were deemed acceptable, because they did not adversely influence occupant risk safety criteria nor cause rollover. After impact, the vehicle exited the barrier at an angle of 12.7 degrees, and its trajectory did not violate the bounds of the exit box. Therefore, test no. [ILT-2](#page-162-0) was determined to be acceptable according to the MASH safety performance criteria for test designation no. 3-10.

The working width of the system was 35.8 in. (909 mm), as measured at the midspan between post nos. 13 and 14, which was 13.5 in. (343 mm) downstream from the pole. However, the maximum dynamic deflection of the rail was 29.4 in. (747 mm) at the midspan between post nos. 13 and 14, and the maximum dynamic deflections of the rail at the adjacent posts (i.e., post nos. 13 and 14) were 27.1 and 26.8 in. (688 and 681 mm), respectively. Since the difference in rail deflection for the entire 75-in. (1,905-mm) long span where the pole was located was less than one inch, it was believed that the pole placed at any location in the span would not interact with the guardrail. Moreover, even if the pole was located at the midspan between post nos. 13 and 14 where the maximum working width of 35.8 in. (909 mm) occurred, the vehicle would not have contacted the pole as it was offset 41 in. (1,041 mm) away from the front face of the rail.
### **9 SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

The safe placement of a light pole with respect to the Midwest Guardrail System was determined through computer simulation and full-scale crash testing. Computer simulation was utilized to select critical impact points and critical pole locations for the full-scale crash tests. A series of computer simulations were conducted on the MGS with varying lateral pole offsets varying from 12 in. to 28 in. (305 mm to 711 mm) and longitudinal pole offsets varying from 0 in. to 37.5 in. (0 mm to 953 mm) from the centerline of the post. In order to determine the minimum safe lateral pole offset, several criteria, such as vehicle stability, occupant risk measures, rail pocketing, vehicle snag on pole, rail deflection, and rail load were evaluated in each simulation. The analyses primarily focused on MASH TL-3 impacts with a 2270P vehicle due to increased dynamic deflections, but several simulations with 1100C vehicle impacts were also performed to ensure that the pole offset was safe for the small car. Based on the results of LS-DYNA simulations, a 406-mm (16-in.) lateral offset away from the back of the MGS posts to front face of pole was initially considered the minimum lateral offset. However, the project sponsor recommended a 20-in. (508-mm) lateral pole offset behind the MGS posts to allow a 10-in. (254 mm) clearance between the concrete pole foundation and line posts. Thus, a 20-in. (508-mm) lateral pole offset was selected.

Based on the simulation and previous crash testing, the most critical pole offset for pickup truck testing was a 20-in. (508-mm) lateral offset away from the back of posts to the front face of the pole and a 24-in. (610-mm) longitudinal offset away from post no. 13 to the centerline of the pole due to high longitudinal ORAs. For small car testing, an 8-in. (203-mm) longitudinal offset away from post no. 13 was found to be the most critical pole placement at a 20-in. (508-mm) lateral pole offset based on the simulation and previous MGS crash testing.

Two full-scale crash tests were performed on the combination MGS with nearby light pole according to the TL-3 safety performance criteria defined in MASH, test designation nos. 3-11 and 3-10. The 50-ft (15.25-m) tall light pole mounted on a 9-in. (229-mm) tall breakaway transformer base was utilized for the crash tests.

In test no. ILT-1, a 5,000-lb (2,268-kg) pickup truck impacted the 31-in. (787-mm) tall MGS offset away from the light pole at a speed of 62.6 mph (100.7 km/h) and at an angle of 25.2 degrees resulting in an impact severity of 117.0 kip-ft (158.6 kJ). The MGS adequately contained and redirected the 2270P vehicle with controlled lateral displacements of the barrier. The pole broke away due to the contact with the pickup truck and fell safely on the ground. All occupant risk criteria were within the recommended MASH safety limits. Thus, test no. ILT-1 passed the safety criteria of MASH test designation no. 3-11. A summary of the safety performance evaluation is provided in [Table 23.](#page-182-0)

In test no. ILT-2, a 2,420-lb (1,098-kg) Hyundai Accent car impacted the 32-in. (813-mm) tall MGS offset away from the light pole at a speed of 62.7 mph (100.9 km/h) and at an angle of 24.8 degrees resulting in an impact severity of 59.4 kip-ft (80.5 kJ). In test no. ILT-2, the left-front tire barely contacted the transformer base. The pole did not fracture, and the car was safely contained and redirected. All occupant risk criteria were within the recommended MASH safety limits, so test no. ILT-2 passed the safety criteria of MASH test designation no. 3-10. A summary of the safety performance evaluation is provided in [Table 23.](#page-182-0)

Based on the results of the crash tests and numerical simulations, it was concluded that a lateral offset of 20 in. (508 mm) between the back of the post and front face of the Illinois Tollway's breakaway light pole (or 41-in. (1,041-mm) between the front face of the MGS rail with 12-in. (305-mm) deep blockouts and the front face of the pole) resulted in a safe performance of the MGS. This lateral offset may be applicable for poles and supports with a similar breakaway mechanism, height, mass, and material. However, different breakaway poles or supports require further evaluation and should not be used within the working width of the MGS.

Since the critical longitudinal offsets of the pole with respect to the MGS posts were evaluated, the breakaway light pole could be placed anywhere behind the MGS exclusive of the restrictions in special applications of the MGS. Further implementation guidance was developed for placement of breakaway poles in special applications, including in guardrail end terminals, MGS trailing-end anchorages, MGS stiffness transitions, approach slopes, long-span MGS, and wood post and non-blockout MGS. This information is provided in the following Chapter [10.](#page-183-0)

<span id="page-182-0"></span>

Evaluation Factors		<b>Evaluation Criteria</b>			Test No. $ILT-1$	Test No. $ILT-2$
Structural Adequacy	A.	Test article should contain and redirect the vehicle or bring the vehicle to a controlled stop; the vehicle should not penetrate, underride, or override the installation although controlled lateral deflection of the test article is acceptable.	<sub>S</sub>	S		
	D.	Detached elements, fragments or other debris from the test article should not penetrate or show potential for penetrating the occupant compartment, or present an undue hazard to other traffic, pedestrians, or personnel in a work zone. Deformations of, or intrusions into, the occupant compartment should not exceed limits set forth in Section 5.2.2 and Appendix E of MASH.	S	S		
	F.	The vehicle should remain upright during and after collision. The maximum roll and pitch angles are not to exceed 75 degrees.				${\bf S}$
Occupant	H.	Occupant Impact Velocity (OIV) (see Appendix A, Section A5.2.2 of MASH for calculation procedure) should satisfy the following limits:				S
<b>Risk</b>		<b>Occupant Impact Velocity Limits</b>				
		Component	Preferred	Maximum		
		Longitudinal and Lateral	30 ft/s $(9.1 \text{ m/s})$	40 ft/s $(12.2 \text{ m/s})$		
	I.	The Occupant Ridedown Acceleration (ORA) (see Appendix A, Section A5.2.2 of MASH for calculation procedure) should satisfy the following limits:				
		Occupant Ridedown Acceleration Limits				S
		Component	Preferred	Maximum		
		Longitudinal and Lateral	15.0 g's	20.49 g's		
<b>MASH Test Designation</b>					$3 - 11$	$3-10$
Pass/Fail					Pass	Pass

Table 23. Summary of Safety Performance Evaluation Results

S – Satisfactory U – Unsatisfactory NA - Not Applicable

### **10 IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE**

### <span id="page-183-0"></span>**10.1 Background**

As previously noted, the research detailed herein demonstrated that the MGS with a 20-in. (508-mm) lateral offset between the back of the MGS posts to the front face of the 50-ft (15.2-m) tall luminaire pole used by the Illinois Tollway mounted on the CS370 breakaway transformer base performed in an acceptable manner according to the TL-3 safety standards of MASH. For the MGS with steel posts spaced at  $6 \text{ ft} - 3 \text{ in.} (1,905 \text{ mm})$  with 12-in. (305-mm) deep wood blockouts, the front face of the breakaway pole can be located 41 in. (1,041 mm) behind the front face of the W-beam rail, or 20 in. (508 mm) behind the back of the steel posts, with restrictions regarding terminals, anchorages, transitions, and special applications. Multiple variations of the MGS system have been developed for special applications that may be more sensitive to the placement of utility poles in close proximity to guardrail. These special applications include terminals and anchorages, MGS stiffness transition to thrie beam approach guardrail transitions, MGS long-span system, MGS adjacent to fill slopes, MGS on 8:1 approach slopes, MGS in combination with curbs, wood post MGS, MGS with 8-in. (203-mm) blockouts, and MGS without blockouts. Since multiple MGS variations are available, recommendations regarding the placement of the breakaway luminaire pole behind the MGS will likely vary depending on the nature and behavior of the special applications listed above.

The following sections provide implementation guidance and/or recommendations regarding pole placement within MGS special applications. This implementation guidance is only applicable to the breakaway light pole that was tested in this study. These recommendations are intended to ensure comparable safety performance of the guardrail systems laterally offset away from the breakaway luminaire pole, which are based on the full-scale testing and any associated research available at the conclusion of this project. Although some installation sites will require systems outside the bounds of these recommendations, the reasoning behind these recommendations should be considered along with other roadside treatments when selecting the specific final site design.

### **10.2 Guardrail Terminals and Anchorages**

Multiple W-beam guardrail end terminals have been developed for use with the MGS. Guardrail terminals are sensitive systems that have been carefully designed to satisfy safety performance standards. Pole placement within a terminal region could significantly degrade a terminal's crashworthiness. For tangent, energy-absorbing approach terminals, it is recommended to have a minimum of 12.5 ft (3.8 m) of standard MGS beyond the inner end of a guardrail terminal (i.e., stroke length) to avoid heavy vehicle contact with pole while engaged with the terminal head, as shown in [Figure 137a](#page-184-0). Second, based on both FHWA Guidelines and 2011 AASHTO Roadside Design Guidelines [\[35\]](#page-193-0), a pole should not be longitudinally placed within a distance of 75 ft (22.8 m) from the end terminal to prevent vehicle from contacting the pole, as shown in [Figure 137b](#page-184-0). Thus, a pole should not be longitudinally placed within a distance of 12.5 ft (3.8 m) plus the stroke length of an end terminal or 75 ft (22.8 m) from the end terminal, whichever is greater. While FHWA Guidelines enforces a minimum clearance distance of 75 ft (22.8 m), Illinois Tollway considers a clear distance of 90 ft (27.4 m) from the end terminal.



\* Pole should not be longitudinally placed within a distance of 12.5 ft (3.8 m) plus the stroke length of an end terminal or 75 ft (22.8 m) from the end terminal, whichever is greater.

<span id="page-184-0"></span>Figure 137. Recommended Distance Between Luminaire Pole Offset MGS and Tangent Energy-Absorbing Terminals

For energy-absorbing terminals that flare away from the roadway, the geometric layout results in increased effective impact angles, which increases system deflections for impacts on or near the flared terminal. Due to the increase in system deflections associated with guardrail flares, it is recommended to have at least 25 ft (7.6 m) of tangent MGS to separate a flared guardrail terminal and a pole, as shown in [Figure 138a](#page-185-0). Considering the FHWA Guidelines and 2011 AASHTO Roadside Design Guidelines in conjunction with flared approach terminals, a pole should not be longitudinally placed within a distance of 25 ft (7.6 m) of tangent MGS or 75 ft (22.8 m) from the end terminal, as shown i[n Figure 138b](#page-185-0), whichever is greater. While FHWA Guidelines enforces a minimum clearance distance of 75 ft (22.8 m), Illinois Tollway considers a clear distance of 90 ft (27.4 m) from the end terminal.

For non-energy absorbing end terminals, the minimum required obstacle-free longitudinal distance is more difficult to address due to different vehicle trajectories behind and beyond terminals. While AASHTO Roadside Design Guidelines recommends a minimum recovery area of 75 ft (22.8 m) long and 20 ft (6 m) wide behind a terminal, it denotes that a larger obstacle-free area for a non-energy absorbing terminal would be desirable. For non-energy absorbing terminals, it is recommended to refer to an end terminal's runout longitudinal distance, as provided by the manufacturers, when determining acceptable pole placement from the end of device.

Moreover, pole placement near trailing-end guardrail anchorages may affect system performance. In the previous study of a reduced-length MGS, a 2270P pickup truck impacted the MGS at 10<sup>th</sup> post from the downstream end of the guardrail. The maximum dynamic lateral deflection was 42.2 in. (1,072 mm) at  $8<sup>th</sup>$  post from the downstream end of the guardrail. The working width of the system was found to be 48.8 in. (1,240 mm) [\[36\]](#page-193-1).

From the noted study, it is believed that pole placement behind the  $8<sup>th</sup>$  post [i.e., 43.75 ft (13.3 m) away from the downstream end of the guardrail system] and upstream from the  $8<sup>th</sup>$  post would result in acceptable vehicle-to-barrier and vehicle-to-pole interaction, which would be similar to the current study findings. Therefore, it is recommended that no pole be placed closer than 43.75 ft (13.3 m) away from the downstream end of the guardrail system, as shown in [Figure](#page-185-1)  [139.](#page-185-1)



\* Pole should not be longitudinally placed within a distance of 25 ft (7.6 m) of tangent MGS or 75 ft (22.8 m) from the end terminal, whichever is greater

<span id="page-185-0"></span>Figure 138. Recommended Distance Between Luminaire Pole Offset MGS and Flared Energy-Absorbing Terminals



<span id="page-185-1"></span>Figure 139. Recommended Distance Between Luminaire Pole Offset MGS and Trailing-End Guardrail Anchorages

#### **10.3 MGS Stiffness Transition**

The MGS stiffness transition was previously developed to connect standard MGS to various thrie beam approach guardrail transitions. Both steel post and wood post versions of the MGS stiffness transition have been developed, as well as a configuration for use adjacent to roadside curbs [\[37](#page-193-2)[-39\]](#page-193-3). Within these previous studies, the maximum dynamic deflections and working widths of the MGS stiffness transition are listed in [Table 24.](#page-186-0) In the current study, the maximum dynamic deflection and working width for test no. ILT-1 were 44.1 in. (1,120 mm) and 47.3 in. (1,201 mm), respectively. In test no. ILT-2, the maximum dynamic deflection and working width were 29.4 in. (747 mm) and 35.8 in. (909 mm), respectively. Therefore, it is believed that it would be acceptable to place a pole at 20 in. (508 mm) or farther between the back of the posts and pole face upstream from a MGS stiffness transition, assuming that a 41-in. (1,041 mm) lateral clearance between the face of the rail and the front face of the pole is provided.

Note that the thrie beam transition and W-beam-to-thrie-beam region deflect less than observed in the MGS due to its higher stiffness and strength. Therefore, a pole can be placed behind a MGS stiffness transition when using a 20-in. (508-mm) lateral offset between the back of post and pole face.

Test No.	<b>Test Article</b>	Vehicle	Weight/Mass $lb$ (kg)	Speed mph (km/h)	Dynamic Deflection in. $(mm)$	Working Width in. $(mm)$
MWTSP-2	<b>MGS Stiffness</b>	2270P	4,993	61.2	32.8	51.6
	Transition		(2,265)	(98.5)	(833)	(1,310)
MWTSP-3	<b>MGS Stiffness</b>	1100C	2,394	61.0	18.5	39.8
	Transition		(1,086)	(98.2)	(470)	(1,011)
MWTC-2	<b>MGS Stiffness</b>	1100C	2,410	61.3	16.4	32.5
	<b>Transition with Curb</b>		(1,168)	(98.7)	(417)	(826)
MWTC-3	<b>MGS Stiffness</b>	2270P	4,969	61.0	23.9	40.8
	<b>Transition with Curb</b>		(2,254)	(98.2)	(607)	(1,036)
$ILT-1$	<b>MGS Offset Pole</b>	2270P	5,000 (2,268)	62.6	44.1	47.3
				(100.7)	(1,120)	(1,201)
$ILT-2$	<b>MGS Offset Pole</b>	1100C	2,420 (1,098)	62.7	29.4	35.8
				(100.9)	(747)	(909)

<span id="page-186-0"></span>Table 24. Summary of MGS Stiffness Transition Crash Test Results

### **10.4 MGS Long-Span System**

The MGS long-span guardrail system was successfully full-scale crash tested using an unsupported span length of 25 ft (7.6 m) with three Controlled Release Terminal (CRT) posts adjacent to each end of the unsupported span [\[40\]](#page-193-4). These CRT posts were incorporated into the system in order to mitigate concerns for wheel snag on posts adjacent to the unsupported span when traversing from the unsupported span to the downstream standard guardrail. The combination of the 25-ft (7.6-m) long unsupported span and breakaway CRT posts led to system deflections and working widths much higher than the standard MGS adjacent to both sides of the long-span system. Since safe pole placement and acceptable MGS performance is affected by system deflections, the pole should be located farther away from the long-span system to ensure that one system does not negatively affect the performance of the other system. Therefore, it is recommended that at least 25 ft (7.6 m) of standard MGS be utilized between the outer CRT post of a long-span system and the pole, applicable to each side of the long span, as shown in [Figure](#page-186-1)  [140.](#page-186-1)



<span id="page-186-1"></span>Figure 140. Recommended Distance between Pole Placement and MGS Long-Span System

### **10.5 MGS Adjacent to Slopes**

Full-scale crash testing has been successfully conducted on three different MGS configurations placed on or adjacent to 1:2 fill slopes [\[41-](#page-193-5)[43\]](#page-194-0). These configurations varied the post length and post placement relative to the slope break point. However, the lack of soil backfill behind the guardrail posts resulted in increased system deflections and working widths for all three MGS configurations. The working widths of the MGS with 6-ft (1.8-m) and 9-ft (2.7-m) long posts located at the slope break point of a 1:2 fill slope were 77.4 in. (1,966 mm) and 64.2 in. (1,631 mm), respectively. For now, it is not recommended to place a pole within these working widths for MGS systems installed at the slope break point of 1:2 to 1:3 fill slopes due to concerns for excessive deflections and an increased risk of post and vehicle interaction with the pole.

### **10.6 MGS on 1:8 Approach Slopes**

Previously, full-scale crash testing was successfully performed on the MGS installed on a 1:8 approach slope with the W-beam positioned 5 ft (1.5 m) laterally behind the slope break point [\[44\]](#page-194-1), as shown in [Figure 141.](#page-187-0)



<span id="page-187-0"></span>Figure 141. MGS on 1:8 Approach Slope

This testing program was conducted according to the NCHRP Report No. 350 impact safety standards using both an 820C small car and a 2000P pickup truck. From the crash testing program, the mounting height of the blocked MGS relative to the airborne trajectory of the front bumper and impact-side wheels was deemed critical for satisfactorily containing the 2000P pickup truck. Both the bumper and c.g. height of the MASH 2270P pickup are higher than the 2000P pickup. Thus, there are concerns that the same system may be unable to successfully capture the pickup truck according to the current MASH safety standards. The placement of a pole near the system may increase safety risks, such as excessive occupant risk, vehicle snag, and/or vehicle override. Since the system was not evaluated under MASH standards, pole placement behind an MGS installed on a 1:8 approach slope is not recommended until further evaluation is conducted.

Note that it is likely acceptable to install a pole behind an MGS installed on a 1:10 approach slope or flatter.

### **10.7 MGS in Combination with Curbs**

During the original MGS development effort, the MGS was crash tested under NCHRP Report No. 350 and MASH with nearly identical dynamic deflection and working width. The system was also evaluated in combination with a 6-in. (152-mm) tall, AASHTO Type B curb with its midpoint of front face placed 6 in. (152 mm) in front of the guardrail face [\[45\]](#page-194-2). Full-scale crash testing of this configuration was conducted with the 2000P vehicle under NCHRP Report No. 350 with dynamic deflection of 40.3 in. (1,033 mm) and working width of 57.2 in. (1,453 mm). This testing of MGS with curb under NCHRP Report No. 350 indicated lower dynamic deflection and higher working width as compared to the standard MGS [\[7\]](#page-190-0). Lower dynamic deflection may reduce potential for vehicle interaction with pole, and increased working width may increase barrier interaction with pole. At this time, the MGS in combination with curbs was not evaluated with small cars, nor has it been evaluated under MASH safety performance criteria. Recent MASH small car testing of an MGS stiffness transition with a 4-in. (102 mm) tall curb resulted in W-beam rail rupture due to partial vehicle underride as well as a combined lateral and vertical load being imparted to the lower rail [\[39\]](#page-193-3). The potential for similar splice loading exists with other curbs mounted beneath the MGS. Therefore, further evaluation of MGS adjacent to curbs under MASH TL-3 impact conditions with the 1100C and 2270P vehicles is needed to evaluate barrier dynamic deflection and working width as well as splice loading by the small car.

Illinois Tollway commonly uses a  $5\frac{1}{4}$ -in. (133-mm) sloped curb (gutter type G-3, as shown in [Figure 142\)](#page-188-0) with less height as compared to the 6-in. (152-mm) tall curb which was successfully tested under NCHRP Report No. 350. Based on the available data, there might be potential for using pole offsets reported in this study from the back of MGS post in combination with the Type G-3 curb gutter. However, further research and testing is recommended.



<span id="page-188-0"></span>Figure 142. Gutter Type G-3 Used by Illinois Tollway

# **10.8 Wood Post MGS**

An MGS utilizing 6-in. x 8-in. (152-mm x 203-mm) timber posts, fabricated from both Southern Yellow Pine and White Pine material were previously successfully tested and evaluated in accordance with MASH safety performance standards [\[46-](#page-194-3)[47\]](#page-194-4). Full-scale testing illustrated that the MGS performed similarly when utilizing either W6x8.5 steel posts or 6-in. x 8-in. (152-mm x 203-mm) wood posts. System deflections, working widths, and vehicle decelerations were similar between these MGS configurations, as shown previously in Tables 2 and 3. As such, the placement of pole near a wood-post system with either Southern Yellow Pine or White Pine material should result in similar system behavior and performance. However, the wood posts are 2 in. (51 mm) deeper than the steel posts. Thus, the front face of the pole should be placed 20 in. (508 mm) behind the back face of the wood posts, or 43 in. (1,092 mm) behind the front face of the W-beam rail.

# **10.9 MGS without Blockouts**

Previously, full-scale crash testing was successfully performed on the MGS without blockouts. The installation utilized standard steel guardrail posts and 12-in. (305-mm) long steel backup plates to prevent contact between the rail and post flanges to reduce the probability of rail tearing. The non-blocked MGS was successfully crash tested to MASH safety standards using both the 2270P and 1100C vehicles with smaller dynamic deflections and working widths as compared to the standard MGS [\[48\]](#page-194-5). The current study demonstrated a need to provide a 41-in. (1,041 mm) clearance between the face of the MGS rail and the front face of the pole to ensure safety performance. Thus, the same clearance should be provided between the face of the rail in the nonblocked MGS and the front face of the pole.

### **10.10 MGS with 8-in. (203-mm) Blockouts**

The points noted in the previous section regarding non-blocked MGS may apply to other configurations utilizing a blockout depth less than 12 in. (305 mm). The safety performance of 8 in. (203-mm) and 12-in. (305-mm) deep blockouts with MGS has been shown to be acceptable [\[49\]](#page-194-6). Thus, it is believed that the effect of pole placement within an MGS installation of either blockout type should be similar as long as a lateral offset of 41 in. (1,041 mm) is provided between the rail face and front face of pole. The same implementation guidelines and restrictions from the front face of the rail should be used with the MGS configured with 8-in. (203-mm) deep blockouts, 41-in. (1,041-mm) for steel post MGS and 43-in. (1,092 mm) clearance for wood post MGS.

# **10.11 MGS with Reduced Post Spacing**

A quarter-post spacing MGS was successfully full-scale crash tested according to NCHRP Report No. 350 [\[50\]](#page-194-7). A 26 percent reduction in working width from 49.6 in. (1,260 mm) (test no. NPG-4) for a standard MGS to 36.7 in. (932 mm) (test no. NPG-6) for a quarter-post spacing MGS was observed. For a half post spacing MGS, dynamic deflections and working widths were recommended based on Barrier VII numerical analysis. Reduced post spacing MGS has not been crash tested under MASH. Reduction of post spacing would potentially reduce the dynamic deflection and working width similar to the reductions observed in the NCHRP Report No. 350 testing and numerical analysis. Thus, the recommended 20-in. (508-mm) offset between the pole and back of the MGS with ¼- and ½-post spacing would be sufficient for safe vehicle redirection. However, potential reduction in pole offset from the back of the MGS with ¼- and ½- post spacing cannot be determined without further research with respect to reduced post spacing with the MGS under MASH TL-3 impact conditions.

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# **12 APPENDICES**

### **Appendix A. Verification and Validation of Computer Simulations Test No. 2214MG-2**

# **A \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_MASH 2270P Pickup Truck\_**

(Report 350 or MASH08 or EN1317 Vehicle Type)

# Striking a \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_31-in. tall Midwest Guardrail System\_

(roadside hardware type and name)

**Report Date: \_\_\_1/26/2016\_**

# **Type of Report** (check one)

 $\Box$  Verification (known numerical solution compared to new numerical solution) or Validation (full-scale crash test compared to a numerical solution).



# **Composite Validation/Verification Score**



The analysis solution (check one)  $\boxtimes$  is  $\Box$  is NOT verified/validated against the known solution.

# **PART I: BASIC INFORMATION**

These forms may be used for validation or verification of roadside hardware crash tests. If the known solution is a full-scale crash test (i.e., physical experiment) which is being compared to a numerical solution (e.g., LSDYNA analysis) then the procedure is a validation exercise. If the known solution is a numerical solution (e.g., a prior finite element model using a different program or earlier version of the software) then the procedure is a verification exercise. This form can also be used to verify the repeatability of crash tests by comparing two full-scale crash test experiments. Provide the following basic information for the validation/verification comparison:

- 1. What type of roadside hardware is being evaluated (check one)?
	- $\boxtimes$  Longitudinal barrier or transition

Terminal or crash cushion

- Breakaway support or work zone traffic control device
- Truck-mounted attenuator

Other hardware:

2. What test guidelines were used to perform the full-scale crash test (check one)? NCHRP Report 350  $\boxtimes$  MASH08 EN1317 Other:

\_

- 3. Indicate the test level and number being evaluated (fill in the blank). \_\_TL3-11\_
- 4. Indicate the vehicle type appropriate for the test level and number indicated in item 3 according to the testing guidelines indicated in item 2.

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### NCHRP Report 350/MASH08



# **PART II: ANALYSIS SOLUTION VERIFICATION**

Using the results of the analysis solution, fill in the values for Table E-1. These values are indications of whether the analysis solution produced a numerically stable result and do not necessarily mean that the result is a good comparison to the known solution. The purpose of this table is to ensure that the numerical solution produces results that are numerically stable and conform to the conservation laws (e.g., energy, mass and momentum).



# Table E-1. Analysis Solution Verification Table.

\* Only one part, the left front tire of the vehicle has uncontrolled and unresolvable hourglass. It is reasonable to accept that.

If all the analysis solution verification criteria are scored as passing, the analysis solution can be verified or validated against the known solution. If any criterion in Table E-1 does not pass one of the verification criterion listed in Table E-1, the analysis solution cannot be used to verify or validate the known solution. If there are exceptions that the analyst things are relevant these should be footnoted in the table and explained below the table.

The Analysis Solution (check one)  $\boxtimes$  passes  $\Box$  does NOT pass all the criteria in Table E1-1

 $\boxtimes$  with without exceptions as noted.

# **PART III: TIME HISTORY EVALUATION TABLE**

Using the RSVVP computer program ('Single channel' option), compute the Sprague-Geers MPC metrics and ANOVA metrics using time-history data from the known and analysis solutions for a time period starting at the beginning of the contact and ending at the loss of contact. Both the Sprague-Geers and ANOVA metrics must be calculated based on the original units the data was collected in (e.g., if accelerations were measured in the experiment with accelerometers then the comparison should be between accelerations. If rate gyros were used in the experiment, the comparison should be between rotation rates). If all six data channels are not available for both the known and analysis solutions, enter "N/A" in the column corresponding to the missing data. Enter the values obtained from the RSVVP program in Table E-2 and indicate if the comparison was acceptable or not by entering a "yes" or "no" in the "Agree?" column. Attach a graph of each channel for which the metrics have been compared at the end of the report.

Enter the filter, synchronization method and shift/drift options used in RSVVP to perform the comparison so that it is clear to the reviewer what options were used. Normally, SAE J211 filter class 180 is used to compare vehicle kinematics in full-scale crash tests. Either synchronization option in RSVVP is acceptable or both should result in a similar start point. The shift and drift options should generally only be used for the experimental curve since shift and drift are characteristics of sensors. For example, the zero point for an accelerometer sometimes "drifts" as the accelerometer sits out in the open environment of the crash test pad whereas there is no sensor to "drift" or "shift" in a numerical solution.

In order for the analysis solution to be considered in agreement with the known solution (i.e., verified or validated), all the criteria scored in Table E-2 must pass. If all the channels in Table E-2 do not pass, fill out Table E-3, the multi-channel weighted procedure.

If one or more channels do not satisfy the criteria in Table E-2, the multi-channel weighting option may be used. Using the RSVVP computer program ('Multiple channel' option), compute the Sprague-Geers MPC metrics and ANOVA metrics using all the time histories data from the known and analysis solutions for a time period starting at the beginning of the contact and ending at the loss of contact. If all six data channels are not available for both the known and analysis solutions, enter "N/A" in the column corresponding to the missing data.

For some types of roadside hardware impacts, some of the channels are not as important as others. An example might be a breakaway sign support test where the lateral (i.e., Y) and vertical (i.e., Z) accelerations are insignificant to the dynamics of the crash event. The weighting procedure provides a way to weight the most important channels more highly than less important channels. The procedure used is based on the area under the curve, therefore, the weighing scheme will weight channels with large areas more highly than those with smaller areas. In general, using the "Area (II)" method is acceptable although if the complete inertial properties of the vehicle are available the "inertial" method may be used. Enter the values obtained from the RSVVP program in Table E-3 and indicate if the comparison was acceptable or not by entering a "yes" or "no" in the "Agree?" column. In order for the analysis solution to be considered in agreement with the known solution (i.e., verified or validated), all the criteria scored in Table E-3 must pass.

Table E-2. Roadside Safety Validation Metrics Rating Table – Time History Comparisons (single channel option- CFC60)



The Analysis Solution (check one)  $\Box$  passes  $\boxtimes$  does NOT pass all the criteria in Table E-2 (single-channel time history comparison). If the Analysis Solution does NOT pass, perform the analysis in Table E-3 (multi-channel time history comparison).



Figure 1. X-Channel (a) acceleration-time history data used to compute metrics, and (b) Integration of acceleration-time history data



Figure 2. Y-Channel (a) acceleration-time history data used to compute metrics, and (b) Integration of acceleration-time history data



Integration of acceleration-time history data



Figure 4. Roll Channel (a) angular rate-time history data used to compute metrics, and (b) Integration of angular rate-time history data



Figure 5. Pitch Channel (a) angular rate-time history data used to compute metrics, and (b) Integration of angular rate-time history data



Figure 6. Yaw Channel (a) angular rate-time history data used to compute metrics, and (b) Integration of angular rate-time history data



Table E-3. Roadside Safety Validation Metrics Rating Table – Time History Comparisons (multi-channel option-CFC 60)

The Analysis Solution (check one)  $\boxtimes$  passes  $\Box$  does NOT pass <u>all</u> the criteria in Table E-3.

Table E-2. Roadside Safety Validation Metrics Rating Table – Time History Comparisons (single channel option- CFC180)



The Analysis Solution (check one)  $\Box$  passes  $\boxtimes$  does NOT pass all the criteria in Table E-2 (single-channel time history comparison). If the Analysis Solution does NOT pass, perform the analysis in Table E-3 (multi-channel time history comparison).



Figure 7. X-Channel (a) acceleration-time history data used to compute metrics, and (b) Integration of acceleration-time history data



Figure 8. X-Channel (a) acceleration-time history data used to compute metrics, and (b) Integration of acceleration-time history data



Figure 9. X-Channel (a) acceleration-time history data used to compute metrics, and (b) Integration of acceleration-time history data



Table E-3. Roadside Safety Validation Metrics Rating Table – Time History Comparisons (multi-channel option- CFC 180)

The Analysis Solution (check one)  $\boxtimes$  passes  $\Box$  does NOT pass all the criteria in Table E-3.

# **PART IV: PHENOMENA IMPORTANCE RANKING TABLE**

Table E-4 is similar to the evaluation tables in Report 350 and MASH. For the Report 350 or MASH test number identified in Part I (e.g., test 3-10, 5-12, etc.), circle all the evaluation criteria applicable to that test in Table E-4. The tests that apply to each criterion are listed in the far right column without the test level designator. For example, if a Report 350 test 3-11 is being compared (i.e., a pickup truck striking a barrier at 25 degrees and 100 km/hr), circle all the criteria in the second column where the number "11" appears in the far right column. Some of the Report 350 evaluation criteria have been removed (i.e., J and K) since they are not generally useful in assessing the comparison between the known and analysis solutions.





Note: The circles around the letters indicate the criteria that are applicable to this case.

Complete Table E-5 according to the results of the known solution (e.g., crash test) and the numerical solution (e.g., simulation). Consistent with Report 350 and MASH, Task E-5 has three parts: the structural adequacy phenomena listed in Table E-5a, the occupant risk phenomena listed in Table E-5b and the vehicle trajectory criteria listed in Table E-5c. If the result of the analysis solution agrees with the known solution, mark the "agree" column "yes." For example, if the vehicle in both the known and analysis solutions rolls over and, therefore, fails criterion F1, the known and the analysis columns for criterion F1 would be evaluated as "no." Even though both failed the criteria, they agree with each other so the "agree" column is marked as "yes." Any criterion that is not applicable to the test being evaluated (i.e., not circled in Table E-4) should be indicated by entering "NA" in the "agree?" column for that row.

Many of the Report 350 evaluation criteria have been subdivided into more specific phenomenon. For example, criterion A is divided into eight sub-criteria, A1 through A8, that provide more specific and quantifiable phenomena for evaluation. Some of the values are simple yes or no questions while other request numerical values. For the numerical phenomena, the analyst should enter the value for the known and analysis result and then calculate the relative difference. Relative difference is always the absolute value of the difference of the known and analysis solutions divided by the known solution. Enter the value in the "relative difference" column. If the relative difference is less than 20 percent, enter "yes" in the "agree?" column.

Sometimes, when the values are very small, the relative difference might be large while the absolute difference is very small. For example, the longitudinal occupant ride down acceleration (i.e., criterion L2) in a test might be 3 g's and in the corresponding analysis might be 4 g's. The relative difference is 33 percent but the absolute difference is only 1 g and the result for both is well below the 20 g limit. Clearly, the analysis solution in this case is a good match to the experiment and the relative difference is large only because the values are small. The absolute difference, therefore, should also be entered into the "Difference" column in Table E-5.

The experimental and analysis result can be considered to agree as long as either the relative difference or the absolute difference is less than the acceptance limit listed in the criterion. Generally, relative differences of less than 20 percent are acceptable and the absolute difference limits were generally chosen to represent 20 percent of the acceptance limit in Report 350 or MASH. For example, Report 350 limits occupant ride-down accelerations to those less than 20 g's so 20 percent of 20 g's is 4 g's. As shown for criterion L2 in Table E-5, the relative acceptance limit is 20 percent and the absolute acceptance limit is 4 g's.

If a numerical model was not created to represent the phenomenon, a value of "NM" (i.e., not modeled) should be entered in the appropriate column of Table E-5. If the known solution for that phenomenon number is "no" then a "NM" value in the "test result" column can be considered to agree. For example, if the material model for the rail element did not include the possibility of failure, "NM" should be entered for phenomenon number T in Table E-5. If the known solution does not indicate rail rupture or failure (i.e., phenomenon  $T = \text{``no''}$ ), then the known and analysis solutions agree and a "yes" can be entered in the "agree?" column. On the other hand, if the known solution shows that a rail rupture did occur resulting in a phenomenon T entry of "yes" for the known solution, the known and analysis solutions do not agree and "no" should be entered in the "agree?" column. Analysts should seriously consider refining their model to incorporate any phenomena that appears in the known solution and is shown in Table E-5.

All the criteria identified in Table E-4 are expected to agree but if one does not and, in the opinion of the analyst, is not considered important to the overall evaluation for this particular comparison, then a footnote should be provided with a justification for why this particular criteria can be ignored for this particular comparison.

			<b>Evaluation Criteria</b>	<b>Known</b> <b>Result</b>	<b>Analysis</b> <b>Result</b>	<b>Difference</b> Relative/ <b>Absolute</b>	Agree?
Structural Adequacy	A	A1	Test article should contain and redirect the vehicle; the vehicle should not penetrate, under-ride, or override the installation although controlled lateral deflection of the test article is acceptable. (Answer Yes or No)	Yes	Yes		<b>Yes</b>
		A2	Maximum dynamic deflection: - Relative difference is less than 20 percent or Absolute difference is less than 0.15 m	$1.11 \text{ m}$	$1.14 \text{ m}$	2.7 % $0.13 \text{ m}$	<b>Yes</b>
		A <sub>3</sub>	Length of vehicle-barrier contact: - Relative difference is less than 20 percent or Absolute difference is less than 2 m	10.3 <sub>m</sub>	9 <sub>m</sub>	12.6 % 1.3 <sub>m</sub>	<b>Yes</b>
		A4	Number of broken or significantly bent posts is less than 20 percent. (reported: post nos 13,14,15 bent and web of the post 16 also bent)	$\overline{4}$	4		<b>Yes</b>
		A5	Did the rail element rupture or tear (Answer Yes or No)	N <sub>0</sub>	No		<b>Yes</b>
		A <sub>6</sub>	Were there failures of connector elements (Answer Yes or No)	N <sub>o</sub>	N <sub>o</sub>		<b>Yes</b>
		A7	Was there significant snagging between the vehicle wheels and barrier elements (Answer Yes or No).	N <sub>o</sub>	N <sub>o</sub>		<b>Yes</b>
		A8	Was there significant snagging between vehicle body components and barrier elements (Answer Yes or No).	N <sub>o</sub>	N <sub>o</sub>		<b>Yes</b>

Table E-5(a). Roadside Safety Phenomena Importance Ranking Table (Structural Adequacy)

<b>Evaluation Criteria</b>			<b>Known</b> <b>Result</b>	<b>Analysis</b> <b>Result</b>	<b>Difference</b> Relative/ <b>Absolute</b>	Agree?	
Occupant Risk		${\bf D}$	Detached elements, fragments or other debris from the test article should not penetrate or show potential for penetrating the occupant compartment, or present an undue hazard to other traffic, pedestrians or personnel in a work zone. (Answer Yes or No)	Pass	Pass		<b>Yes</b>
	$\overline{F}$	F1	The vehicle should remain upright during and after the collision although moderate roll, pitching and yawing are acceptable. (Answer Yes or No)	Pass	Pass		<b>Yes</b>
		F2	Maximum roll of the vehicle: - Relative difference is less than 20 percent or - Absolute difference is less than 5 degrees.	$4.81^\circ$	$11.67^{\circ*}$	142% $6.86^\circ$	N <sub>o</sub>
		F <sub>3</sub>	Maximum pitch of the vehicle is: - Relative difference is less than 20 percent or - Absolute difference is less than 5 degrees.	$1.84^\circ$	$3.17^\circ$	72% $1.33^\circ$	<b>Yes</b>
		F <sub>4</sub>	Maximum yaw of the vehicle is: - Relative difference is less than 20 percent or Absolute difference is less than 5 degrees.	45.74°	$46.21^\circ$	1.02% $0.47^\circ$	<b>Yes</b>
	L	L1	Occupant impact velocities: - Relative difference is less than 20 percent or Absolute difference is less than 2 m/s.				
			Longitudinal OIV (m/s)	4.67	4.43	5.1% $0.24 \text{ m/s}$	<b>Yes</b>
			Lateral OIV (m/s)	4.76	4.99	4.83% $0.23$ m/s	Yes
			THIV $(m/s)$ $\bullet$	6.91	$NA**$		
		L2	Occupant accelerations: - Relative difference is less than 20 percent or Absolute difference is less than 4 g's.				
			Longitudinal ORA $\bullet$	8.23	11.16	35.6% 2.93 g	<b>Yes</b>
			Lateral ORA $\bullet$	6.93	9.05	30.59% $2.12\text{ g}$	<b>Yes</b>
			PHD $\bullet$	10.76	NA		
			<b>ASI</b> $\bullet$	<b>NA</b>	NA		

Table E-5(b). Roadside Safety Phenomena Importance Ranking Table (Occupant Risk)

\* The roll, pitch, and yaw Euler angles were calculated for the simulation using the same procedure for full-scale crash tests.

\*\* Not required

<b>Evaluation Criteria</b>			<b>Known</b> <b>Result</b>	<b>Analysis</b> <b>Result</b>	<b>Difference</b> <b>Relative/</b> <b>Absolute</b>	Agree?	
Trajectory Vehicle		M1	The exit angle from the test article preferable should be less than 60 percent of test impact angle, measured at the time of vehicle loss of contact with test device.	$13.5^\circ$	20.39		<b>Yes</b>
	M	M <sub>2</sub>	Exit angle at loss of contact: - Relative difference is less than 20 percent or - Absolute difference is less than 5 degrees.	$13.5^\circ$	20.39	51.03% $6.9^{\circ*}$	<b>Yes</b>
		M <sub>3</sub>	Exit velocity at loss of contact: - Relative difference is less than 20 percent or - Absolute difference is less than 5 degrees.	63.7 km/h	59.76 km/h	6.18 % $3.94$ km/h	<b>Yes</b>
		M <sub>4</sub>	One or more vehicle tires failed or de-beaded during the collision event (Answer Yes or No).	Yes	<b>NM</b>		

Table E-5(c). Roadside Safety Phenomena Importance Ranking Table (Vehicle Trajectory)

\* In the simulation, vehicle was still in contact with the barrier at time 500 msec. Moreover, a difference of 6.9° is relatively small.

The Analysis Solution (check one)  $\Box$  passes  $\boxtimes$  does NOT pass all the criteria in Tables E-5a through E-5c  $\Box$  with exceptions as noted  $\Box$  without exceptions.

### **Appendix B. Verification and Validation of Computer Simulations Test No. 2214MG-3**

### **A \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ MASH 1100C Small Car\_** (Report 350 or MASH08 or EN1317 Vehicle Type)

**Striking a \_\_\_\_\_\_32-in. tall Midwest Guardrail System \_** 

(roadside hardware type and name)

### **Report Date: \_\_1/26/2016\_**

# **Type of Report** (check one)

 $\Box$  Verification (known numerical solution compared to new numerical solution) or Validation (full-scale crash test compared to a numerical solution).



### **Composite Validation/Verification Score**



The analysis solution (check one)  $\overline{\boxtimes}$  is  $\overline{\text{ } }$  is NOT verified/validated against the known solution.
#### **PART I: BASIC INFORMATION**

These forms may be used for validation or verification of roadside hardware crash tests. If the known solution is a full-scale crash test (i.e., physical experiment) which is being compared to a numerical solution (e.g., LSDYNA analysis) then the procedure is a validation exercise. If the known solution is a numerical solution (e.g., a prior finite element model using a different program or earlier version of the software) then the procedure is a verification exercise. This form can also be used to verify the repeatability of crash tests by comparing two full-scale crash test experiments. Provide the following basic information for the validation/verification comparison:

5. What type of roadside hardware is being evaluated (check one)?

 $\boxtimes$  Longitudinal barrier or transition

Terminal or crash cushion

Breakaway support or work zone traffic control device

Truck-mounted attenuator

Other hardware:

6. What test guidelines were used to perform the full-scale crash test (check one)? NCHRP Report 350  $\boxtimes$  MASH08 EN1317

\_

Other:

- \_ 7. Indicate the test level and number being evaluated (fill in the blank). TL 3-10
- 8. Indicate the vehicle type appropriate for the test level and number indicated in item 3 according to the testing guidelines indicated in item 2.

#### NCHRP Report 350/MASH08



### **PART II: ANALYSIS SOLUTION VERIFICATION**

Using the results of the analysis solution, fill in the values for Table E-1. These values are indications of whether the analysis solution produced a numerically stable result and do not necessarily mean that the result is a good comparison to the known solution. The purpose of this table is to ensure that the numerical solution produces results that are numerically stable and conform to the conservation laws (e.g., energy, mass and momentum).



### Table E-1. Analysis Solution Verification Table.

\* Only one part, the fender in vehicle has uncontrolled and unresolvable hourglass. It is reasonable to accept that.

If all the analysis solution verification criteria are scored as passing, the analysis solution can be verified or validated against the known solution. If any criterion in Table E-1 does not pass one of the verification criterion listed in Table E-1, the analysis solution cannot be used to verify or validate the known solution. If there are exceptions that the analyst things are relevant these should be footnoted in the table and explained below the table.

The Analysis Solution (check one)  $\boxtimes$  passes  $\Box$  does NOT pass all the criteria in Table E1-1

 $\boxtimes$  with without exceptions as noted.

### **PART III: TIME HISTORY EVALUATION TABLE**

Using the RSVVP computer program ('Single channel' option), compute the Sprague-Geers MPC metrics and ANOVA metrics using time-history data from the known and analysis solutions for a time period starting at the beginning of the contact and ending at the loss of contact. Both the Sprague-Geers and ANOVA metrics must be calculated based on the original units the data was collected in (e.g., if accelerations were measured in the experiment with accelerometers then the comparison should be between accelerations. If rate gyros were used in the experiment, the comparison should be between rotation rates). If all six data channels are not available for both the known and analysis solutions, enter "N/A" in the column corresponding to the missing data. Enter the values obtained from the RSVVP program in Table E-2 and indicate if the comparison was acceptable or not by entering a "yes" or "no" in the "Agree?" column. Attach a graph of each channel for which the metrics have been compared at the end of the report.

Enter the filter, synchronization method and shift/drift options used in RSVVP to perform the comparison so that it is clear to the reviewer what options were used. Normally, SAE J211 filter class 180 is used to compare vehicle kinematics in full-scale crash tests. Either synchronization option in RSVVP is acceptable or both should result in a similar start point. The shift and drift options should generally only be used for the experimental curve since shift and drift are characteristics of sensors. For example, the zero point for an accelerometer sometimes "drifts" as the accelerometer sits out in the open environment of the crash test pad whereas there is no sensor to "drift" or "shift" in a numerical solution.

In order for the analysis solution to be considered in agreement with the known solution (i.e., verified or validated), all the criteria scored in Table E-2 must pass. If all the channels in Table E-2 do not pass, fill out Table E-3, the multi-channel weighted procedure.

If one or more channels do not satisfy the criteria in Table E-2, the multi-channel weighting option may be used. Using the RSVVP computer program ('Multiple channel' option), compute the Sprague-Geers MPC metrics and ANOVA metrics using all the time histories data from the known and analysis solutions for a time period starting at the beginning of the contact and ending at the loss of contact. If all six data channels are not available for both the known and analysis solutions, enter "N/A" in the column corresponding to the missing data.

For some types of roadside hardware impacts, some of the channels are not as important as others. An example might be a breakaway sign support test where the lateral (i.e., Y) and vertical (i.e., Z) accelerations are insignificant to the dynamics of the crash event. The weighting procedure provides a way to weight the most important channels more highly than less important channels. The procedure used is based on the area under the curve, therefore, the weighing scheme will weight channels with large areas more highly than those with smaller areas. In general, using the "Area (II)" method is acceptable although if the complete inertial properties of the vehicle are available the "inertial" method may be used. Enter the values obtained from the RSVVP program in Table E-3 and indicate if the comparison was acceptable or not by entering a "yes" or "no" in the "Agree?" column. In order for the analysis solution to be considered in agreement with the known solution (i.e., verified or validated), all the criteria scored in Table E-3 must pass.

Table E-2. Roadside Safety Validation Metrics Rating Table – Time History Comparisons (single channel option- CFC60)



The Analysis Solution (check one)  $\Box$  passes  $\boxtimes$  does NOT pass all the criteria in Table E-2 (single-channel time history comparison). If the Analysis Solution does NOT pass, perform the analysis in Table E-3 (multi-channel time history comparison).



Figure 1. X-Channel (a) acceleration-time history data used to compute metrics, and (b) Integration of acceleration-time history data<br>True and Test curves Velocity



Integration of acceleration-time history data



Figure 3. Z-Channel (a) acceleration-time history data used to compute metrics, and (b) Integration of acceleration-time history data



Figure 4. Roll Channel (a) angular rate-time history data used to compute metrics, and (b) Integration of angular rate-time history data



Figure 5. Pitch Channel (a) angular rate-time history data used to compute metrics, and (b) Integration of angular rate-time history data



Integration of angular rate-time history data



Table E-3. Roadside Safety Validation Metrics Rating Table – Time History Comparisons (multi-channel option- CFC60)

\* The mean residual error is 7.4% which is close to 5%. Thus, it is acceptable.

The Analysis Solution (check one)  $\boxtimes$  passes  $\Box$  does NOT pass <u>all</u> the criteria in Table E-3.

Table E-2. Roadside Safety Validation Metrics Rating Table – Time History Comparisons (single channel option- CFC 180)



The Analysis Solution (check one)  $\Box$  passes  $\boxtimes$  does NOT pass all the criteria in Table E-2 (single-channel time history comparison). If the Analysis Solution does NOT pass, perform the analysis in Table E-3 (multi-channel time history comparison).



Figure 4. X-Channel (a) acceleration-time history data used to compute metrics, and (b) Integration of acceleration-time history data



Figure 5. Y-Channel (a) acceleration-time history data used to compute metrics, and (b) Integration of acceleration-time history data



Figure 6. Z-Channel (a) acceleration-time history data used to compute metrics, and (b) Integration of acceleration-time history data



Table E-3. Roadside Safety Validation Metrics Rating Table – Time History Comparisons (multi-channel option- CFC 180)

\* The mean residual error is 7.4% which is close to 5%. Thus, it is acceptable.

The Analysis Solution (check one)  $\boxtimes$  passes  $\Box$  does NOT pass <u>all</u> the criteria in Table E-3.

### **PART IV: PHENOMENA IMPORTANCE RANKING TABLE**

Table E-4 is similar to the evaluation tables in Report 350 and MASH. For the Report 350 or MASH test number identified in Part I (e.g., test 3-10, 5-12, etc.), circle all the evaluation criteria applicable to that test in Table E-4. The tests that apply to each criterion are listed in the far right column without the test level designator. For example, if a Report 350 test 3-11 is being compared (i.e., a pickup truck striking a barrier at 25 degrees and 100 km/hr), circle all the criteria in the second column where the number "11" appears in the far right column. Some of the Report 350 evaluation criteria have been removed (i.e., J and K) since they are not generally useful in assessing the comparison between the known and analysis solutions.





Note: The circles around the letters indicate the criteria that are applicable to this case.

Complete Table E-5 according to the results of the known solution (e.g., crash test) and the numerical solution (e.g., simulation). Consistent with Report 350 and MASH, Task E-5 has three parts: the structural adequacy phenomena listed in Table E-5a, the occupant risk phenomena listed in Table E-5b and the vehicle trajectory criteria listed in Table E-5c. If the result of the analysis solution agrees with the known solution, mark the "agree" column "yes." For example, if the vehicle in both the known and analysis solutions rolls over and, therefore, fails criterion F1, the known and the analysis columns for criterion F1 would be evaluated as "no." Even though both failed the criteria, they agree with each other so the "agree" column is marked as "yes." Any criterion that is not applicable to the test being evaluated (i.e., not circled in Table E-4) should be indicated by entering "NA" in the "agree?" column for that row.

Many of the Report 350 evaluation criteria have been subdivided into more specific phenomenon. For example, criterion A is divided into eight sub-criteria, A1 through A8, that provide more specific and quantifiable phenomena for evaluation. Some of the values are simple yes or no questions while other request numerical values. For the numerical phenomena, the analyst should enter the value for the known and analysis result and then calculate the relative difference. Relative difference is always the absolute value of the difference of the known and analysis solutions divided by the known solution. Enter the value in the "relative difference" column. If the relative difference is less than 20 percent, enter "yes" in the "agree?" column.

Sometimes, when the values are very small, the relative difference might be large while the absolute difference is very small. For example, the longitudinal occupant ride down acceleration (i.e., criterion L2) in a test might be 3 g's and in the corresponding analysis might be 4 g's. The relative difference is 33 percent but the absolute difference is only 1 g and the result for both is well below the 20 g limit. Clearly, the analysis solution in this case is a good match to the experiment and the relative difference is large only because the values are small. The absolute difference, therefore, should also be entered into the "Difference" column in Table E-5.

The experimental and analysis result can be considered to agree as long as either the relative difference or the absolute difference is less than the acceptance limit listed in the criterion. Generally, relative differences of less than 20 percent are acceptable and the absolute difference limits were generally chosen to represent 20 percent of the acceptance limit in Report 350 or MASH. For example, Report 350 limits occupant ride-down accelerations to those less than 20 g's so 20 percent of 20 g's is 4 g's. As shown for criterion L2 in Table E-5, the relative acceptance limit is 20 percent and the absolute acceptance limit is 4 g's.

If a numerical model was not created to represent the phenomenon, a value of "NM" (i.e., not modeled) should be entered in the appropriate column of Table E-5. If the known solution for that phenomenon number is "no" then a "NM" value in the "test result" column can be considered to agree. For example, if the material model for the rail element did not include the possibility of failure, "NM" should be entered for phenomenon number T in Table E-5. If the known solution does not indicate rail rupture or failure (i.e., phenomenon  $T = \text{``no''}$ ), then the known and analysis solutions agree and a "yes" can be entered in the "agree?" column. On the other hand, if the known solution shows that a rail rupture did occur resulting in a phenomenon T entry of "yes" for the known solution, the known and analysis solutions do not agree and "no" should be entered in the "agree?" column. Analysts should seriously consider refining their model to incorporate any phenomena that appears in the known solution and is shown in Table E-5.

All the criteria identified in Table E-4 are expected to agree but if one does not and, in the opinion of the analyst, is not considered important to the overall evaluation for this particular comparison, then a footnote should be provided with a justification for why this particular criteria can be ignored for this particular comparison.







Table E-5(b). Roadside Safety Phenomena Importance Ranking Table (Occupant Risk).

\* The roll, pitch and yaw Euler angles were calculated for the simulation using the same procedure for full-scale crash tests.

\*\* Not required

<b>Evaluation Criteria</b>				<b>Known</b> <b>Result</b>	<b>Analysis</b> <b>Result</b>	<b>Difference</b> Relative/ <b>Absolute</b>	Agree?
Trajectory Vehicle	M		The exit angle from the test article preferable should be less M1 than 60 percent of test impact angle, measured at the time of vehicle loss of contact with test device.	$14.1^\circ$	$8^{\circ}$		<b>Yes</b>
			Exit angle at loss of contact: $M2$ - Relative difference is less than 20 percent or - Absolute difference is less than 5 degrees.	$14.1^\circ$	$8^{\circ}$	42.8% $6.1^{\circ*}$	<b>Yes</b>
			Exit velocity at loss of contact: M3 - Relative difference is less than 20 percent or - Absolute difference is less than 5 degrees.	48.4 km/h	48.49 km/h	0.18% $0.09$ km/h	<b>Yes</b>
		M <sub>4</sub>	One or more vehicle tires failed or de-beaded during the collision event (Answer Yes or No).	Yes	<b>NM</b>		

Table E-5(c). Roadside Safety Phenomena Importance Ranking Table (Vehicle Trajectory).

\* In the simulation, vehicle was still in contact with the barrier at time 500 msec. Moreover, a difference of 6.1° is relatively small.

The Analysis Solution (check one)  $\Box$  passes  $\boxtimes$  does NOT pass all the criteria in Tables E-5a through E-5c  $\Box$  with exceptions as noted  $\Box$  without exceptions.

# **Appendix C. Valmont and Hapco Light Pole and Base Drawings**



Figure C-1. Valmont Light Pole



Figure C-2. Valmont Arm



Figure C-3. Valmont Base



Figure C-4. Valmont CS300 Base



Figure C-5. Valmont CS370 Base



Figure C-6. Hapco Light Pole



Figure C-7. Hapco Arm



Figure C-8. Hapco Vibration Damper Assembly



Figure C-9. Hapco Base

# **Appendix D. Federal Highway Administration Acceptance Letters**



Federal Highway **Administration** 

400 Seventh St., S.W.<br>Washington, D.C. 20590

Refer to: HNG-14

Mr. Robert A. Sik Vice President, Akron Foundry Company 2728 Wingate Avenue P.O. Box 27028 Akron, Ohio 44319-0009

Dear Mr. Sik:

This is in response to your July 13 letter to Mr. Artimovich requesting acceptance by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) of Feralux CS-300 and CS-370 cast aluminum transformer bases for use on Federal-aid highway projects. Tests were conducted to assess compliance of the bases with FHWA breakaway requirements, which cite Section 7 of the 1985 American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials' (AASHTO) Standard Specifications for Structural Supports for Highway Signs, Luminaires and Traffic Signals. The Southwest Research Institute forwarded copies of the five crash test reports (Project No. 06-3116-516), dated June 1990, containing results of the pendulum tests on various aluminum and steel poles with these bases. Fully dimensioned drawings and material test reports on the aluminum castings had been received from you on May 31.

AUS 6 1991

The tests used an instrumented 1,800-pound pendulum fitted with a 10 stage crushable nose which simulates the left quarter point of a 1979 Volkswagen Rabbit. Impact speed was 20 mph. A summary of the tested hardware is presented below:



Details of the tested hardware are shown in Enclosure I. Test parameters and measured and extrapolated test results and are shown on Enclosure II as part of Test Series IV. This information shows that the tested pole-base combinations will meet the change in velocity and stub-height requirements adopted by the FHWA.

The 16.5 fps calculated change in velocity of Test 13 exceeds FHWA requirements. However, as the calculated changes in velocities nearly always over estimate the 60 mph results, we will consider the results of Test 13 as meeting the new FHWA requirements.

Figure D-1. LS-17

 $\overline{c}$ 

Thus, the transformer bases manufactured for Feralux, as shown on the enclosed drawings, are acceptable for use on Federal-aid highway projects within the range of conditions tested, if proposed by a State. This acceptance is limited to breakaway characteristics of the bases and does not cover their structural features. Presumably, Feralux will supply potential users with sufficient information on structural design limitations and on installation requirements to ensure proper performance. We anticipate that the States will require certification from Feralux that the bases furnished have essentially the same chemistry, mechanical properties, and geometry as those used in the tests, and that supports with those bases will meet the FHWA breakaway requirements.

Since these breakaway support designs are proprietary items, to be used in a Federal aid highway project they; (a) must be supplied through competitive bidding with equally suitable unpatented items; (b) the State highway agency must certify that they are essential for synchronization with existing highway facilities, or that no equally suitable alternate exists; or (c) they must be used for research or for a distinctive type of construction on relatively short sections of road for experimental purposes. Our regulations concerning proprietary products are contained in Title 23, Code of Federal Regulations, Section 635.411, a copy of which was provided with previous correspondence.

Sincerely yours,

J.a. Starm

L. A. Staron Chief, Federal-Aid and Design Division

**Enclosures** 

Geometric and Roadside Design Acceptance Letter LS-17

Figure D-2. LS-17

Endorsement to FHWA field offices: All of the transformer bases covered by this letter and Geometric and Roadside Design Acceptance Letters LS-18 and LS-19 were manufactured by Akron Foundry Company. For marketing purposes Akron Foundry has requested these three acceptance letters to cover what is essentially two 9-inch high transformer base models that will be manufactured by Akron Foundry and sold by three firms: Feralux, Pole Lite, and Akron **Foundry.** One model has top and bottom bolt circle ranges of 11.5 inches to  $12.5$  inches. It will carry a marking of CS-300 for Feralux, F-1300 for Pole Lite, and TB-AF6-9" for Akron. The other has top and bottom bolt circle ranges of 14.5 inches to 15.25 inches. It will carry a marking of CS-370 for Feralux, F-1302 for Pole Lite, and 9" for Akron. A separate series of tests was run to cover the Feralux model designations, while another series was run to cover the combined Pole Lite and Akron designations. It is our understanding that in production the Feralux bases will only be marked with Feralux's base numbers. On the other hand, bases to be marketed by either Pole Lite or Akron will be manufactured showing both suppliers' model numbers and before being shipped, one model number will be removed so that only the nominal supplier's model number will remain.

Figure D-3. LS-17



LS -17

















LS -17











LS -17


 $\mathcal{N}_{\mathbf{r}}$ 

+ I.W. signifies Internal Weld

\* Anch or bolt nuts should not be torqued over 150 foot - pounds.

\*\* All tests run with twin mast arms.

\*\* A small shard of aluminum remained between 2 and 3 inches above the base plate.

LS -17

238



Federal Highway **Administration** 

AUG 61990 400 Seventh St., S.W. Washington, D.C. 20590

Refer to: HNG-14

Mr. Robert A. Sik Vice President, Akron Foundry Company 2728 Wingate Avenue P.O. Box 27028 Akron, Ohio 44319-0009

Dear Mr. Sik:

This is in response to your July 13 letter to Mr. Artimovich requesting acceptance by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) of Pole Lite Model F-1300 and F-1302 cast aluminum transformer bases for use on Federal-aid highway projects. Tests were conducted to assess compliance of the bases with FHWA breakaway requirements, which cite Section 7 of the 1985 American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials' (AASHTO) Standard Specifications for Structural Supports for Highway Signs, Luminaires and Traffic Signals. The Southwest Research Institute forwarded copies of the five crash test reports (Project No. 06-3116-516), dated June 1990, containing results of the pendulum tests on various aluminum and steel poles with these bases. Fully dimensioned drawings and material test reports on the aluminum castings had been received from you on May 31.

The tests used an instrumented 1,800-pound pendulum fitted with a 10 stage crushable nose which simulates the left quarter point of a 1979 Volkswagen Rabbit. Impact speed was 20 mph. A summary of the tested hardware is presented below:



Details of the tested hardware are shown in Enclosure I. Test parameters and measured and extrapolated test results and are shown on Enclosure II as part of Test Series IV. This information shows that the tested pole-base combinations will meet the change in velocity and stub-height requirements adopted by the FHWA.

The 16.8 fps calculated change in velocity of Test 14 exceeds FHWA requirements. However, as the calculated changes in velocities nearly always over estimate the 60-mph results, we will consider the results of Test 14 as meeting the new FHWA requirements.

Figure  $D-11$ .  $LS-18$ 

Thus, the transformer bases manufactured for Pole Lite, as shown on the enclosed drawings, are acceptable for use on Federal-aid highway projects within the range of conditions tested, if proposed by a State. This acceptance is limited to breakaway characteristics of the bases and does not<br>cover their structural features. Presumably you or Pole Lite will supply<br>potential users with sufficient information on structural design limitat and on installation requirements to ensure proper performance. We anticipate that the States will require certification from Pole Lite that the bases furnished have essentially the same chemistry, mechanical properties, and geometry as those used in the tests, and that supports with those bases will meet the FHWA breakaway requirements.

Since these breakaway support designs are proprietary items, to be used in a Federal-aid highway project they; (a) must be supplied through competitive bidding with equally suitable unpatented items; (b) the State highway agency must certify that they are essential for synchronization with existing highway facilities, or that no equally suitable alternate exists; or (c) they must be used for research or for a distinctive type of construction on relatively short sections of road for experimental purposes. Our regulations concerning proprietary products are contained in Title 23, Code of Federal Regulations, Section 635.411, a copy of which was provided with prior correspondence.

Sincerely yours.

J.a. Starm

L. A. Staron Chief, Federal-Aid and Design Division

Enclosures

Geometric and Roadside Design Acceptance Letter LS-18

Figure  $D-12$ . LS-18

Endorsement to FHWA field offices: All of the transformer bases covered by this letter and Geometric and Roadside Design Acceptance Letters LS-17 and LS-19 were manufactured by Akron Foundry Company. For marketing purposes Akron Foundry has requested these three acceptance letters to cover what is essentially two 9-inch high transformer base models that will be manufactured by Akron Foundry and sold by three firms: Feralux, Pole Lite, and Akron Foundry. One model has top and bottom bolt circle ranges of 11.5 inches to 12.5 inches. It will carry a marking of CS-300 for Feralux, F-1300 for Pole Lite, and TB-AF6-9" for Akron. The other has top and bottom bolt circle ranges of 14.5 inches to 15.25 inches. It will carry a marking of CS-370 for Feralux, F-1302 for Pole Lite, and TB-AF5-9" for Akron. A separate series of tests was run to cover the Feralux model designations, while another series was run to cover the combined Pole Lite and Akron designations. It is our understanding that in production the Feralux bases will only be marked with Feralux's base numbers. On the other hand, bases to be marketed by either<br>Pole Lite or Akron will be manufactured showing both suppliers' model numbers<br>and before being shipped, one model number will be removed so that onl nominal supplier's model number will remain.

Figure  $D-13$ .  $LS-18$ 



LS -18





243







#### 1986 AASHTO REQUIREMENTS / 1800 LB.PENDULUM TEST

AKRON FOUNDRY TEST 10 ON POLE-LITE F-1800 T-BASE **PROJECT 06-8116-516** 







LS -18









LS -18



+ I.W. signifies Internal Weld

\* Anch or bolt nuts should not be torqued over 150 foot - pounds.

\*\* All tests run with twin mast arms.

\*\* A small shard of aluminum remained between 2 and 3 inches above the base plate.

## $L5-19$



U.S.Department of Transportation Federal Highway

Administmiion

2116  $6 \,$   $90$  400 Seventh St., S.W. Washington, D.C. 20590

Refer to: HNG-14

Mr. Robert A. Sik Vice President, Akron Foundry Company 2728 Wingate Avenue P.O. Box 27028 Akron, Ohio 44319-0009

Dear Mr. Sik:

This is in response to your July 13 letter to Mr. Artimovich requesting acceptance by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) of your company's cast aluminum transformer bases for use on Federal-aid highway projects. **Tests** were conducted to assess compliance of the bases with FHWA breakaway requirements, which cite Section 7 of the 1985 American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials' (AASHTO) Standard Specifications for Structural Suooorts for Hishway Sians. Luminaires and Traffic Signals. The Southwest Research Institute forwarded copies of the five crash test reports (Project No. 06-3116-516), dated June 1990, containing results of the pendulum tests on various aluminum and steel poles with these bases. Fully dimensioned drawings and material test reports on the aluminum castings had been received from you on May 31.

The tests used an instrumented 1,800-pound pendulum fitted with a 10 stage crushable nose which simulates the left quarter point of a 1979 Volkswagen Rabbit. Impact speed was 20 mph. A summary of the tested hardware is presented below:



Details of the tested hardware are shown in Enclosure I. Test parameters and measured and extrapolated test results and are shown on Enclosure II as part of Test Series IV. This information shows that the tested pole-base combinations will meet the change in velocity and stub-height requirements adopted by the FHWA.

The 17.1 fps and 16.8 fps calculated changes in velocity of Tests 12 and 14, respectively, exceed FHWA requirements. However, as the calculated changes in velocities nearly always over estimate the 60-mph results, we will consider

Figure  $D-22$ .  $LS-19$ 

 $\overline{2}$ 

the Test 14 results as meeting the new FHWA requirements. However, in the absence of other test evidence, we believe the calculated 60-mph change in velocity for Test 12 is beyond the limit we should accept without qualification.

Thus, the transformer bases manufactured by your company and distributed under the product numbers shown above, as shown on the enclosed drawings, are acceptable for use on Federal-aid highway projects within the range of conditions tested, if proposed by a State, except that for base TB3-AF-1517-17 I.W. for which our acceptance is limited to use were the combined supported weight of the pole, mast arm, and luminaire does not exceed 900 pounds. This acceptance is limited to breakaway characteristics of the bases and does not cover their structural features. Presumably, you will supply potential users with sufficient information on structural design limitations and on installation requirements to ensure proper performance. We anticipate that States will require certification from Akron Foundry that bases furnished have essentially the same chemistry, mechanical properties, and geometry as those used in the tests, and that supports with those bases will meet the FHWA breakaway requirements.

Since your company's breakaway support designs are proprietary items, to be used in a Federal-aid highway project they; (a) must be supplied through competitive bidding with equally suitable unpatented items; (b) the State highway agency must certify that they are essential for synchronization with existing highway facilities, or that no equally suitable alternate exists; or (c) they must be used for research or for a distinctive type of construction on relatively short sections of road for experimental purposes. Our regulations concerning proprietary products are contained in Title 23, Code of Federal Regulations, Section 635.411, a copy of which was provided with prior correspondence.

Your letter also requested acceptance for TB-1 and TB-2 bases tested with heavier pole hardware. Enclosure III is a copy of our letter of acceptance dated May 30, 1990, sent in response to an earlier request.

Sincerely yours,

J.a. Starm

L. A. Staron Chief, Federal-Aid and Design Division

Enclosures

Geometric and Roadside Design Acceptance Letter LS-19

Figure  $D-23$ .  $LS-19$ 

Endorsement to FHWA field offices: All of the transformer bases covered by this letter and Geometric and Roadside Design Acceptance Letters LS-17 and LS-18 were manufactured by Akron Foundry Company. For marketing purposes Akron Foundry has requested these three acceptance letters to cover what is essentially two 9-inch high transformer base models that will be manufactured by Akron Foundry and sold by three firms: Feralux, Pole Lite, and Akron Foundry. One model has top and bottom bolt circle ranges of 11.5 inches to It will carry a marking of CS-300 for Feralux, F-1300 for Pole  $12.5$  inches. Lite, and TB-AF6-9" for Akron. The other has top and bottom bolt circle ranges of 14.5 inches to 15.25 inches. It will carry a marking of CS-370 for Feralux, F-1302 for Pole Lite, and TB-AF5-9" for Akron. A separate series of tests was run to cover the Feralux model designations, while another series was run to cover the combined Pole Lite and Akron designations. It is our understanding that in production the Feralux bases will only be marked with Feralux's base numbers. On the other hand, bases to be marketed by either Pole Lite or Akron will be manufactured showing both suppliers' model numbers and before being shipped, one model number will be removed so that only the nominal supplier's model number will remain.

Figure D-24. LS-19



MATERIAL MELTED AND MANUFACTURED IN THE USA. CASTINGS PRODUCED IN THE USA.

SPECIAL CUT-OFF 17.25 DIA.GROUND MOUNT ONLY

253



LS -19

June 29, 2017 MwRSF Report No. TRP-03-361-17

254



LS -19





LS -19



#### 1985 AASHTO REQUIREMENTS / 1800 LB.PENDULUM TEST

AKRON POUNDRY TEST 10 ON POLE-LITE F-1300 T-BASE<br>PROJECT 06-8116-816

Figure 3. Assembly Drawing, Akron Foundry Test 10





LS -19



Figure 3. Assembly Drawing, Akron Foundry Test 12

LS -19





LS -19





LS -19



+ 1.W. signifies Internal Weld

++ All tests run with twin mast arms.

\* Anch or bolt nuts should not be torqued over 150 foot - pounds.

\*\* A small shard of aluminum remained between 2 and 3 inches above the base plate.

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### **Appendix E. Material Specifications**





Item No.	Description	<b>Material Specification</b>	<b>Material Cert Reference</b>
c1	<b>BCT</b> Anchor Cable End Swaged Fitting	Grade 5 - Galv. Fitting Per AASHTO M232 (ASTM A153), Stud Per AASHTO M232 or M298 (ASTM A153 or B695), CERT gives a variety of different ASTM numenclatures not listed here	R#15-0601 H#498219 AND H#498221
c2	3/4" [190] Dia. 6x19, 24 1/2" [622] Long <b>IWRC IPS Wire Rope</b>	IPS Galv. Per AASHTO M30 (ASTM A741) Type II Class A	R#15-0601 H#53131485, H#53127002, 10342780, 10207730, 25807
c <sub>3</sub>	115-HT Mechanical Splice - 3/4" [19] Dia.	As Supplied	n/a
c4	Crosby Heavy Duty HT - 3/4" [19] Dia. Cable Thimble	Stock No. 1037773 - Galv. - As Supplied	n/a
c <sub>5</sub>	Crosby G2130 or S2130 Bolt Type Shackle - 1 1/4" [32] Dia. with thin head bolt, nut, and cotter pin, Grade A, Class 3	Stock Nos. 1019597 and 1019604 - As Supplied	n/a
c6	Chicago Hardware Drop Forged Heavy Duty Eye Nut - Drilled and Tapped 1/2" [38] Dia. - UNC 6 [M36x4]	Stock No. 107 - As Supplied	n/a
c7	TLL-50K-PTB Load Cell		n/a
d1	45' [13716] Long Aluminum Pole, Pay Item No. 903A10, JS830003	6063-T4 Aluminum Alloy	Cast#416067
d2	CS-370 Anchor Base, Model No. 10R145153B9T	ASTM B108/B108M-12 VO#228196	H#096-16
d3	Truss, Model No. 1TA1566C60ZA	6063-T6 Aluminum Alloy, Valmont Order#327087-1-1	Cast#915028
d4	1" [25] Dia. UNC, 4" [102] Long Hex <b>Head Bolt</b>	Bolt - ASTM A449 or SAE J429 Grade 5 Galv. Per <b>ASTM</b> A153, Nut - ASTM A563DH Galv. Per ASTM A153	as supplied
d <sub>5</sub>	1" [25] Dia. Hardened Flat Washer	ASTM A153 Galv. Low Carbon Steel	as supplied

Table E-2. Bill of Materials, Test No. [ILT-1](#page-141-0) (Cont'd)

265



Table E-3. Bill of Materials, Test No. [ILT-1](#page-141-0) (Cont'd)

266



Table E-4. Bill of Materials, Test No. [ILT-1](#page-141-0) (Cont'd)

267



Table E-5. Bill of Materials, Test No. [ILT-1](#page-141-0) (Cont'd)





269



Table E-7. Bill of Materials, Test No. [ILT-2](#page-162-0) (Cont'd)

270



Table E-8. Bill of Materials, Test No. [ILT-2](#page-162-0) (Cont'd)

271



Table E-9. Bill of Materials, Test No. [ILT-2](#page-162-0) (Cont'd)

272



Table E-10. Bill of Materials, Test No. [ILT-2](#page-162-0) (Cont'd)


12-ft 6-in. (3.8-m) Long W-Beam MGS Section, Test Nos. [ILT](#page-162-0)-1 and ILT-2

#### GREGORY HIGHWAY PRODUCTS, INC. 4100 13th St. SW Canton, Ohio 44710





All Guardrail and Terminal Sections meets AASHTO M-180, All structural steel meets AASHTO M-183 & M270 All Bolts and Nuts are of Domestic Origin

All material fabricated in accordance with Nebraska Department of Transportation<br>All controlled oxidized/corrosion resistant Guardrail and terminal sections meet ASTM A606, Type 4.

By Andrew Artar, VP of Sales & Marketing Gregory Highway Products, Inc.



12-ft 6-in. (3.8-m) Long W-Beam MGS Section, Test Nos. [ILT](#page-141-0)-1 and [ILT](#page-162-0)-2

#### **GREGORY HIGHWAY PRODUCTS, INC.** 4100 13th St. SW Canton, Ohio 44710



R#15-0602 H#8479

#### MGS 12'6" Guardrail W-Beam QTY 40

June 2015 SMT

**By** 

Bolts compty with ASTM A-307 specifications and are galvanized in accordance with ASTM A-153, unless otherwise stated. Nuts comply with ASTM A-563 specifications and are galvanized in accordance with ASTM A-153, unless otherwise stated. All other galvanized material conforms with ASTM-123 & ASTM-653 All Galvanizing has occurred in the United States All steel used in the manufacture is of Domestic Origin, "Made and Melted in the United States" All Steel used meets Title 23CFR 635.410 - Buy America All Guardrail and Terminal Sections meets AASHTO M-180, All structural steel meets AASHTO M-183 & M270 All Bolls and Nuts are of Domestic Origin

All material fabricated in accordance with Nebraska Department of Transportation

All controlled oxidized/corrosion resistant Guardrail and terminal sections meet ASTM A606, Type 4.

z -lay

Andrew Artar, VP of Sales & Marketing Gregory Highway Products, Inc.

Notary Public, State of Ohio

James P. Dehnke Notary Public, State of Ohio My Commission Expires 10-19-2019

STATE OF OHIO: COONTY OF STARK<br>Sworn to and supscribed before may a Notary Public, by<br>Andrew Mar this 3 Bay of June, 2015

12-ft 6-in. (3.8-m) Long W-Beam MGS Section, Test Nos. [ILT](#page-141-0)-1 and [ILT](#page-162-0)-2

June [29, 2017](#page-0-0) MwRSF Report No. [TRP-03-361-17](#page-0-1)

## Certified *inalysis*



As of: 5/16/12

Trinity Highway Products, LLC 550 East Robb Ave. Lima, OH 45801 Customer: MIDWEST MACH.& SUPPLY CO. P.O. BOX 703 MILFORD, NE 68405

Order Number: 1164746 Customer PO: 2563 BOL Number: 69500 Document #: 1 Shipped To: NE Use State: KS

**RESALE** Project:



6-ft 3-in. (1,905-mm) Long W-Beam MGS Section, Test Nos. [ILT](#page-162-0)-1 and ILT-2

# **HIGHWAY SAFETY CORP**

#### P.O. BOX 358 GLASTONBURY, CT 06033 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE/ANALYSIS REPORT

SOLD TO:

MIDWEST MACHINERY & SUPPLY 974-238th Road

SHIP TO: MIDWEST MACHINERY & SUPPLY 974 238TH ROAD MILFORD,

Milford, NE, USA



ALL STEEL USED IN MANUFACTURING IS MADE AND MELTED IN THE USA, INCLUDING HARDWARE FASTENERS, AND COMPLIES WITH THE BUY AMERICA ACT. ALL COATINGS PROCESSES ARE PERFORMED IN THE USA AND COMPLY WITH THE BUY AMERICA ACT. BOLTS











BOLTS COMPLY WITH ASTM A-307 SPECIFICATIONS AND ARE GALVANIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ASTM A-153, UNLESS OTHERWISE STATED.

NUTS COMPLY WITH ASTM A-563 SPECIFICATIONS AND ARE GALVANIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ASTM A-153, UNLESS OTHERWISE STATED. WASHERS COMPLY WITH ASTMT-436 SPECIFICATION AND/OR F-844 AND ARE GALVANIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ASTMT-2329.<br>3/4" DIA CABLE 6X19 ZINC COATED SWAGED END AISI C-1035 STEEL ANNEALED STUD 1" DIA ASTM449 AASHTO M30, TYPE II BR  $\text{STRENGTH}\,-\,46\,000\,\text{LB}$ 

Keller

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#25 E. O'Connor Lima, OH

š

Customer: MIDWEST MACH.& SUPPLY CO. P.O. BOX 81097

LINCOLN, NE 68501-1097



Sales Order: 1093497 Customer PO: 2030 BOL # 43073 Document# 1

Print Date: 6/30/08 Project: RESALE Shipped To: NE Use State: KS

Trinity Highway Products, LLC<br>Certified By:

Trinity Highway Products, LLC Certificate Of Compliance For Trinity Industries, Inc. \*\* SLOTTED RAIL TERMINAL \*\* NCHRP Report 350 Compliant



DOMIR  $\frac{5}{9}$  otary Public:  $\alpha$ 



6-in. (152-mm) Long BCT Post Sleeve, Test Nos. [ILT-1](#page-141-1) and [ILT-2](#page-162-1)

	Ő					<b>Certified Analysis</b>			
		Trinity Highway Products, LLC							
550 East Robb Ave. Lima, OH 45801							Order Number: 1145215		
							Customer PO: 2441		
Customer: MIDWEST MACH.& SUPPLY CO.							BOL Number: 61905		Asof: 4/15/11
		P.O. BOX 703	Document #: 1						
							Shipped To: NE		
MILFORD, NE 68405				Use State: KS					
Project:		<b>RESALE</b>							
Qty	Part # 206G	Description	Spec	CL		TY Heat Code/Heat # 140734	Yield	TS.	$\mathbb{C}$ Mn Elg $\mathbb{P}$ $\overline{\mathbf{s}}$ 51 Cu Ch Cr. 38.2472 26.4 0.190
	10	T12/6'3/S	$M - 180$ M-180	A A	T $\overline{2}$	139587	64,240 64,220	82,640 81,750	0.740 0.015 0.006 0.010 0.110 0.00 0.060 花鳥花 28.5 0.190 0.720 0.014 0.001 0.020 0.130 0.000 0.060 0.001
			$M - 180$	А	$\overline{2}$	139588	63,850	82,080	24.9 0.200 0.730 0.012 0.004 0.020 0.140 0.000 0.050 0.003
			$M-180$		$\overline{2}$	139589		74,810	27.7 0.190
				Α	$\overline{2}$	140733	55,670		0.720 0.012 0.003 0.020 0.130 0.000 0.050 C.OD. .
	260G 55	T12/25/6'3/S	M-180 $M-180$	А A	$\,2$	139588	59,000 63,850	78,200 82,080	28.1 0.190 0.740 0.015 0.006 0.010 0.120 0.030 0.373 2-701 24.9 0.200 0.730 0.012 0.004 0.020 0.140 0.00 0.050 0.000 -2
			$M-180$	л	$\overline{2}$	139206	61,730	78,580	0.710 0.012 0.004 0.020 0 (40 26.0 0.180 0.000.050 0.201
			$M - 180$	A	$\overline{2}$	139587	64,220	81,750	28.5 0.190 0,720 0.014 0.003 0.020 0.130 0.000 0.060 0.322
			$M-180$	А	$\mathbf{z}$	140733	59,000	78,200	0.740 0.015 0.006 0.010 0.110 28.1 0.190 0.090 0.070 1.321
			$M-180$	A	$\overline{2}$	140734	64,240	82,640	0.000 0.060 0.300 (a) 26.4 0.190 0.740 0.015 0.006 0.010 0.110
	260G		M-180	Α	$\overline{2}$	140734	64,240	82,640	26.4 0.190 0.740 0.015 0.006 0.010 0.110 0.00 0.060 0.035
			M-180	A	$\overline{2}$	139587	64,220	81,750	28.5 0.190 0.720 0.014 0.003 0.020 0.130 0.000.0.063 0.362
			$M-180$	Α	$\overline{\mathbf{2}}$	139588	63,850	82,080	0.730 0.012 0.004 0.020 0.140 0.000 0.050 6.100 24.9 0.200
			M-180	A	$\mathbf{2}$	139589	55,670	74,810	0.000.0.060 0.003 27.7 0.190 0.720 0.012 0.003 0.020 0.130
			$M-180$	A	$\overline{z}$	140733	59,000	78,200	0.740 0.013 0.006 0.010 0.120 0.000 2.070 2.07 28.1 0.190
	703 A 76	25X11,75X16 CAB ANC	$A - 36$			V911470	51,460	71,280	27.5 0.120 0.800 0.015 0.030 0.190 0.300 0.00 0.000 0.03% #
	701A		$A - 36$			N3540A	46,200	65,000	31.0 0.120 0.380 0.010 0.019 0.010 0.180 0.00 0.070 0.07. 4
	729G 24	TS 8X6X3/16X8'-0" SLEEVE	$A - 500$			N4747	63,548	85,106	27.0 0.130 0.610 0.013 0.001 0.040 0.160 0.00 0.160 0.104 0
	749G 24	TS 8X6X3/16X6'-0" SLEEVE	A-500			N4747	63,548	85,106	27.0 0.150 0.610 0.013 0.001 0.040 0.160 0.00 0.160 0.000 0
	7820 22	5/8"X8"X8" BEAR PL/OF	$A - 36$			18486	49,000	78,000	25.1 0.210 0.860 0.021 0.036 0.250 0.260 2.50 0.170 0.0 4 5
	25 974G	T12/TRANS RAIL/6'3"/3'1.5	$M-180$	$\Lambda$	$\overline{\mathbf{2}}$	140735	61,390	80,240	27.1 0.200 0.740 0.014 0.005 0.010 0.120 0.00 0.07E ECCI +

Figure E-11. Anchor Bearing Plate, Test Nos. [ILT-1](#page-141-1) and [ILT-2](#page-162-1)

**Certified Analysis** 





Project RESALE

Trinity Wichsons Products III'



Upna delivery, all materials subject to Trinity Highway Products, LLC Storage Stain Policy No. LG-002.

ALL STEEL USED WAS MELTED AND MANUFACTURED IN USA AND COMPLUSS WITH THE BUY AMERICA ACT.

ALL GUARDRAIL MEETS AASHTO M-180, ALL STRUCTURAL STEEL MEETS ASTM A36

ALL OTHER GALVANIZED MATERIAL CONFORMS WITH ASTM-123.

BOLTS COMPLY WITH ASTM A-307 SPECIFICATIONS AND ARE GALVANIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ASTM A-153, UNLESS OTHERWISE STATED. NUTS COMPLY WITH ASTM A-563 SPECIFICATIONS AND ARE GALVANIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ASTM A-153, UNLESS OTHERWISE STATED.

3/4" DIA CABLE 6X19 ZINC COATED SWAGED END AISI C-1035 STEEL ANNEALED SYUD 1" DIA ASTM 449 AASHTO M30, TYPE E BREAKING STRENGTH-49100LB

Siste of Texas, County of Tarrant. Sworn and subscribes before me this 20th day of June, 2008



Trinity Highway Products, LLC Certified By:

Stelanie ansl.

EYSTONE THREADED PRODUCTS

MATERIAL CERTIFICATION

7600 HUB PARKWAY VALLEY VIEW, OHIO 44125



FULL THREAD STUDS - PLAIN FINISH

4867 Pcs. 1"-8 X 8-3/4"

PART NO. C-1681

 $- - - - - -$  MATERIAL DESCRIPTION ---- - - - -. . . . . Weight Size Length Shape Grade Type  $0.9090 / 0.9090$ 168.00 7,980 LBS. **RND** 1045 CD Heat No. Order No. Rec. Date Code 10348290 0024549 12/10/14 TSW  $- - - - - - - - - - - - -$  SPECIFICATIONS ASTM A108-13 SAE J403  $- - - - - - -$  CHEMICALS - $\,c$ ELEMENTS:  $MN$  $\mathbf{P}$  $\mathbf{S}$ S.T. ΝI CR  $0.0110$  $0.0250$ AMOUNTS 0.4800 0.8400 0.2600 0.0500 0.1000 ELEMENTS: **MO** CU SN  $\mathbf v$ AT. N  $\mathbf{B}$ 0.0070 0.0030  $0.0060$ AMOUNTS 0.0200 0.1500 0.0230 0.0001 ELEMENTS:

ТI NB 0.0010 AMOUNTS  $0.0010$ 

STEEL MELTED AND MANUFACTURED IN THE U.S.A.



State of Ohio County of Cuyahoga

Sworn to and subscribed before me<br>This A LO M of DUC

We certify the foregoing a true and accurate report as represented by our suppliers. smc

**RECEIVED** JAM SSEOR

 $\sim$  100  $\sim$ 

- 21

Figure E-13. BCT Anchor Cable, Test Nos. [ILT-1](#page-141-1) and [ILT-2](#page-162-1)

2014



Quality Technician















**EMAIL CHARTER** 1658 Cold Springs Road **STEFI** CHARTER Saukville, Wisconsin 53080 (262) 268-2400 **CHARTER STEEL TEST REPORT** 1-800-437-8789 A Division of<br>Charter Manufacturing Company, Inc. **Reverse Has Text And Codes** FAX (262) 268-2570 Cust P.O. 089592-04 Customer Part # 600276 Wirerope Works, Inc. **Charter Sales Order** 70034920 100 Maynard St. Heat # 10207730 **Roger Gilliland** Ship Lot # 1078510 Williamsport, PA-17701 1069 M SK CG HRQ 7/32 Grade Kind Attn: Roger Gilliland Process  $HR$ **Finish Size** 7/32 I hereby certify that the material described herein has been manufactured in accordance with the specifications and standards listed<br>below and on the reverse side,and that it satisfies these requirements. Test Results of Heat Lot# 10207730 Lab Code: 7388<br>CHEM C MN SI N CR MO CU SN s ν %Wt  $.70$ .65  $.008$ 800. .23  $.03$ .05 .01 .06 .004 .002 **NB** AL N TI  $,003$  $,0050$  $.001$  $.000$ **CHEM. DEVIATION EXT.-GREEN =** Test Results of Rolling Lot# 1078510<br>Min Value Max Value<br>150.9 155.1 # of Tests Mean Value 153.0 **TENSILE TENSILE LAB = 0358-02** 2 **REDUCTION OF AREA** ž 52 55 54 RA LAB = 0358-02 **ROD SIZE** 10 .217  $.221$ .219 **ROD OUT OF ROUND<br>REDUCTION RATIO = 803:1** 3 .003 .004 .004 **Specifications:** Manufactured per Charter Steel Quality Manual Rev 9,08-01-09 Meets customer specifications with any applicable Charter Steel exceptions for the following customer documents: Customer Document = 6000 Revision = 8 Dated = 12-AUG-04 **Additional Comments:** Melted and Manufactured in the United States of America



 $\bar{\mathcal{A}}$ 

Figure E-21. 34-in. Diameter Wire Rope, Test Nos. [ILT-1](#page-141-1) and [ILT-2](#page-162-1)

 $\mathcal{L}_{\rm{max}}$ 



Figure E-22. Aluminum Pole, Test No. [ILT-1](#page-141-1)





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## Certificate Of Conformance

Certificate# 653171-1 Date: 23-Dec-2015 PO: 93596



We hereby certify that the material shipped and covered by this document. Has been inspected in accordance with the extruded tube dimensional requirements of (Aluminum Standards and Data 2013), as published by the Aluminum Association and other applicable requirements as stated on the customer order, and has been found to comply. The material meets the compositional limits for the alloy as indicated, and has been processed to comply with the temper requirements for the alloy.

We Hereby certify to the best of our knowledge and beleif the foregoing data

**Eric Zebro** 

Authorized Signature

Figure E-24. Truss, Test No. [ILT-1](#page-141-1)



Figure E-25. %-in. (16-mm) Dia. UNC, 14-in. (356-mm) Long Guardrail Bolt and Nut, Test Nos. [ILT-1](#page-141-1) and [ILT-2](#page-162-1)

LUAU **CHARTER** 1658 Cold Springs Road Saukville, Wisconsin 53080 **STEEL** CHARTER STEEL (262) 268-2400 1-800-437-8789 A Division of<br>Charter Manufacturing Company, Inc. Fax (262) 268-2570 **CHARTER STEEL TEST REPORT** Melted in USA Manufactured in USA Cust P.O. 85523 Customer Part # 10005 Charter Sales Order 70058737 Heat # 351040 4310508 Ship Lot # Telefast Industries Inc. 1018 R AK FG RHQ 1-5/32 Grade 777 West Bagley Road Process **HRCC** Berea, OH-44017 Finish Size  $1 - 5/32$ Kind Attn : Jeff Leisinger Ship date 21-NOV-14 I hereby certify that the material described herein has been manufactured in accordance with the specifications and standards listed below and that it satisfies these requirements. The recording of false, fictitious and fraudulent statements or entries on this document may be punishable as a felony under federal statute. Test results of Heat Lot # 10351040 Lab Code: 7388<br>CHEM  $\frac{C}{16}$ **MN** SI  $\frac{NI}{.05}$  $C$ R<br>.08 MO cu SN P s  $%Wt$  $.64$  $.007$  $.007$  $090.$  $.01$  $.08$  $.007$  $.001$ NB AL. N B  $\mathsf T\mathsf I$ .023 .0060  $.0001$  $.001$  $.001$ MACRO ETCH SAMPLE TYPE=R

Figure E-26. <sup>5</sup>/<sub>8</sub>-in. (16-mm) Dia. UNC, 1.25-in. (32-mm) Long Guardrail Bolt and Nut, Test Nos. [ILT-1](#page-141-1) and [ILT-2](#page-162-1)

**MACRO ETCH CENTER=1** 

**MACRO ETCH RANDOM=1** 

MACRO ETCH SURFACE=1



Date 11/07/2014

**VERSAILLES IN 47042** 



# **Performance Test Results**



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ANAGER QUALI **TERRY ELKINS** 

Figure E-27. <sup>5</sup>/<sub>8</sub>-in. (16-mm) Dia. UNC, 1.25-in. (32-mm) Long Guardrail Bolt and Nut, Test Nos. [ILT-1](#page-141-1) and [ILT-2](#page-162-1)



Figure E-28. <sup>5</sup>/<sub>8</sub>-in. (16-mm) Dia. UNC, 10-in. (254-mm) Long Hex Head Bolt and Nut, Test Nos. [ILT-1](#page-141-1) and [ILT-2](#page-162-1)



R#16-0217 **BCT Hex Nuts** December 2015 SMT Fastenal part#36713 Control# 210101523

## **CERTIFICATE OF CONFORMANCE**

### DESCRIPTION OF MATERIAL AND SPECIFICATIONS



22979 Stelfast Parkway Strongsville, Ohio 44149

Part No: AFH2G0625C

- Cust Part No: 36713
- Quantity (PCS): 1200
- Description: 5/8-11 Fin Hx Nut Gr2 HDG/TOS 0.020
- Specification: SAE J995(99) - GRADE 2 / ANSI B18.2.2
- Stelfast I.D. NO: 595689-O201087
- 210101523 **Customer PO:**
- Warehouse: DAL.

The data in this report is a true representation of the information provided by the material supplier certifying that the product meets the mechanical and material requirements of the listed specification. This certificate applies to the product shown on this document, as supplied by STELFAST INC. Alterations to the product by our customer or a third party shall render this certificate void.

This document may only be reproduced unaltered and only for certifying the same or lesser quantity of the product specified herein. Reproduction or alteration of this document for any other purpose is prohibited.

Stelfast certifies parts to the above description. The customer part number is only for reference purposes.

**David Biss** 

**Quality Manager** 

Figure E-29. <sup>5</sup>/<sub>8</sub>-in. (16-mm) Dia. UNC, 1<sup>1</sup>/2-in. (38-mm) Long Hex Head Bolt and Nut, Test Nos. [ILT-1](#page-141-1) and [ILT-2](#page-162-1)



⅝-in. (16-mm) Dia. UNC, 1½-in. (38-mm) Long Hex Head Bolt and Nut, Test Nos. [ILT-1](#page-141-1) and [ILT-2](#page-162-1)

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7/8-in. (22-mm) Dia. UNC, 7½-in. (191-mm) Long Hex Head Bolt and Nut, Test Nos. [ILT-1](#page-141-1) and [ILT-2](#page-162-1)

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7/8-in. (22-mm) Dia. UNC, 7½-in. (191-mm) Long Hex Head Bolt and Nut, Test Nos. [ILT-1](#page-141-1) and [ILT-2](#page-162-1)



Figure E-33. %-in. (16-mm) Dia. UNC, 10-in. (254-mm) Long Hex Head Bolt and Nut, Test Nos. [ILT-1](#page-141-1) and [ILT-2](#page-162-1)



Figure E-34. <sup>7</sup>/<sub>8</sub>-in. (22-mm) Dia. Plain Round Washer, Test Nos. [ILT-1](#page-141-1) and [ILT-2](#page-162-1)



HECHANICAL FASTENER<br>CERTIFICATE HO. AZLA 0139.01<br>EXPIRATION DATE 01/31/14

Jechn W. Ferguseen

## -R#17-75 IL MGS Tollway F1554 Gr. 105 Anchor Bolts H#5802372003 L#36429

 $22101$ 

r×

DOC ID 7.5.3.1F Rev B 4/6/12 Date created 8/8/16

### **MATERIAL TEST REPORT**




**ACCREDITED** 

**MECHANICAL FASTENER<br>CERTIFICATE NO. A2LA 0139.01<br>EXPIRATION DATE 01/31/16** 

NUCOR FASTENER<br>A DIVISION OF NUCOR CORPORATION Ferriser  $\prime$  W. JOHN W. FERGUSON<br>QUALITY ASSURANCE SUPERVISOR

Figure E-37. 1-in. (25-mm) Dia. UNC Hex Head Nut, Test Nos. [ILT-1](#page-141-0) and [ILT-2](#page-162-0)

### **INSPECTION CERTIFICATE**





### DIMENSIONS IN inch



**INSPECTED BY** 

Yu Tain Lin

CERTIFIED BY

Jing Yeh Tsao

Figure E-38. 1-in. (25-mm) Dia. Plain Round Washer, Test Nos. [ILT-1](#page-141-0) and [ILT-2](#page-162-0)



¾-in. (19-mm) Dia. Epoxy-Coated Rebar, Item h6, Test Nos. [ILT-1](#page-141-0) and [ILT-2](#page-162-0)



¾-in. (19-mm) Dia. Epoxy-Coated Rebar, Item h6, Test Nos. [ILT-1](#page-141-0) and [ILT-2](#page-162-0)



\* - Indicates Bend Test on this Bar

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¾-in. (19-mm) Dia. Epoxy-Coated Rebar, Item h6, Test Nos. [ILT-1](#page-141-0) and [ILT-2](#page-162-0)



¾-in. (19-mm) Dia. Epoxy-Coated Rebar, Item h6, Test Nos. [ILT-1](#page-141-0) and [ILT-2](#page-162-0)



Figure E-43. Pole Concrete Foundation, Test Nos. [ILT-1](#page-141-0) and [ILT-2](#page-162-0)



PONum



CRYSTAL

We hereby certify that the material shipped and covered by this document. Has been inspected in accordance with the extruded tube dimensional requirements of (Aluminum Standards and Data 2013), as published by the Aluminum Association and other applicable requirements as stated on the customer order, and has been found to comply. The material meets the compositional limits for the alloy as indicated, and has been processed to comply with the temper requirements for the alloy.

We Hereby certify to the best of our knowledge and beleif the foregoing data

### Eric Zebro

Authorized Signature

Figure E-45. Truss, Test No. [ILT-2](#page-162-0)

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# **Appendix F. Vehicle Center of Gravity Determination**

Test: ILT-1					Dodge Ram 1500 quadcab				
	<b>Vehicle CG Determination</b>								
			Weight	Vertical	<b>Vertical M</b>				
<b>VEHICLE</b>	Equipment		(Ib.)	CG (in.)	$(lb-in.)$				
$\ddot{}$	Unbalasted Truck (Curb)		4961		28.21781 139988.56				
$\ddot{}$	Hub		19		15.65625 297.46875				
$\ddot{}$		Brake activation cylinder & frame	7	27.25	190.75				
$\ddagger$		Pneumatic tank (Nitrogen)	27	27.5	742.5				
$\pm$	Strobe/Brake Battery		5	27	135				
$\pm$	<b>Brake Reciever/Wires</b>		5	52.5	262.5				
$\ddag$	CG Plate including DAS		42	30.25	1270.5				
	<b>Battery</b>		$-47$	40	$-1880$				
	Oil		$-5$	20	$-100$				
	<b>Interior</b>		$-78$	34	$-2652$				
	Fuel		$-164$	18.5	$-3034$				
	Coolant		$-10$	37	$-370$				
	Washer fluid		$-2$	32	-64				
$\ddot{}$	<b>Water Ballast</b>		132	18.5	2442				
$\ddot{}$	<b>Onboard Battery</b>		14	25.75	360.5				
	<b>Backseat</b>		76	48	3648				
		Note: (+) is added equipment to vehicle, (-) is removed equipment from vehicle Estimated Total Weight (lb.) Vertical CG Location (in.) 28.34961	4982		141237.78				
		139.875							
		2270P MASH Targets		<b>Test Inertial</b>		<b>Difference</b>			
	Test Inertial Weight (lb.)	$5000 \pm 110$		5000					
		$63 \pm 4$		61.01					
		<b>NA</b>		$-0.70061$					
Wheel Base (in.) <b>Center of Gravity</b> Longitudinal CG (in.) Lateral CG (in.) Vertical CG (in.)		28 or greater		28.35		0.0 $-1.98653$ <b>NA</b> 0.34961			
		Note: Long. CG is measured from front axle of test vehicle Note: Lateral CG measured from centerline - positive to vehicle right (passenger) side							
	<b>CURB WEIGHT (Ib.)</b>				<b>TEST INERTIAL WEIGHT (Ib.)</b>				
		Left Right			Left	Right			
	Front	1439 1390		Front	1429	1390			
	Rear	1094 1038		Rear	1122				
	<b>FRONT</b>	2829 lb.		<b>FRONT</b>	2819 lb.	1059			
	<b>REAR</b>	2132 lb.		<b>REAR</b>	2181 lb.				

Figure F-1. Vehicle Mass Distribution, Test No. [ILT-1](#page-141-0)



# **Appendix G. Static Soil Tests**



Figure G-1. Soil Strength, Initial Calibration Tests





# **Appendix H. Vehicle Deformation Records**

#### VEHICLE PRE/POST CRUSH FLOORPAN - SET 1







Figure H-1. Floorpan Deformation Data - Set 1, Test No. [ILT-1](#page-141-0)







Figure H-2. Floorpan Deformation Data - Set 2, Test No. [ILT-1](#page-141-0)

#### VEHICLE PRE/POST CRUSH INTERIOR CRUSH - SET 1







Figure H-3. Occupant Compartment Deformation Data - Set 1, Test No. [ILT-1](#page-141-0)

#### VEHICLE PRE/POST CRUSH INTERIOR CRUSH - SET 2







Figure H-4. Occupant Compartment Deformation Data – Set 2, Test No. [ILT-1](#page-141-0)



Exterior Vehicle Crush (NASS) - Front, Test No. [ILT-1](#page-141-0)



Exterior Vehicle Crush (NASS) - Side, Test No. [ILT-1](#page-141-0)





Figure H-7. Floorpan Deformation Data - Set 1, Test No. [ILT-2](#page-162-0)



Figure H-8. Floorpan Deformation Data – Set 2, Test No. [ILT-2](#page-162-0)

VEHICLE PRE/POST CRUSH INTERIOR CRUSH - SET 1

	TEST:	ILT-2								
	VEHICLE: Hyundai		Accent							
		X	Y	Z	$\chi$	Y'	Z	ΔX	ΔY	$\Delta Z$
	<b>POINT</b>	(in.)	(in.)	(in.)	(in.)	(in.)	(in.)	(in.)	(in.)	(in.)
	1	15.112	$-22.508$	22.941	15.007	$-22.222$	22.741	$-0.105$	0.287	$-0.200$
	$\overline{2}$	11.815	$-13.267$	26.595	11.728	$-12.989$	26.548	$-0.087$	0.278	$-0.047$
<b>DASH</b>	3	13.284	1.157	23.621	13.096	1.423	23.616	$-0.188$	0.266	$-0.005$
	4	13.195	$-22.365$	12.717	13.139	$-22.133$	12.736	$-0.055$	0.232	0.019
	5	12.328	$-12.971$	12.566	12.203	$-12.699$	12.532	$-0.125$	0.272	$-0.034$
	6	8.934	0.226	12.779	8.721	0.469	12.789	$-0.212$	0.244	0.011
	7	21.643	$-26.701$	5.671	21.624	$-26.434$	5.563	$-0.019$	0.267	$-0.108$
PANEL SIDE	8	18.045	$-26.725$	3.034	18.069	$-26.512$	2.992	0.024	0.213	$-0.042$
	9	21.212	$-26.728$	0.587	21.283	$-26.536$	0.461	0.071	0.192	$-0.126$
	10	$-13.724$	$-27.513$	25.568	$-13.570$	$-27.832$	25.629	0.153	$-0.320$	0.061
SIDE	11	0.810	$-27.382$	23.464	0.837	$-27.445$	23.420	0.027	$-0.064$	$-0.044$
<b>DOOR</b>	12	11.521	$-27.449$	21.912	11.442	$-27.219$	21.871	$-0.079$	0.230	$-0.041$
<b>IMPACT</b>	13	$-11.248$	$-27.821$	6.326	$-11.115$	$-28.027$	6.456	0.132	$-0.206$	0.130
	14	$-0.324$	$-28.251$	2.537	$-0.359$	$-28.441$	2.657	$-0.034$	$-0.190$	0.120
	15	9.050	$-27.872$	1.915	8.982	$-28.044$	1.869	$-0.068$	$-0.172$	$-0.046$
	1	2.457	$-17.628$	39.865	2.410	$-17.436$	39.936	$-0.047$	0.192	0.071
	$\overline{\mathbf{c}}$	3.094	$-13.104$	40.022	3.155	$-12.904$	40.018	0.061	0.200	$-0.004$
<b>ROOF</b>	3	3.440	$-9.421$	40.133	3.520	$-9.286$	40.095	0.079	0.135	$-0.039$
	4	3.892	$-4.209$	40.122	3.794	$-4.005$	40.148	$-0.098$	0.204	0.025
	5	3.967	0.314	40.105	3.863	0.389	40.116	$-0.104$	0.075	0.011
	6	$-4.374$	$-17.091$	42.882	$-4.155$	$-16.980$	42.884	0.219	0.111	0.002
	$\overline{7}$	$-3.516$	$-13.173$	43.005	$-3.398$	$-13.168$	43.007	0.118	0.006	0.001
	8	$-3.047$	$-8.878$	43.144	$-3.029$	$-8.809$	43.163	0.018	0.068	0.020
	9	$-2.826$	$-3.946$	43.242	$-2.869$	$-3.847$	43.268	$-0.043$	0.099	0.027
	10	$-2.611$	$-0.311$	43.204	$-2.729$	$-0.167$	43.247	$-0.118$	0.144	0.043
	11	$-10.764$	$-16.529$	44.338	$-10.548$	$-16.591$	44.370	0.216	$-0.061$	0.032
	12	$-10.514$	$-13.217$	44.580	$-10.434$	$-13.137$	44.647	0.080	0.080	0.068
	13	$-10.456$	$-9.382$	44.809	$-10.329$	$-9.401$	44.853	0.127	$-0.019$	0.044
	14	$-10.137$	$-4.241$	44.934	$-10.080$	$-4.097$	44.980	0.057	0.144	0.046
	15	$-10.459$	$-0.731$	45.027	$-10.414$	$-0.623$	45.070	0.045	0.108	0.042



Figure H-9. Occupant Compartment Deformation Data – Set 1, Test No. [ILT-2](#page-162-0)

VEHICLE PRE/POST CRUSH INTERIOR CRUSH - SET 2

	TEST:	ILT-2								
	VEHICLE: Hyundai		Accent							
		X	Y	Z	$\chi$	Y'	Z	ΔX	ΔY	$\Delta Z$
	<b>POINT</b>	(in.)	(in.)	(in.)	(in.)	(in.)	(in.)	(in.)	(in.)	(in.)
	1	28.720	$-25.270$	24.940	28.717	$-24.865$	24.927	$-0.003$	0.404	$-0.014$
	$\overline{2}$	25.032	$-16.114$	28.465	24.841	$-15.683$	28.288	$-0.191$	0.432	$-0.177$
<b>DASH</b>	3	26.548	$-1.700$	25.880	26.445	$-1.312$	25.858	$-0.103$	0.388	$-0.022$
	4	27.816	$-25.080$	14.727	27.818	$-24.719$	14.727	0.001	0.361	0.000
	5	26.876	$-15.686$	14.494	26.823	$-15.278$	14.547	$-0.053$	0.409	0.053
	6	23.251	$-2.557$	14.569	23.207	$-2.123$	14.584	$-0.044$	0.434	0.015
SIDE PANEL	7	37.098	$-29.197$	8.392	37.067	$-28.817$	8.413	$-0.031$	0.380	0.021
	8	33.774	$-29.247$	5.506	33.714	$-28.895$	5.528	$-0.061$	0.352	0.022
	9	37.186	$-29.100$	3.461	37.163	$-28.767$	3.429	$-0.023$	0.333	$-0.032$
	10	$-0.040$	$-30.739$	24.690	0.012	$-30.762$	24.725	0.052	$-0.023$	0.035
IMPACT SIDE	11	14.526	$-30.385$	24.000	14.466	$-30.217$	24.034	$-0.060$	0.168	0.034
	12	25.274	$-30.277$	23.441	25.324	$-29.890$	23.475	0.050	0.387	0.034
<b>DOOR</b>	13	4.339	$-30.816$	5.745	4.453	$-30.700$	5.838	0.114	0.116	0.092
	14	15.589	$-31.043$	3.087	15.558	$-30.977$	3.154	$-0.031$	0.066	0.067
	15	24.922	$-30.528$	3.396	24.909	$-30.502$	3.358	$-0.012$	0.026	$-0.038$
	1	14.242	$-20.789$	40.655	14.319	$-20.513$	40.657	0.077	0.275	0.003
	$\overline{\mathbf{c}}$	14.996	$-16.231$	40.852	14.972	$-15.941$	40.879	$-0.024$	0.291	0.027
	3	15.190	$-12.512$	41.064	15.314	$-12.185$	41.036	0.124	0.327	$-0.028$
	4	15.482	$-7.453$	41.169	15.546	$-7.026$	41.166	0.064	0.426	$-0.003$
<b>ROOF</b>	$\sqrt{5}$	15.478	$-2.885$	41.211	15.546	$-2.540$	41.195	0.068	0.345	$-0.016$
	6	7.400	$-20.359$	42.924	7.309	$-20.042$	42.962	$-0.090$	0.317	0.038
	$\overline{7}$	8.094	$-16.498$	43.179	8.078	$-16.190$	43.200	$-0.016$	0.308	0.021
	8	8.477	$-12.128$	43.405	8.446	$-11.895$	43.428	$-0.031$	0.233	0.023
	9	8.573	$-7.247$	43.571	8.530	$-6.889$	43.608	$-0.043$	0.359	0.037
	10	8.688	$-3.589$	43.599	8.657	$-3.174$	43.639	$-0.031$	0.415	0.040
	11	0.809	$-19.970$	43.760	0.924	$-19.644$	43.748	0.116	0.327	$-0.012$
	12	0.933	$-16.552$	44.064	0.937	$-16.262$	44.061	0.004	0.290	$-0.003$
	13	0.974	$-12.857$	44.317	0.969	$-12.520$	44.324	$-0.005$	0.336	0.007
	14	1.191	$-7.562$	44.519	1.137	$-7.308$	44.537	$-0.054$	0.253	0.018
	15	0.831	$-4.112$	44.608	0.757	$-3.758$	44.631	$-0.074$	0.354	0.023



Figure H-10. Occupant Compartment Deformation Data - Set 2, Test No. [ILT-2](#page-162-0)



Figure H-11. Exterior Vehicle Crush (NASS) - Front, Test No. [ILT-2](#page-162-0)



Exterior Vehicle Crush (NASS) - Side, Test No. [ILT-2](#page-162-0)

**Appendix I. Accelerometer and Rate Transducer Data Analysis Test No. [ILT-1](#page-141-0)**



10-ms Average Longitudinal Deceleration (SLICE-1), Test No. [ILT](#page-141-1)-1



Longitudinal Change in Velocity (SLICE-1), Test No. [ILT](#page-141-1)-1



Longitudinal Change in Displacement (SLICE-1), Test No. [ILT](#page-141-1)-1



10-ms Average Lateral Deceleration (SLICE-1), Test No. [ILT](#page-141-1)-1



Lateral Change in Velocity (SLICE-1), Test No. [ILT](#page-141-1)-1



Lateral Change in Displacement (SLICE-1), Test No. [ILT](#page-141-1)-1


Figure I-7. Vehicle Angular Displacements (SLICE-1), Test No. [ILT-1](#page-141-0)



Acceleration Severity Index (SLICE-1), Test No. [ILT](#page-141-0)-1



10-ms Average Longitudinal Deceleration (SLICE-2), Test No. [ILT](#page-141-0)-1



Longitudinal Change in Velocity (SLICE-2), Test No. [ILT](#page-141-0)-1



Longitudinal Change in Displacement (SLICE-2), Test No. [ILT](#page-141-0)-1



10-ms Average Lateral Deceleration (SLICE-2), Test No. [ILT](#page-141-0)-1



Lateral Change in Velocity (SLICE-2), Test No. [ILT](#page-141-0)-1



Lateral Change in Displacement (SLICE-2), Test No. [ILT](#page-141-0)-1



Figure I-15. Vehicle Angular Displacements (SLICE-2), Test No. [ILT-1](#page-141-0)



Acceleration Severity Index (SLICE-2), Test No. [ILT](#page-141-0)-1

**Appendix J. Accelerometer and Rate Transducer Data Analysis Test No. [ILT-2](#page-162-0)**



10-ms Average Longitudinal Deceleration (SLICE-1), Test No. [ILT](#page-162-1)-2



Longitudinal Change in Velocity (SLICE-1), Test No. [ILT](#page-162-1)-2



Longitudinal Occupant Displacement (SLICE-1), Test No. [ILT](#page-162-1)-2



10-ms Average Lateral Deceleration (SLICE-1), Test No. [ILT](#page-162-1)-2



Lateral Change in Velocity (SLICE-1), Test No. [ILT](#page-162-1)-2



Lateral Change in Displacement (SLICE-1), Test No. [ILT](#page-162-1)-2



Figure J-7. Vehicle Angular Displacements (SLICE-1), Test No. [ILT-2](#page-162-1)

363



Acceleration Severity Index (SLICE-1), Test No. [ILT](#page-162-1)-2

364



10 -ms Average Longitudinal Deceleration (SLICE -2), Test No. [ILT](#page-162-1) - 2



Longitudinal Change in Velocity (SLICE -2), Test No. [ILT](#page-162-1) - 2



Longitudinal Change in Displacement (SLICE -2), Test No. [ILT](#page-162-1) - 2



10-ms Average Lateral Deceleration (SLICE-2), Test No. [ILT](#page-162-1)-2



Lateral Change in Velocity (SLICE-2), Test No. [ILT](#page-162-1)-2



Lateral Occupant Displacement (SLICE-2), Test No. [ILT](#page-162-1)-2



Figure J-15. Vehicle Angular Displacements (SLICE-2), Test No. [ILT-2](#page-162-1)



Acceleration Severity Index (SLICE -2), Test No. [ILT](#page-162-1) - 2

## **Appendix K. Load Cell Data**



Figure K-1. Load Cell Data, Downstream Anchorage System, Test No. [ILT-1](#page-141-1)



Figure K-2. Load Cell Data, Upstream Anchorage System, Test No. [ILT-1](#page-141-1)



Figure K-3. Load Cell Data, Downstream Anchorage System, Test No. [ILT-2](#page-162-0)



Figure K-4. Load Cell Data, Upstream Anchorage System, Test No. [ILT-2](#page-162-0)

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